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Abstract
This dissertation examines the equity issuance 
process from an international perspective. Specifically/ 
it examines the underpricing, long run stock price 
performance and operating performance of Mexican ADR IPOs 
compared to that of domestic Mexican IPOs. This study
also examines the share price response to global seasoned
equity offerings by Mexican firms. Mexican IPOs and
global seasoned equity issues by Mexican firms are further 
distinguished based on the nature of the foreign tranche, 
that is whether it is a Level III (public offering) or a 
144A (private placement) issue. This distinction is 
maintained throughout the study owing to the differences 
and the unique nature of these markets.
ADR IPOs and ADR seasoned equity offerings are 
generally undertaken by large, well established Mexican 
firms and underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In 
addition, ADR issues incur substantial costs such as 
listing fees, increased disclosure of information, and 
costs incurred in complying with SEC rules and
regulations. There are also benefits of an international 
listing such as increased investor recognition, an 
enlarged investor base and a higher degree of monitoring 
and certification.
iv
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This study uses data provided by the Mexican stock 
exchange over the period of 1989 to 1996 and finds that 
ADR IPOs of Mexican firms show modest underpricing and no 
long run stock price underperformance or decline in 
operating performance subsequent to the issue, in contrast 
to the findings for IPOs in the U.S. These findings are 
consistent with the well-established nature of Mexican 
firms that go public as well as the institutional features 
of ADRs. Global seasoned equity offerings and Mexican 
firm commitment domestic issues show the negative share 
price response usually associated with seasoned equity 
offerings in the United States.
v
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Chapter 1: Introduction
With the continuing globalization of the financial 
world, there has been increased interest in American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and foreign securities in 
general.1 The dramatic increase in the trading of foreign 
stocks in the United States (US) provides a good indication 
of this sustained trend in the globalization of investing. In 
June 1993, ADRs accounted for about 7.5 percent of the nearly 
$2.25 trillion worth of shares traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (Marray, 1994) . More specifically, in 1993 the 
volume of trading for ADRs on US exchanges totaled 6.3 
billion certificates, a 47 percent increase over 1992 and the 
dollar volume was $200 billion, a 60 percent increase over 
1992 (Ramos, 1994).
In light of the above, it is not surprising that 
interest in emerging markets has grown considerably in the 
last few years.2 The expansion of capital markets in the 
emerging economies is the result of a simple correlation of 
needs. As many countries in Latin America, Asia and to a 
lesser degree in central and eastern Europe, have shifted
Only Canadian firms maintain a direct ordinary listing in the US, 
which must be on a US exchange.The International Finance Corporation (IFC) defines a country as 
emerging if the per capita income of the country is less than $7,000. However, by this definition some Asian and African countries such as Singapore, South Africa and Israel would be classified as developed, 
even though most investors regard them as emerging markets (Hale, 
1994) . Usually the term emerging markets refers more to the 
development stage of the stock market. Generally, these markets are 
characterized by "small market capitalization, high market volatility, economic and political instability, dramatic currency swings, 
illiquidity and high transaction costs, rapid and unpredictable growth, constant change, and a limited amount of reliable information 
(Peavy et al., 1994)." In common parlance, it is simply a reflection of the pace of the economic development.
1
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from quasi-state-run economies to market based economies, 
there has been a need for investment capital to keep pace 
with their development needs. From the viewpoint of US 
investors, emerging market investments have become 
increasingly attractive because of their high potential 
returns and diversification benefits. The attractive but 
volatile returns of emerging markets can be seen by looking 
at countries like Argentina and Mexico, where between 1989 
and 1993 the annual returns on common stocks have ranged 
from -47.0 percent to 260.9 percent and 8.3 percent to 64.6 
percent, respectively (Lyle, 1993).
Despite the increasing internationalization of capital 
markets and the accompanying increased interest in US 
ownership of foreign stocks, there have been relatively few 
studies of emerging markets or the effects of international 
listing on firm valuation in the home markets, mainly due 
to lack of availability of data. This study focuses on 
examining the equity issuance process, both for Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) and Seasoned Equity Offerings 
(SEOs), in the context of international equity offerings. 
An international equity offering refers to the special case 
of a domestic offering and an international offering (a US 
offering in the context of the present study), 
concurrently. The motivations for the study are threefold.
Firstly, a majority of the theoretical models and 
explanations of the issues related to the equity issuance 
process (such as IPO underpricing, long run stock price and
2
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operating performance, and announcement effects of seasoned 
equity offering) rely heavily on the US institutional and 
regulatory framework. Clearly then, there is need for 
further international research to assess the robustness of 
current theoretical models as well as to question the 
validity of extending stylized facts (such as IPO 
underpricing, long run performance, intraday pattern of 
trading volume, volatility etc.) over to stock markets 
characterized as emerging, which by definition imply 
significant differences vis-a-via well developed US capital 
markets. This discussion is not meant to suggest that the 
above mentioned stylized facts are isolated US phenomenon 
but rather that to assess whether the extent and magnitude 
of these well documented phenomena are country and/or 
sample period specific.
The following examples illustrate this point. In 
contrast to the well documented average first day return of 
about 15 percent for IPOs in the US and United Kingdom 
(countries with heavy IPO activity), initial returns have 
varied from 78.5 percent to 166.6 percent for Brazil and 
Malaysia, respectively (Ritter (1987), Aggarwal et al., 
(1993), Dawson (1987)). Another illustration of the 
inadequacy or the lack of applicability of certain models 
as explanations of emerging markets can be seen by 
considering the litigation hypothesis (Hensler (1996), 
Hughes and Thakor (1992)) that has been put forth as an 
explanation for the observed underpricing of IPOs. Even
3
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though studies by Tinic (1988) and Hensler (1996) among 
others find empirical support for the litigation hypothesis 
in the context of the US it is questionable whether the 
same hypothesis can be used to explain underpricing in 
Mexico or other Latin American countries where there is 
little history or probability of legal retribution being 
imposed on the parties involved in the issuance of IPOs 
(Hensler, Herrera and Lockwood (1995)).
Secondly, it is only recently that IPOs or equity 
issuance in general have made a significant appearance in 
Latin America or much of the emerging economies, unlike the 
US and the UK which have had active equity markets (both 
primary as well as secondary) for a long time. It is only 
since the 1980s that the spread of liberal economic ideas, 
coupled with the economic stalemate and bureaucratic inertia 
of state directed investment, has led to major reforms and 
privatization programs in many developing countries. This is 
a departure from the long standing tradition of the state 
acting as a macro-entrepreneur with its emphasis on sovereign 
borrowing rather than direct funding of firms (Glen and 
Pinto,(1994)).
In the context of Mexico, the focus of the present 
study, it was only in the late 1980's that there was a shift 
in government policy leading to the privatization of banks 
and many government owned industries, spurring the private 
sector (Mexican economic background is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 2) . Consequently, there have been few
4
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published studies of the Bolsa Mexicans de Valores (the 
official name of the Mexican stock exchange), underscoring 
the need for further research. This lack of research is also 
partly due to lack of availability of data. In fact, the 
earliest data maintained by Bolsa de Valores on a 
computerized basis dates only from 1989. Furthermore, the 
Bolsa de Valores is of particular interest given its size and 
status as one of the leading emerging markets, the increasing 
interest of international investors, and the recently enacted 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
Thirdly, this study reexamines the going public 
process as well as seasoned equity issuance in the context 
of globalization, a perspective that is both timely as well 
as relatively unexplored. Much of the extant literature on 
IPOs and seasoned equity issuance is based on events 
occurring only in the home country of the issuing firm 
without the presence of a foreign tranche. Yet there is a 
growing trend in both the IPO and seasoned equity process 
toward internationalization, that is, a domestic equity 
offering that includes an international offering (outside 
the home country), concurrently. In the case of a Mexican 
firm going public, the company has the choice of making a 
purely domestic offering or simultaneously raising capital 
outside the home jurisdiction by conducting an American 
Depositary Receipts (ADR) offering. Further, the firm has 
a choice of making a 144A (private placement) offering or a 
Level III sponsored ADR offering, which differ in terms of
5
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exchange listing and trading venue, requirements to comply 
with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 
the level of continuing disclosure, and the firm's ability 
to raise capital subsequently (the different ADR programs 
are discussed in chapter 3) .
Similarly, a seasoned equity issuance could be a 
rights offering, a purely domestic offering, or an ADR 
offering. Moreover, a firm has a choice of making a Level 
II ADR offering (which is simply an exchange listing but 
does not permit any capital raising activity) prior to 
upgrading to a Level III offering at the time of the 
seasoned equity issuance. The integration of markets 
implied by the above events raises interesting and 
important questions which this study hopes to answer. What 
type of firms are more likely to engage in international 
equity offerings? Can any firm characteristics be 
identified that increase the likelihood or influence a 
company's decision to issue equity abroad? Is there a 
separating equilibrium or pooling equilibrium in terms of 
firm quality with respect to the place of offering 
(domestic or global) and the type of international offering 
(Level III sponsored program versus 144A private placement 
issue) ? Are there differences in underpricing, aftermarket 
stock price and operating performance of these companies, 
and are the empirical results consistent with the notion of 
a self selection process.
6
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Debates over the degree of market fragmentation/ 
integration as well as over the costs and benefits of a 
cross-border listing (including 144A private placement) 
make the potential impact of international listing on 
various stock characteristics (such as valuation effects, 
risk, return, volatility, bid-ask spread, liquidity, 
information flow, and the price discovery process etc.) 
controversial issues amongst researchers (Lau et al. 1994, 
Cheung and Lee 1995) . Segmentation of markets due to 
information constraints, differences in tax structures, or 
regulatory barriers create incentives for firms to adopt 
policies that mitigate associated negative effects. 
Foerster and Karolyi (1996) divide investment barriers into 
direct and indirect costs. Direct costs comprise higher 
transaction costs, restrictions on foreign ownership of 
capital, and tax related issues such as withholding taxes, 
capital gains tax etc. Indirect costs arise from higher 
monitoring costs due to less stringent disclosure 
environment or a lack of information on securities.
Errunza and Losq, (1985) develop an asset pricing 
model in terms of a two country mildly segmented market 
scenario. In their model, country 1 securities can be 
purchased by investors in either country 1 or country 2. 
However, country 2 securities are restricted and can only 
be purchased by investors in country 2. Their results show 
that country 2 securities would command a positive super 
risk premium unlike country 1 securities that would be
7
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priced as if markets were completely integrated. An 
international listing for a country 2 security would lead 
to a lower equilibrium expected return as the super risk 
premium would disappear (due to, among other reasons, lower 
transaction costs, lower information costs from more 
disclosure of information as well as more production of 
information from increased analyst coverage, and improved 
liquidity resulting from multiple market makers leading to 
a lower bid-ask spread). This is consistent with Merton's 
(1987) investor recognition hypothesis and Amihud and 
Mendelson's (1986) liquidity hypothesis. Stapleton and 
Subrahmanyam (1977) show that faced with a segmented 
market, managers of such firms will try to counter the 
negative effects of segmentation by direct foreign 
investment, mergers with foreign firms, or dual listing. In 
the context of the present study, Mexican securities would 
be viewed as country 2 securities.
Even though there are no explicit investment barriers 
that prohibit US investors from purchasing Mexican 
securities, absence of sufficient and reliable information 
could cause them to view the securities in this manner. 
This would be in accordance with Klein and Bawa (1977) and 
Merton (1987) who show that it may be optimal for investors 
to exclude form their portfolios securities on which they 
possess limited information. Thus, in completely
integrated capital markets dual listing of a firm's stock 
on a foreign exchange would not be expected to have a
8
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significant effect on the stock characteristics in the home 
country any more than would be the case if the capital 
markets were either completely or mildly segmented.
In addition to the degree of market segmentation, 
further confounding the issue is the tradeoff involved in 
the costs and benefits associated with an international 
listing. The benefits of an international listing include 
increased investor recognition, international valuation, an 
enlarged ownership base, access to more extensive capital 
markets and a higher degree of monitoring and 
certification. There are substantial costs associated with 
international listing that include listing fees, greater 
disclosure of information, costs incurred in complying with 
different standards of disclosure, an increase in 
litigation potential due to more stringent rules and 
regulations and stricter enforcement in the US. In fact, 
firms have a choice in terms of selecting the particular 
market (such as NYSE, the London market, or other 
exchanges) for an overseas listing. The US, with the 
highest disclosure requirements in the world, may not be 
the optimal location for some firms in other countries to 
list on (Siconolfi, 1992). It is plausible that some firms 
might obtain the benefits of an international listing and 
convey an unambiguous signal of quality by listing their 
shares on an exchange other than NYSE, for example the 
London stock market (Cheung and Lee, 1995).
9
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The above discussion implies that the net effect of an 
overseas listing on shareholder wealth is an open question 
unlike the typical case of a first exchange listing in a 
home country which would be considered a positive signal 
conveying managers confidence in the future prospects of 
the firm.3 This suggests that the effects of an 
international listing should be analyzed on a case by case 
basis (that is, by country) as marginal gains from such a 
listing are sensitive to degree of market integration, 
associated costs and benefits (as discussed above), and the 
regulatory and institutional framework of the countries 
involved. Thus, it is unclear whether there are positive 
returns from an additional listing (and more specifically 
an international listing) and this question can only be 
answered by empirical research.
The previous research that is closest in spirit to 
the proposed study is in the area of valuation effects of 
international listings.4 The chronology of events in a 
listing involves a formal application, acceptance or
3 Studies by VanHome (1970), Ying et al. (1977), Fabozzi (1981), 
McConnell and Sanger (1984, 1987) and Grammatikos and 
Papaioannou(1986) among others investigate the effect on stock returns 
of a firm changing its domestic trading venue, as would be the case when a firm moves from the over-the-counter market to one of the organized exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American stock Exchange. The empirical findings of these studies show 
that the market reacts positively to the listing announcement during the pre-listing period. However, the price decline during the post­
listing period seems to largely offset the initial gain.4 There is a line of research that has examined issues such as changes
in liquidity, bid-ask spread, volatility, order flow and other 
microstructure issues in the context of international listing.
However, due to the different nature and direction of these studiesthey are not discussed in this paper. Along the same lines some
studies have investigated issues related to information flow and price
discovery but in the context of dual domestic listing (that is, stocks
10
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rejection by the exchange, followed by the actual listing 
and commencement of trading. Most previous studies use the
first trading date as the event date, a deviation from
typical event studies that focus on detecting abnormal 
returns around definitive announcement dates. The time- 
period involved in establishing an ADR program and the 
start of trading ranges from approximately 7 weeks for a 
144A program to 9 weeks for a Level I ADR program, with 
Level II or Level III being the most time consuming, 
requiring nearly 14 weeks (An information guide to
Depositary Receipts, 1995) . It is more meaningful to
discuss the extant literature in terms of studies that have 
looked at US firms listing abroad versus studies that have 
examined foreign firms' listing in the US since for the 
reasons listed above the valuation effects of an 
international listing, a priori, are expected to depend 
upon the domicile of the stock.
Among the most prominent studies that have examined 
stock price reactions to US firms listing their shares 
abroad is the study by Howe and Kelm (1987). The focus of 
their study is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
starting 90 days prior to the actual listing and extending 
40 days after the event. Their sample includes a total of 
158 listings (includes first, second, and third listing) by 
US firms on 16 exchanges abroad. They argue that by 
focusing on CARs rather than simply abnormal returns (ARs),
that are traded on more that one domestic exchange.
11
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they are able to make inferences about the net effect of 
the entire listing process. They find significant negative 
CARs returns during the pre-listing period (application and 
approval phase) as well as during the post-listing period.5
The surprising direction of the results is perhaps 
well expressed by the authors themselves, "Corporate 
managers who are concerned with the financial well-being of 
their common shareholders should avoid foreign listings. 
Thus conclusion is perhaps counterintuitive and definitely 
runs contrary to the current trend of the 
"internationalization" of financial markets. However, 
given the robustness and significance of the results, the 
benefits of listing appear to be noticeably outweighed by 
the costs." They attribute the negative stock price 
reaction to indirect costs associated with the regulatory 
uncertainty firms expose themselves to when they list 
overseas, although they never support this assertion. 
However, Reilly et al., (1990) examine US firms listings on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange and find weak positive abnormal 
returns around the application and significant negative 
abnormal returns on the day of the actual listing. In 
contrast, Lee (1991) investigates US firms listings on the 
London and Toronto stock exchanges and do not find evidence 
of any valuation effects associated with the listing.
5 The presence of negative returns in the post-listing period even for 
studies that find positive abnormal returns in the pre-listing period can be best characterized as anomalous with no satisfactory theoretical explanation (Alexander et al., 1987, Jayaraman et al., 
1993).
12
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More recently, Lau et al., (1994) reexamine the 
question of whether international stock listings benefit 
stockholders by examining a sample of 108 US firms that had 
a foreign listing involving 8 countries (15 foreign stock 
exchanges) . They detect no abnormal returns around the 
application date, and they find significant positive CARs 
11 days surrounding the acceptance day, although single-day 
ARs are insignificant. Similar to previous studies, they 
discount the absence of one-day ARs based on the fact that 
"Since the application and acceptance dates are rarely 
published in newspapers and are not widely known to 
investors, the absence of one-day abnormal returns may not 
necessarily imply that listings have no valuation 
consequences." Like earlier studies, they find a 
significant negative abnormal return on the first trading 
date, which they term a transient negative valuation 
impact. Their results also indicate a negative post-listing 
valuation impact that remains significant 125 trading days 
after the listing as measured by CARs (the significance of 
the post-listing results is only driven by strong negative 
CARs on two exchanges, Tokyo and Basel). They characterize 
their results as weak evidence supporting the notion that 
foreign listing is beneficial to stockholders.
The following studies also examine the impact of 
listing but with the important difference that they 
consider the case of foreign stocks listing in the US 
instead of vice-versa. Alexander et al., (1988) using
13
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monthly returns find positive significant CARs in the pre­
listing period (where t=0 denotes the month the security 
starts trading in the US), insignificant CARs in the 
listing period, and significant negative CARs in the post­
listing period. Partitioning their sample into Canadian 
firms and non-Canadian firms (13 Canadian stocks and 21 
ADRs from Japan, Australia and other countries) they find 
this effect to be more pronounced for non-Canadian firms 
than Canadian firms. They conjecture that this difference 
may be due to relatively less segmentation between the 
Canadian and the US market compared to non-Canadian markets 
and the US market or alternatively due to the higher 
covariance of the Canadian market with the US market. 
Jayaraman et al., (1993) find positive abnormal returns on 
the day of listing (day 0 is the listing date for the ADR) 
and no negative post-listing performance, results that 
again are different from and inconsistent with earlier 
studies. Their sample consists of mainly Japanese and 
British firms. Foerster and Karolyi (1996) document the 
effect of foreign listing on shareholders wealth. Their 
sample consists mainly of Canadian and European 
(particularly British) firms. Their findings of
significant average abnormal returns in the pre-listing and 
listing period, and negative performance afterwards are 
similar to the results of Alexander et al., 1988. The 
inconsistency of the above results implies that the 
valuation effects of an international listing remain
14
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ambiguous, a point widely acknowledged and mentioned in the 
aforementioned literature.
The objective of this study is to investigate many of 
the import ant issues raised above in the context of the 
Mexican Stock Market. The Mexican Stock Market is 
particularly suited for the purposes of this study for 
several reasons. Firstly, Mexican ADRs account for a 
significant percentage of the total number of ADRs currently 
traded in the US. Also, Mexican ADRs account for a 
significant percentage of share trading volume and dollar 
trading volume, ranking among the top five countries and 
accounting for the largest percentage of share and dollar 
trading volume by country. Secondly, the importance of ADRs 
as a separate asset class and their impact on the underlying 
Mexican securities is indicated by the fact that ADRs 
represent on an average 60 percent of total foreign 
investment in the Mexican equity market over the period of 
1991 to 1996. Total foreign investment as a percentage of 
the market capitalization of Bolsa has ranged from 25 percent 
to 30 percent over the same period. Lastly, the trading 
hours of the Bolsa and NYSE overlap to a great extent which 
permits an examination of effects of an international listing 
on the underlying stocks in isolation without the additional 
confounding effects of extended trading hours.
More specifically, this study examines the performance 
of IPOs in Mexico distinguishing between those that are 
purely domestic versus those that include an international
15
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offering, a focus that is maintained throughout the paper. 
A cross-sectional regression framework is used to identify 
variables that account for underpricing as well as to 
examine and test the robustness of existing models that 
have been developed to explain the underpricing phenomenon. 
This study also investigates the well documented 
deterioration in the long-run stock price as well as 
operating performance following an initial public offering. 
Finally, seasoned equity offerings (both domestic as well 
as international) are analyzed using event study 
methodology to examine the impact of international cross 
listing on shareholder wealth.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 presents a description of the Mexican 
Stock Market and its various institutional details. It 
also includes a discussion of the distinguishing features 
of Mexican companies as well as important rules and 
regulations pertaining to them. Chapter 3 is an overview 
of the different depositary programs that can be 
established by a foreign firm in the US. Chapter 4 
discusses the data used in the study. Chapter 5 reviews 
the relevant literature on IPOs followed by empirical 
results on underpricing, long-run stock price performance, 
operating performance and factors explaining underpricing. 
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of international cross­
listing on shareholder wealth. Concluding remarks and a 
brief summary appear in chapter 7.
16
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Chapter 2: Mexican Stock Market
2.1 Introduction
The Mexican Stock Exchange was founded in 1894. In 
1976 the institution adopted its current corporate name: 
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores, S.A. de C.V. (BMV), currently the 
only exchange in the country (although the Securities Market 
Act of 1975 permits the existence of one stock exchange in 
each city, subject to meeting certain requirements) . HMV is 
a private organization, constituted as a (variable capital) 
corporation, and its a stockholders are brokerage firms or 
financial intermediaries (registered with the National 
Registry of Securities and Intermediaries), each of which has 
an equal share of the capital.
The brokerage firms are the only entities authorized to 
trade on the exchange.6 Presently, there are 27 Mexican
brokerage firms that trade on the Bolsa. In keeping with the
spirit of reforms that began in 1989 that aimed at building a 
deregulated and competitive framework for the Mexican 
financial system, participation by foreign brokers was 
allowed in 1993. As a result of this change in policy more 
than 100 international financial institutions have applied to 
set up brokerage operations, since April 1994. As of June
1995, 20 foreign firms had been accepted by the Mexican
Treasury, including Bank of Tokyo, Baring Brothers, Deutsche
6 A brokerage house carries out operations on its own account and on 
behalf of third parties, that is, it acts both as a dealer and a 
broker. However, brokerage house officials are prohibited from owning shares.
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Bank, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley and 
Swiss Bank. In the second half of 1995 BMV authorized three 
new brokerage firms, Santander, Merril Lynch and Bankers 
Trust, to operate on the trading floor. The trading hours 
for BMV are 9:30 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. (US Eastern Time) from 
Monday to Friday, throughout the year with the exception of 
holidays authorized by the National Securities Commission. A 
trading session is divided into seven trading periods and 
five recesses of five minutes each. The first trading period 
is preceded by the entry of bid and ask quotations. During 
the last trading period for the day all types of transactions 
are allowed, except entry of bids.
The Mexican stock market is one of the largest emerging 
markets and is far more developed than the other stock 
markets in Latin America, despite the fact that trading in 
stocks represents less than 2% of trading by value on the 
Mexican securities market from 1988 to 1994.7 At the end of 
March 1995, there were 193 companies (excluding mutual funds) 
listed on the Bolsa, with a market capitalization of 
approximately US $107 billion.
The dollar capitalization of the Mexican stock market 
increased 3,500% during the 1985-1992 period, a growth 
broadly in line with the increase in macroeconomic stability 
and financial liberalization. However, BMV is characterized 
by a high degree of market concentration (a feature common to
7 Total trading includes the amount of trading in the capital market and the money market.
18
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
most emerging markets) . In 1991/ the top 10 listed companies 
on BMV accounted for more than 50% of the market 
capitalization. The comparable market concentration in mature 
markets generally represents less than 25% of total market 
capitalization. Presently, Telefonos de Mexico alone 
accounts for about 25% of the total market capitalization. In 
1994, the five most actively traded equity issues represented 
approximately 55% of the total volume of equity issues traded 
on the Mexican Stock Exchange.
Total value traded in 1994 was U.S $84.01 billion, an 
increase of 34.87% over 1993. The volume of shares traded 
was 23.85 billion, a decline of 15.27% over 1993, with an 
average daily traded value of approximately U.S $336 million 
and an average daily trading volume of 83.35 million shares. 
Some important summary statistics and market capitalization 
behavior are presented in Table 2.1, Figure 2.1, and Figure 
2.2.
2.2 Main Mexican Equity Securities
2.2.1 Stocks
Mexican companies can issue common as well as preferred
stock. Each company may issue several different series of
stock, each with different rights or shareholders base. In
comparison, most companies in the United States issue just
one class of common stock.8 Following is a description of 
the different categories of stock:
8 Traditionally, the NYSE has discouraged companies from creating dual 
or multiple classes of stock with unequal voting rights although there 
are exceptions such as Ford (Class B), Citizens Utility (Class A  and 
Class B) and General Motors (GM Classic, Class E and Class H) .
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• "A" shares have full economic and corporate rights and can 
be directly owned only by Mexican nationals. They account 
for at least 51 percent of company voting rights.
• Free Subscription Shares - "B" shares can be owned by 
foreigners (unless the company is a financial group or 
multiple banking institution) as well as Mexicans and 
convey the same rights as the "A"s. These represent around 
40 to 49% of the total capital stock, although there are 
cases in which the proportion rises to more than 50%. 
Individuals can own only up to ten percent of the shares 
outstanding. The steps involved in the purchase or sale of 
free subscription shares are shown in Figure 2.3. Both 
series A and B shares can be further divided into:
Series I (1 or F) - shares corresponding to the fixed 
portion of the capital.
Series II (2 or V) - shares corresponding to the variable 
portion of the capital.
As per company statutes, each firm must maintain a 
minimum level of capital, the fixed part of which cannot be 
changed without the approval of the shareholders at an 
extraordinary meeting. The variable part changes whenever a 
company conducts a rights issue or a stock repurchase. 
However, both series I and series II carry equal rights.
• Limited Voting Shares - Foreign investors may acquire 
series nCn or "L" stocks, which convey fundamental economic 
rights and some very reduced voting rights. Series "C"
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• Transfers the shares 
to the account of the 
brokerage firm or of 
the investor
Keeps the shares in custody or 
trankers them to appropriate 
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• Receives the 
purchase order
• Executes it like any 
other on the trading 
floor of the BMV
• Receives the confirmation
• Settles the operation
• Receives assignation or 
physical shares
• Confirms the operation41
after the transaction has been 
made
*The operation can alao be confirmed by Indeval
Figure 2.3 
Free Subscription Shares
shares are limited to 30% of total capital. Series "L" is 
similar to Series "C", but carries no voting rights.
The series classification presented above is not the 
most comprehensive; a variety of other series designations 
exist and are presented in Table 2.6. The basic premise 
behind the series classification is to ensure domestic 
control of Mexican firms, a policy followed in some other 
developing countries that also seek to restrict or control 
foreign equity investment.
2.2.2 Certificates of Ordinary Participation (CFOs)
Foreign investment on the Bolsa in most stocks is 
formally permitted up to 49%. However, in practice this 
percentage is often not available for new investment because 
equity may already be held by a foreign partner. This 
practical restriction led in 1989 to the revision of rules 
for stock investment. The new regulation to promote Mexican 
investment and regulate foreign investment, published in May 
1989, significantly broadened the options for foreign 
investment. Effective November 1989, foreign investors can 
buy stock intended exclusively for Mexican nationals (Series 
"A") through Certificates of Ordinary Participation issued by 
trusts or neutral funds. CPOs are negotiable instruments 
issued by a Mexican Trust, presently managed by National 
Financiera (NAFINSA), a Mexican development bank, certifying 
that series "A" shares of listed coup any are held in the 
trust.9 Following execution of a purchase order for series
9 It is required that the companies whose shares participate in the trust
25
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"A" shares by a foreign investor, the stock is deposited in 
the trust which then issues the corresponding CPOs. The CPOs 
are then deposited in the account of the brokerage firm or 
the foreign investor with S.D. Indeval (Instituto para el 
Deposito de Valores) .10 In the case of a sell order, the 
stock is taken out of the trust for sale, and the CPO 
outstanding against it is canceled. CPOs have the same 
economic rights as the underlying shares but no voting 
rights. A schematic presentation of the steps involved in 
the purchase or sale of a CPO is presented in Figure 2.4. The 
holder of the CPO is obliged to adhere to the majority.
In addition to CPOs against series A stock Mexican 
firms can also issue stock representative of their capital in 
series "N" which can be subscribed by neutral trusts. The 
fiduciary participation certificates or CPOs issued against 
these neutral shares (N) represent only pecuniary rights and 
can be acquired by foreign individuals or institutional 
investors. The neutral shares are not taken into account in
make or intend to make new investments to expand their activities. Most 
firms comply with this requirement.
10 S.D. Indeval is the Central Securities Depositary of Mexico. Its 
functions include custody, administration, transferring, clearing and 
settlement of securities. More specifically, it is responsible for 
collection of dividends (either cash or stock), interest, splits, etc. corresponding to the securities held on deposit on behalf of its 
participants. Currently, S.D. Indeval keeps all equities and money 
market instruments traded on the Bolsa with the exception of Federal 
Government issues which are kept by the Central Bank (Banco de 
Mexico) . S.D. Indeval is also in the process of establishing links 
with foreign institutions similar to itself, such as Cedel and 
Euroclear (two of the most important clearing agents in Europe) with 
the aim of facilitating the settlement and clearing process for 
international transactions. In October 1987, the institution was privatized and became S.D. Indeval, S.A. de C.V.; prior to that it operated as a decentralized government organization.
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Figure 2.4
Certificates of Ordinary Participation (CPOs)
determining the proportion of the equity interests of foreign 
investors in the capital stock of issuing companies.
2.2.3 Mutual Funds and American Depositary Receipts (ADRs)
Other alternatives for investing in Mexican stocks 
include common-stock mutual funds listed on the Bolsa, 
offshore mutual funds listed outside Mexico, and American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) . Foreigners may own up to 49% of 
a stock mutual fund, with no one investor permitted to hold 
more than 10% of the fund regardless of nationality. The 
equity funds (Fondos Comunes) must manage their portfolios 
within certain parameters in order to diversify risk and 
offer adequate liquidity. The common stock funds cannot 
invest more than 10% of their capital in the securities of 
any one company; they can acquire no more than 30% of the 
capital of a single company; and between 10% and 20% of their 
capital must be in securities with high liquidity (discussed 
later) and no less than 50% in equity.11 Common stock funds 
can be constituted as open or closed-end funds; however most 
of them have adopted the former mode.
Another category of managed portfolio available to 
investors is a Venture Capital Fund (Sincas) . Venture 
capital funds are relatively new in the market and as the 
name suggests provide venture capital, management, and 
technological skills to small and medium sized companies. 
SINCAs must be constituted as closed end funds but unlike
11 Although common stock mutual funds primarily invest in shocks they 
may also invest: in money market and fixed income securities (somewhat similar in concept to Balance Funds).
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closed end funds the price of SINCAs is determined by 
Valuation Committees and not supply and demand. It should be 
pointed out that fixed-income funds (Renta Fija) are much 
larger in number as well in terms of assets under management. 
Equity funds are in second place followed by venture capital 
funds. The portfolios of fixed income funds are highly 
concentrated in money market instruments, mainly government 
issues. There are two kinds of fixed income funds, one for 
individual investors and the other for corporate investors. 
Both money funds (fixed income funds) as well as stock funds 
are managed either by brokerage firms or banks.
Offshore mutual funds and ADRs represent perhaps the 
easiest means for foreign investors to access Mexican 
securities. Some of the internationally listed funds whose 
portfolios consist entirely of Mexican securities include the 
Mexican Fund (listed on NYSE in 1981), Mexico Equity and 
Income Fund (listed on NYSE in 1990) and the Emerging Mexico 
Fund (listed on NYSE in 1990) . Additionally, there are also 
international equity funds such as Latin America Equity Fund 
and Latin America Inv., that focus on Latin America and 
invest partially in Mexican securities. Besides the ease of 
transacting in a familiar market place the shares of these 
funds have a highly liquid secondary market in contrast to 
the sale of stock on a relatively illiquid foreign stock 
exchange.
The most popular alternative for foreign investment in 
Mexican stock is through ADRs of Mexican companies traded
29
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in the United States. Of the US $34.40 billion total 
foreign investment in the Mexican stock market at the end 
of 1994, 61.53% corresponds to ADRs. There are currently 
63 Mexican companies with ADRs traded in the US. A 
breakdown of the level of foreign investment in ADRs vis-a- 
vis other alternatives available for foreign participation 
is presented in Table 2.2 (Table 2.3 also presents related 
information) . ADRs are negotiable instruments traded in 
the US, issued by an American depositary bank certifying 
that equity of a non-U.S. corporation is held by the 
depositary's custodian abroad (ADRs are discussed in 
greater detail later) . In the case of Mexican equity 
securities there are two kinds of ADRs:
• Traditional ADRs, certifying the deposit of non-"A" 
shares.
• ADRs for CPOs, certifying the deposit of CPOs issued by 
a Mexican trust.
A more detailed sketch of the different parties and 
the steps involved in the transaction of a Mexican ADR is 
presented in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6.
2.2.4 Financial Sector
The above discussion applies to all companies listed on 
the Bolsa except those in the financial services sector. More 
specifically, there is a separate series classification for 
banks, brokerage firms, and financial groups. The important 
events that have affected the financial sector over the last 
decade or so merit special attention in order to better
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Foreign Investment in Equity Market
Doc. 1991 Dao. 1992 Dao. 1993 Dm . 1994 Dao. 1995 Dao. 1996
ADR' a 13,733.46 21,153.95 33,959.55 21,162.85 15,223.50 15,108.14
MaxLoo Fund 499.33 619.00 1,363.65 765.58 750.27 920.17
V c m  ■ubiorlptlon 
SlMUMM
2,960.96 5,096.98 12,906.07 8,079.01 5,684.28 11,418.62
Xtautral Toad 1,348.76 1,798.08 6,360.61 4,348.43 2,620.28 3,506.59
8aoond-tiar
a a d w t
— — 4.05 23.73 31.29 —
Warrants — — 18.11 15.55 5.96 0.95
Total Stock 
M a d n t
18,542.51 28,668.01 54,632.04 34,395.15 24,515.58 30,954.47
Total Debt 
Xnatroaanta
5,466.28 14,206.97 21,849.73 17,167.10 — —
Total Foraign 
Xnvaataant In the 
Saourltias Market


















Selected Economic Indicators and Foreign Investment in the Stock Market.









a % of Market 
Capitalisation
ADRs 
as a % of
Foreign
Investment
1989 98.04 65.45 19.70 2.68 — —
1990 50.10 15.52 29.90 2.959 — —
1991 127.65 91.63 18.80 3.075 18.23 74.06
1992 22.91 9.84 11.90 3.119 20.66 73.79
1993 47.92 36.95 8.00 3.106 27.23 62.16
1994 -8.72 -14.73 7.10 5.05 26.49 61.53
1995 16.96 -23.05 52.00 7.68 26.96 62.10
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in the OTC, NYSE 
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Figure 2.6
Case B: ADRs are available in Secondary U.S. Markets
understand the evolving financial system of Mexico. In 1982, 
Mexico nationalized its commercial banks in response to the 
country's debt crisis. As a first step towards 
reprivatization, the government allowed private ownership of 
up to 34 percent of the banks. In 1987, 34 percent of the 
banks' ordinary capital was issued on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange. This was done using Equity Participation 
Certificates (CAP), a credit certificate that represents bank 
stock. CAPs are divided into three categories:
• Series "A" which represents at least 66 percent of
ordinary capital and may be owned only by the Federal 
government.
• Series "B" which represents the rest of the bank's
ordinary capital and which may be owned by Mexican 
individuals and corporations.
• Series "C" which represents non-ordinary capital and may 
be acquired by foreigners as well as Mexicans but confers 
no corporate rights.
As Mexico shifted from a quasi-state-run economy to a 
market based economy, the privatization of the commercial 
banks was a natural step. Following a constitutional 
amendment and the enactment of the law on Credit
Institutions, between June 1991 and July 1992 the government 
auctioned off controlling interest in all 18 banks.12 In a
12 It should be noted that in 1992 the government still maintained an 
8.9% interest in the banking system which will presumably be sold off. 
Interestingly, many of the buyers were former owners who had formed brokerage firms, insurance companies or leasing companies following 
the nationalization of the banks in 1982.
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further attempt to demonstrate its commitment to open market 
reforms, in June 1993 the Mexican government took steps to 
make the Banco de Mexico, Mexico's central Bank, an 
autonomous entity. Despite the increase in the shareholding 
base, over 130,000 shareholders in 1993 compared to some 
8,000 before nationalization in 1982, a considerable 
concentration of economic power remains. This concentration 
is demonstrated by the fact that three banks, Banamex, 
Bancomer and Serfin, account for nearly 60% of all loans and 
deposits and an even higher share of the industry's profits. 
An important element of the present banking sector is the 7 
government-run development banks. The development banks are 
public institutions, established by the Federal government, 
to channel resources into projects in accordance with 
economic policy and social developmental priorities. 
Prominent among these are Nacional Financiera and Banco de 
Comercio Exterior, institutions that support the development 
and financing of medium and small sized industry, and export 
related industry, respectively.
In July 1990, a new law to regulate financial groups 
was adopted. This law allows the integration of financial 
groups through a holding company that must comprise at least 
three of the following financial entities: multiple service
banks, brokerage firms, insurance companies, foreign exchange 
houses, mutual fund management investment companies, bonding 
companies, financial leasing companies, financial factoring 
companies, and general depository warehouses. The
36
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integration of intermediaries from the banking sector, the 
securities industry, and companies engaged in offering 
supplementary financial services benefits both the providers 
and users of these services by (i) increasing the efficiency 
and competitiveness of the financial system and (ii) allowing 
clients of these financial groups to have the option of 
concentrating diverse financial services into one single 
account (with the ensuing benefits in terms of savings in 
time, paperwork and lower costs) . In keeping with the above 
reforms, Mexico's commercial banks have each been 
incorporated into one of the eighteen financial groups.13 
With the continued reshaping of the Mexican financial system 
and the government stepping away from its long standing role 
as a macro-entrepreneur there will eventually be three series 
of stocks for banks and financial groups:
• "A" shares, which will represent 51% of capital and can be 
acquired only by Mexican individuals, the Federal 
government and development banks.
• "B" shares, which can represent up to 49% of capital and 
may be purchased by Mexican institutional investors such 
as investment funds and insurance companies, and by those 
eligible for ownership of "A" shares.
13 An example of an aforementioned financial holding company is Grupo 
Financiero Bancomer compromised of the following entities:Bancomer (99.98%) BankCasa de Bolsa Bancomer (99.98%) Brokerage HouseArrendadora Monterrey (100.00%) Leasing
Almacenadora Bancomer (63.81%) Warehouse
Factor de Capitales (100.00%) Financial Factoring
Moreover, in addition to Grupo Financiero Bancomer itself being listedon the Bolsa, its subsidiaries Bancomer and Casa de Bolsa Bancomer are
also listed on the exchange.
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• "C" shares, which can represent up to 30% of capital and
may be acquired by both Mexicans as well as foreigners 
(excluding foreign government and official entities), but 
with a limit of no more that five percent held by any 
single individual or institutional owner (twenty percent 
with prior government approval) .
2.2.5 Price and Quotation Index (IPC)
The IPC (Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones - IPC) is the 
main index for the Mexican Stock Exchange. It is a market 
capitalization weighted, industry-composite index, comparable 
in its methodology to the S&P 500 index. It is calculated 
from a sample ranging from 35 to 50 of the most active 
stocks. The selection of the sample group is made every two 
months, based on the Marketability Index, which takes into 
account variables such as number of transactions, value 
traded, days traded, and the variation of prices between one 
movement and the other. The extreme volatility that 
typically characterizes emerging markets applies to the 
Mexican Stock Exchange as can be seen by the nominal yield 
and real yield as measured by the IPC index, reported in 
Figure 2.1.
In addition to the General Price and Quotation Index, 
the Mexican Stock Exchange also publishes sectoral indexes, 
calculated by the type of economic activity and for the 
mutual funds.
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2.3 Market Structure and Trading Mechanism
Following is a discussion of the different types of 
orders and order routing and execution that govern the 
transactions carried out on the Bolsa. As mentioned earlier, 
all securities transactions are executed through the 
brokerage firms that operate on the trading floors of the 
exchange. Further, all transactions involving capital market 
instruments must be carried out and registered on the trading 
floor, including block trades.
The different types of orders that can be issued by an 
investor to a brokerage firm to initiate a security 
transaction include: a limit order, an order in which the 
client sets the maximum price for purchase or the minimum 
price for sale of specific securities, and a market order, an 
order in which the client decides to purchase or sell certain 
securities and leaves it to the broker to carry out the 
transaction at the best price, according to the quotations 
reached during the trading session. All orders are 
registered at the control desk of each brokerage firm with an 
identifying number, the date, and the time, in order to 
determine priorities with • regard to assignment of 
transactions.
The trading posts (corros) are the official 
registration areas for all security transactions. Each 
trading post is assigned specific securities and no 
transaction may be registered in a trading post other than 
the one assigned to it. The six trading posts on the capital
39
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market trading floor handle specific securities according to 
the following distribution:
Distribution of Transactions by Trading Post 
Module Trading Post Type of Instrument Traded
1 I Shares of brokerage firms
and banks 
II Shares of industrial,
2 III retail and service
IV companies
3 V Fixed-income
VI Odd lots (fixed and variable
income)
Each trading post is staffed by exchange employees who 
register transactions and automatically update these 
movements on the corresponding monitors. It should be noted 
that the Mexican stock exchange has no specialists at the 
present time, although this mode has already been authorized 
and its implementation is actively being studied. The data 
on prices and quotations for stock issues posted on the 
monitors include the Stock symbol. Sell bid, Buy bid, 
Fluctuation parameters, Maximum price, Minimum price, Last 
price and Lot and Ticks.14
14 Other pertinent information available on the monitor network includes information on price and quotation indexes, suspended shares, shares with greatest gains (losses), information on dividend payment and the most heavily traded securities during the trading session etc.
The collection, processing, and dissemination of information on trading floor activities and other factors linked with the performance 
of the securities market is done through SIVA (Sistema de Valores 
Automatizado or Automated Securities Consulting System) . There are also Telerate and Reuters terminals for information on the international markets.
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As regards transaction closing, there are several options:
• Open Outcry - By this method, bids to buy and sell are 
actually called out by the broker, in which the floor broker 
indicates whether he is buying or selling and specifies the 
issuer, series, price and quantity. If the number to be 
bought or sold is not specified, a minimum lot is assumed.
• Firm order transaction - Under this procedure, offers to 
buy or sell securities are written in the form of a "firm 
order", indicting issuer, series, quantity and price. The 
broker fills out a ticket and gives it to Exchange clerks 
(corro). These bids are registered in chronological order in 
the trading post to provide access to other floor brokers and 
priority is given to the best price offered. If the 
conditions specified in a firm buy order coincide with those 
of a firm sell order, the transaction is automatically 
executed or closed. An agent wishing to close a firm order 
does so by "announcing" at the trading post corresponding to 
the issue, specifying "buy and close" or "sell and close".
• Cross Order Transaction - When a brokerage firm has buy 
and sell orders from different clients that coincide as to 
issuer, series, quantity and price, the floor broker may 
carry out a cross transaction, which must be reported at the 
appropriate trading post to a cross judge. The registration 
procedure is carried out in the following manner: the broker 
in the corresponding section pushes a buzzer, which is 
connected to a green light above the trading floor, and 
announces "cross order" over the microphone, stating the
41
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issuer, series, price and saying "give” or "take" and the 
number of shares he wishes to cross. The cross judge 
validates the transaction unless any other broker makes a 
better offer and wants to take part in the transaction.
• Negotiated Quoted Order Transaction (or "cama" trades) - 
This type of transaction is also known as a firm order with 
an option to buy or sell, within a certain price fluctuation 
margin. The floor broker using the open outcry method 
indicates the issuer, series, quantity and price spreads 
(without indicating the prices) at which he is prepared to 
trade. The accepting broker is obliged to trade under the 
terms announced and at the prices that are fixed at that 
moment by the broker that made the initial proposal. This is 
not a common form of trading.
The Exchange implemented an automated trading system 
called SATO (Sistema Automatizado de Transacciones 
Operativas) on May 3, 1993. The same year trading of close 
to 100 stock series was incorporated into SATO. The system's 
capacity allows it to process up to 10,000 transactions per 
day. Presently, the online electronic trading system, known 
as EMV-SENTRA Capitales, is used to trade warrants, odd lots 
and approximately half of the stock series listed on the 
Mexican Stock Exchange. System operates may enter firm and 
cross orders or look up bids and trades.
2.3.1 Lots and Ticks
Trading units, or "lots" have been defined according to 
the value or price of each issue, and transactions must be
42
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made in multiples of these amounts. This is necessary to 
avoid excessive fragmentation and makes it possible to handle 
standardized volumes. The lots and ticks for equities traded 
on the Bolsa are defined in Table 2.4, where the tick is the 
minimum upward or downward movement in the price of a share.
2.3.2 Listing Requirements
The listing, maintenance and disclosure requirements 
for companies to be listed on the Bolsa are presented in 
Table 2.5. In July 1993, the second tier market of the 
Mexican Stock Exchange became operational. This section of 
the stock market was created to provide capital to medium­
sized companies with different listing and maintenance 
requirements them the main market. More specifically, to be 
listed on the second tier market, a company only has to have 
a net worth between 20 and 100 million new Pesos and have 
shown a profit in the past three years of operations.
2.3.3 Settlement Period and Commission Rates
The only currently permitted operations in stocks are 
for cash, with a settlement period of two business days after 
the transaction is executed on the trading floor. Margin 
operations were suspended following the 1987 crash.
Brokerage fees have been liberalized by the National 
Securities Commission and since November 1, 1991 transaction 
commissions are fully negotiable between the brokerage house 
and their clients. According to talks with officials of 
Inverlat (one of the prominent brokerage houses in Mexico), 
the following commission structure is a good representation
43
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Table 2.4 
Lots and Ticks for Equities
Pr±o* <H$) Lot Tick
Mlnisut Opan
Outcry
SATO Qpon Outcry a nd SAXO
0.01 0.20 100,000 1,000 0.001
0.21 5.00 10,000 1,000 0.01
5.02 20.00 5,000 1,000 0.02
20.05 50.00 2,000 1,000 0.05
50.10 And up 1,000 1,000 0.10
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Table 2.5 
Requirements for Listed Companies
T>i»tinj Requirements
Main Market Second-Tier Market
Track Reoord 3 years 3 years
Hat Worth. N$ 100 million N$ 20 million
Kamings Positive sum of last 
three years net income
Positive sum of three 
years net income
Public shares offend or 
subscribed 15% of fully paid capital
30% of fully paid 
capital
W n t e e  mober of 
stockholders
200 100
Main fen anno Requirements
M n l e e  Set Worth N$ 50 million N$ 10 million
Shares Held by the public 12% of fully paid 
capital in the market
20% of fully paid 
capital in the market




Financial Statements Quarterly and for some 
issuers monthly
Quarterly and for some 
issuers monthly
legal Information Annually or when they 
have a meeting
Annually or when they 
have a meeting
Extraordinary Information At any time At any time
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of the brokerage fees currently charged by different 
brokerage houses.
Less than N$ 200,000 1.0% - 1.5%
N$ 200,000 - N$ 1,000,000 0.7%
Greater than N$ 1,000,000 0.3% - 0.5%
Prior to November 1991, the brokerage fees were as follows:15 
Less than $ 200 million 1.7%
Greater than $ 200 million 1.0%
2.3.4 Taxation
The tax treatment of nonresidents who invest in 
securities traded on the Mexican Stock Exchange is very 
favorable: they are not subject to any tax either on the 
capital gains or dividends. This is true both for 
individuals as well as corporate investors. In fact, only 
interest obtained on private sector instruments is taxed at 
4.9% or 15%; the 4.9% tax rate is applicable when the foreign 
investor is not a resident of a country considered by Mexican 
legislation as "Tax Haven". There are no exchange 
restrictions on taking capital, dividends, or interest out of 
the country.
2.4 Other Important Characteristics
Securities traded on the Bolsa are subject to price 
fluctuation parameters and trading is automatically suspended 
for issues that exceed these parameters. For equity 
instruments, this range of fluctuation is 5% above or below;
15 As of January 1, 1993 Mexico introduced a new monetary unit called 
"New Peso" (Nuevo Peso N$) to facilitate monetary transactions.1 N$ = 1,000 $ (current Pesos)
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if this limit is exceeded, trading in the security is 
suspended for 60 minutes in the first instance and 90 minutes 
in the second instance in the same trading session. However, 
these parameters and suspension periods do not apply to 
issues traded on international markets, so that they may 
achieve price levels comparable to those on other world stock 
exchanges. Furthermore, these issues are traded
continuously, without recesses, throughout the trading 
session. Also, it should be noted that a Contingency Fund has 
been set up by the Stock Exchange and intermediaries to 
protect investors against the bankruptcy of a brokerage firm.
In 1989, a system for ranking a stock*s marketability 
(indice de bursatilidad - marketability index) was 
introduced, which divides stocks into 4 categories of 
marketability (high, medium, low and minimal) . Short sales 
were introduced for the first time in Mexico in April 1991, 
with operations permitted in stocks with high marketability 
according to the marketability index. The amount of short 
sales in 1995 was 2.21 billion N$ (US$ 345.95 million), an 
increase of 32.08% over the previous year, with a trading 
volume of 189.58 million shares, an increase of more than 
95.05% over the number of shares traded in 1994. At the 
present time, warrants are the only type of derivative 
products being issued on the Mexican Stock Exchange. Trading 
of options and futures is expected to begin shortly. Trading 
of warrants was authorized in September of 1992. The 
warrants include both the American type as well as the
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European type and are on the Bolsa's Price and Quotation 
Index (IPC) or individual listed stocks. The traded value of 
warrants in 1995 was 1.07 billion N$ (US$ 171.11 million), 
with a trading volume of 309 million warrants. There are 
also warrant issues on Mexican stocks or indices quoted on 
the Luxemborg stock exchange, the world's foremost market for 
this type of instrument.
With an uncertain exchange rate, hedging currency 
exposure is an important concern of foreign investors. Since 
1995 the Chicago Mercantile exchange (CME) has relisted the 
futures and options contract on the Mexican Peso that it had 
discontinued in 1985. The Mexican government has lifted the 
restrictions prohibiting the transfer of pesos for foreign 
currency for purely financial transactions. There are also a 
variety of hedging instruments available in the Mexican 
market. These include Mexican securities denominated in 
dollars and payable both in dollars and in pesos, as well as 
instruments linked to the consumer price index that offer 
inflation hedging. In addition, Latin fund, non-dedicated 
funds, and institutional investors that have Latin exposure 
can avail themselves of US dollar-denominated (strike price) 
calls and puts on the Mexican Bolsa Index. The CME is also 
planning to offer, subject to SEC's approval, futures on a 
number of Mexican debt instruments, including short term 
government Treasury bills (cetes), and external debt called 
brady bonds.
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2.5 Business Entities
In the context of this study, the nature of a Mexican 
corporation with variable capital (Sociedad Anonima de 
Capital Variable, or S.A. de C.V.), is of particular 
interest since it is the most common form of corporate 
structure for large and medium sized firms. An S.A. de 
C.V. is capitalized with two distinct funds, fixed and 
variable capital. There is a minimum amount of fixed 
capital designated in the corporate charter. Any changes 
in fixed capital must be approved regardless of whether a 
firm has foreign participation or not, although the 
appropriate regulatory bodies differ in the two cases. In 
contrast, a corporation's variable capital is authorized 
and registered on an open ended basis at its creation. 
Variable capital can be modified through internal 
procedures such as passage of a resolution by the board of 
directors or the shareholders without prior government 
approval. This is an attractive feature considering 
Mexican firms are not allowed to hold their own shares and 
must issue them as capital as required. A corporation that 
reacquires shares must sell them within three months or 
cancel the shares and reduce its capital stock by a 
proportional amount; no treasury stocks are allowed. By 
law an S.A. de C.V. must make any increase in capital stock 
available to its existing shareholders through a rights 
offering before the offer to outsiders.
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All shares of stock are generally of equal value and 
confer equal rights but articles of incorporation may 
provide for different classes of shares with special rights 
for each class. Each share has one vote but certain 
classes of shares may be allowed to vote only at special 
meetings called for extraordinary purposes such as an 
increase or reduction of capital, mergers or acquisitions, 
bond issues etc. The Mexican equity share classification 
was discussed in greater detail earlier and is also 
presented in Table 2.6. Mexican law requires that shares 
with limited voting rights be paid a cumulative annual 
dividend of at least 5 percent before any dividends are 
paid on other shares. Every Mexican corporation is 
required to set aside at least 5 percent of its annual net 
profits in a statutory reserve account until an amount 
equal to one-fifth of the capital stock has accumulated. 
These amounts represent appropriations of retained earnings 
and are included in the shareholder's section of the 
balance sheet. Such reserves are not available for 
dividends. Furthermore no dividends can be declared until 
the corporation has provided for losses incurred in prior 
years. That is, dividends can only be declared from 
retained earnings. Companies are also required to pay out 
10 percent of pre-tax earnings as employee profit sharing 
(with the exception of companies in their first year of 
operations) . If a corporation has a loss equal to more 
than two-thirds of its capital stock, a creditor or
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Table 2.6
Series Classification
A Ordinary series which Mexican stockholders participate in direct 
form, these can be acquired by foreigners through neutral 
investment or ADRs.
A1 Ordinary in which Mexican stockholders participate in direct 
form and represents the fixed part of the capital equity stock, 
also called class I.
A2 Ordinary in which Mexican stockholders participate in direct 
form and represent the variable part of the capital, also called 
class II.
A4 A series with a pending applicable right, in this case related 
to coupon 4.
AA Non-negotiable stock series of Telmex that are held in a
B Ordinary know as free subscription which can be acquired 
directly by foreign investors
B1 Same as series B with the qualification it represents fixed part of capital equity stock, also called class I.
B2 Same as series B with the qualification it represents variable 
part of capital equity stock, also called class II.
BCP Same as B but contains a provisional certificate.
BCR Same as B but considered of restricted circulation.
BCTO Same as B but included in the "Ordinary certificate of 
Participation" which gives restricted voting rights.
B4 B series with a pending applicable right, in this case related 
to coupon 4.
CP Provisional Certificate.
CPO Ordinary Certificate of Participation, these stocks give 
restricted voting rights.
D Superior or preferred dividend.
DCPO D series included in "Ordinary Certificate of Participation" 
which give restricted voting rights.
(table cont'd.)
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Series of affiliate (subsidiary) companies which are under holding companies.
X. Limited voting rights stock which can be acquired by foreigners 
(allows holders to vote only on major issues, such as mergers 
and liquidations.
L4 Similar interpretation as A4 or B4.
ICSO Similar interpretation as DCPO.
T Stocks of restricted circulation.
UB Title/Certificate related to series B.
TJBC Title/Certificate related to series B and C.
UBIi Title/Certificate related to series B and L.
ULD Title/Certificate related to series L and D.
1 Same as A1.
2 Same as A2.
1CP Same as 1 but it has a provisioned, certificate.
20? Same as 2 but it has a provisional certificate.
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minority shareholder may, by law, bring action to force the 
company into liquidation.
Some other unique features that pertain to Mexican 
corporations are as follows. A tax of 2 percent is levied 
on corporate assets. This gives firms an incentive to 
understate their assets, which in turn prevents them from 
using their full assets to secure loans and other 
financing.16 Such regulations and tax rules serve to 
discourage firms from going public. The process of listing 
on the Mexican Stock Exchange requires a preliminary 
screening by the Bolsa, followed by an in-depth 
investigation by the National Securities Commission 
(Comision Nacional de Valores, or CNV.) A major 
disincentive is the capital gains tax which typically 
amounts to more than one third of the value realized in 
going public. Informal comments by brokerage house 
officials also suggest a bias against firms with 
substantial foreign ownership in terms of listing on The 
Bolsa. Mexican incorporated firms with significant foreign 
ownership can expect to be required to submit much more 
extensive documentation than is typically required of 
national firms, the rationale being that the relatively 
limited availability of capital suggests that capital 
should go to support national development rather than 
privately owned business.
16 This tax seems to serve as a minimum income tax since the income tax
53
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2.6 Key Mexican Accounting Principles
Mexican Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(Mexican GAAP) Bulletin B-10 requires all financial 
statements to be presented at the same Mexican Peso 
purchasing power. In other words, all primary financial 
statements must be restated to eliminate the effects of 
inflation. Recognition of the effects of inflation on 
financial information is an important considering given the 
persistent inflation that has characterized the Mexican 
economy. Although inflation accounting is clearly relevant 
given the inflationary Mexican economy, it is costly to 
execute and this puts Mexican firms at a disadvantage in 
complying with US reporting requirements which are based on 
historical rate.
The adjustment for changes in the general level of 
prices is done using the national consumer price index 
(NCPI) published by the Bank of Mexico. All non-monetary 
items on the balance sheet, including all components of 
shareholder's equity, must be. Inventories, fixed assets, 
depreciation and their related costs and expenses (such as 
inventory and cost of sales) may also be restated using the 
current replacement cost method. Current replacement costs 
must be determined by independent appraisers registered 
with the National Securities Commission. The results of 
updating these accounts are included in the respective 
accounts along with the creation of "Excess (shortfall) in
paid may be credited against it.
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the restatement of stockholder's equity" in the 
shareholder's equity section. This account shows the net 
result from the holding of non-monetary assets due to 
inflation. Alternatively, it reflects whether the firm has 
maintained a predominantly surplus or deficit monetary 
position. Similarly for the Income Statement, the costs 
and the expenses associated with non-monetary assets (and 
non-monetary liabilities, if appropriate) must be restated 
for inflation. The net monetary effect (calculated by 
applying factors derived from the general price index to 
the company's net monetary assets and liabilities) of the 
period is accounted for as a component of current period 
income (generally, as part of the financial cost) . Thus, 
results of companies with net monetary liabilities are 
boosted by higher rates of inflation. This is due to the 
fact that the real value of money owed is eroded by 
inflation and companies with net monetary liabilities 
record a gain on monetary position as part of their 
financing items. In addition, changes in the peso value of 
foreign currency denominated debt that results from changes 
in the currency must generally be reflected in the income 
statement as a gain or loss in the period they occur.
The following are some other accounting practices 
followed in Mexico. Depreciation is generally on straight 
line method. Under Mexican GAAP the amortization period 
for goodwill is limited to 20 years, whereas under US GAAP 
good will may be amortized over a period of up to 40 years.
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Most firms provide consolidated financial statements even 
when there is ownership of 50 percent or less (generally up 
to 40 percent). All companies listed on the Mexican Stock 
Exchange are required to publish consolidated financial 
statements. Under Mexican GAAP minority interests in 
subsidiaries must be included as component of stockholder's 
equity. Consequently, minority interests in the income of 
subsidiaries is not presented as an expense in the income 
statement. Under US GAAP, a minority interest in a 
subsidiary is accounted for as a liability by use of the 
"minority interest" account, and is not part of 
stockholder's equity. The accounting method used for most 
acquisitions is the purchase method. Unlike the US, major 
shareholdings are not disclosed. Furthermore, company 
shares owned by directors and managers are now reported, 
non is their compensation.
2.7 Mexican Economy: Some Important Notes
As recently as 1982, the Mexican economy was in 
serious trouble following its declaration of a moratorium 
on payments on its massive debt in 1982. Up until 1990, 
the state continued to play the role of macro-entrepreneur 
and the dominance of the public sector crowded out private 
initiative. Following the nationalization of the financial 
sector in 1982, state control led banks were used mainly to 
finance the public sector and little funds remained to 
finance the private sector. Thus, consumer lending, 
including home mortgages, virtually disappeared. The
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Mexican economy has suffered from double digit inflation in 
every year from 1973 through 1998 with the exception of 
1993 and 1994. High inflation levels have led to a great 
deal of uncertainty, devaluation, and stubbornly high 
interest rates. Additionally, Mexico has followed strict 
fiscal conservatism to fight inflation. Tight fiscal 
policy has contributed to the shortage of available funds 
and high real interest rates.
This macro economic environment has had direct and 
important consequences for Mexican firms seeking to raise 
capital. In spite of the massive backlog of pent-up demand 
that accumulated over years of inflation and instability 
when private sector bank lending was crowded out by the 
public sector and almost dried up, Mexican banks attract 
few borrowers due a to chronic scarcity of funds and high 
interest rates. Faced with such a lack of capital, large 
Mexican firms (Latin America firms in general) have turned 
to international markets as a source for external 
financing.
A clear pattern emerges in the method of financing 
chosen by Latin corporations tapping the international 
capital markets for funds. The form of financing favored 
by issuers during the early 1990s was a 144A offering. 
After the Mexican peso devaluation in December of 1994, 
there was a trend towards the use of debt over equity in 
the subsequent two years (Griffith, (1995)). Both issuer
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and investor preferences explain the observed pattern in 
capital raising by Latin firms.
Many companies established ADR programs to gain 
exposure in order to gain access to the international debt 
markets. Establishing a 144A program is the easiest and 
the least expensive method of flotation in terms of 
disclosure of information as well as transactions costs (a 
more detailed discussion of the alternative ADR programs 
follows in the ADR section) . In addition, the securities 
issuance process is shortened by four to six weeks because 
the issuer does not have to file a registration statement 
with the SEC. Even in a 144A placement, potential investors 
often ask for a commitment for a future listing to 
eventually ensure a high level of liquidity. Despite the 
lack of formal disclosure in 144A transactions, after the 
peso devaluation investors have been demanding more 
information from 144A issuing firms.
A public issue or Level III offering involves a trade 
off between higher transactions costs and greater 
disclosure (before and after the offering) versus greater 
liquidity, greater research coverage, and potentially a 
healthy aftermarket to raise capital in the future (Suarez, 
(1995) ) . Another factor affecting the choice between a 144A 
placement versus a public listing is the receptiveness 
shown by the market. A company may question the wisdom of 
a public issue if the set of potential investors is 
limited. According to Celso de Barros of SG Marburg,
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"Before, a public listing would allow you access to the 
retail market. But the market is really limited to 
qualified institutional buyers right now, so a public 
listing would not offer much benefit" (these comments were 
made a few months after the Mexican peso crisis) .
Another key determinant of whether debt or equity 
dominates the market is the preference shown by 
international investors. Analysts following Latin firms 
seem to be of the opinion that, given the volatile nature 
of these economies, even the best run companies can be 
totally overwhelmed by macro disturbances. A possible 
explanation for this view is the fact that observed capital 
outflows apparently occur at the slightest hint of monetary 
or economic instability (Griffith, (1995) ) . Clearly, in a 
recessionary environment, bonds enjoy more popularity with 
investors as bonds can be securitized in a number of ways 
and maturity dates can be varied to accord with an 
investor's confidence levels. According to a recent report 
by Salomon Brothers average maturity on emerging market 
issues shrank from five to ten years in 1994 to one to 
three years in 1995. To put it simply, the question 
becomes whether the company will have the money to pay back 
the debt rather than whether the company's profit will 
grow. Along the same lines, investors show now greater 
interest in equity during periods when there are optimistic 
projections for the region.
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Chapter 3: Depositary Receipts: An Overview
3.1 Introduction
The number of depositary receipt programs has grown 
from a little over 100 in 1988 to more than 1600 currently. 
The annual dollar trading volume of stock exchange-listed 
depositary receipts has increased from approximately $40 
billion to more than $500 billion during the same period. 
These numbers provide an indication of both the willingness 
of foreign companies to establish depositary receipt programs 
to list their shares on a major exchange and to gain access 
to major international markets as well as of the demand for 
such programs by private and institutional investors.
American depositary receipts (ADRs) are a convenient 
instrument for investors to diversify their portfolios 
internationally while avoiding the obstacles associated 
with direct ownership of foreign securities such as 
undependable settlement, costly currency conversion, 
unreliable custody service, unfamiliar market practices, 
and confusing tax conventions. ADRs are US dollar
denominated negotiable securities issued in the US by a 
depositary bank, representing ownership in non-US
securities. ADRs are always registered even though the
underlying shares may be in bearer, registered or
nominative form. Ease of transfer and legal certainty in 
transactions have contributed to the growing popularity of 
ADRs. There are several types of ADRs and they differ in 
the level of disclosure of information and the degree of
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
compliance with SEC regulation that is required. Of 
particular importance is the fact that some ADR structures 
allow the company to raise capital in the US, while others 
simply permit the firm to list shares and thus merely 
facilitate cross border trading. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
salient features of the different depositary programs. 
Before proceeding to discuss the different ADR structures 
in greater detail, a brief discussion of the benefits of 
ADRs to a company and to an investor follows next.
As negotiable securities, ADRs are quoted in US 
dollars and dividends and other cash distributions are 
converted into dollars at competitive foreign exchange 
rates by the depositary bank. Shareholder information such 
as annual reports, notices of general meetings and 
corporate actions, and official releases are provided to 
ADR holders by either the depositary or its local 
custodian. ADRs are as liquid as the underlying securities 
since the two are interchangeable. Moreover, the 
participation of professional arbitrageurs contributes to 
the liquidity of the ADR market. An ADR transaction 
involves the issuance of a new depositary receipt, transfer 
of an existing depositary receipt or the cancellation of a 
depositary receipt. Approximately 95% of ADR trading is 
done in the form of intra-market trading, that is, an 
existing ADR is simply transferred from one holder (seller)
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Table 3.1











Larval I F-6 None 20,000-50,000 OTC No
Sponsored 12g 3-2(b) None
Larval II F-6 None 20,000-500,000 NYSE, AMEX No
Sponsored 20-F Detailed NASDAQ
Level III F—1 & F-6 Rigorous 500,000-1M NYSE, AMEX Yes
Sponsored 20-F Detailed NASDAQ
Role 144A N/A — 100,000-400,000 PORTAL Yes
♦Source of figures - Bank of New York
62
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to another (buyer) .17 Besides generating convenience and 
greater liquidity/ ADRs are also cost-effective relative to 
trading foreign stocks directly. An added benefit of ADRs 
is that they are recognized as US domestic securities. This 
is an important advantage since many US banks and pension 
funds are prohibited by their charters from holding foreign 
securities.
The main advantages to a non-US corporation of 
initiating an ADR program include diversifying the 
company's shareholder base, improved share valuation, 
increased liquidity of the underlying shares, increased 
recognition in the important US investor community, and an 
enhanced ability to raise capital in the US market.18 
Additionally, the depositary bank maintains accurate 
shareholder records for the issuer and can monitor and 
report large stock transactions, if requested.
3.2 Types of ADR
3.2.1 Sponsored Level I
This is the simplest and least expensive method for 
companies to access US markets. Under this program a 
company cannot be listed on any of the national exchanges 
in the US, limiting US investor interest. This type of 
program can not be used to raise capital in the US. Level 
I ADRs trade in over-the-counter (OTC) market. OTC market
17 Typically 3% to 5% of a foreign company's shares in ADR form are 
required for active intra market trading to emerge.
18 ADRs can also be used in both merger and acquisition transactions 
as well as for ESOPs for US subsidiaries.
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trades are listed in the "Pink sheets", published daily by 
the National Quotation Bureau. It is not uncommon for 
companies to start with a Level I program and upgrade to a 
Level II (Listing) or a Level III (offering) program. The 
majority of ADRs are Level I programs. At the end of June 
1997, approximately 65% of the total 1,314 ADR programs 
(excluding Rule 144A private programs) were Level I 
depositary receipts. The shareholder base in the form of 
depositary receipts for a company with a Level I program 
typically ranges from 5% to 15%. The decision as to 
whether voting rights are offered to ADR holders is made by 
the issuer and the depositary.
A Level I program involves the filing of an F-6 
registration statement but the firm is exempt from full SEC 
reporting requirements under Rule 12g 3-2 (b) . Subsequent 
to the F-6 filing the depositary bank must also file a 
semi-annual report to the SEC containing information about 
the number of depositary receipts issued or cancelled, the 
number of depositary shares outstanding, and the total 
number of holders at the end of the six month period. Under 
Rule 12g 3-2 (b), a non-US corporation issuing Level I ADRs 
(that is, not seeking a listing or intending a public 
offering) can gain exemption by placing the SEC on its 
mailing list and supplying any material public information 
the company publishes in its home country (such as local 
stock exchange filing requirements and any information 
distributed to its shareholders) . The SEC does not require
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this material to be adjusted for differences in US 
accounting practices. Furthermore, any information
supplied to the SEC is not "technically" filed with the SEC 
and thus the company is not liable under the Exchange Act's 
provision against filing false or misleading statements.
3.2.2 Sponsored Level II
A Level II sponsored ADR program allows a company to 
list its ADRs on any of the following exchanges; the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange 
(AMEX) or the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) . Establishing a Level II 
program requires filing of Form 20-F in addition to a Form 
F-6 registration statement. Form 20-F is a comprehensive 
report of all material business activities and financial 
results and must conform to US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) . Form 20-F consists of four 
parts and includes description of the issuer's business, 
any outstanding legal proceedings, description of any 
securities to be registered, fees to be charged to the 
holders of the ADRs, information on any defaults upon 
senior securities and various financial statements. The 
company must also meet the listing requirements of the 
exchange it chooses to list its ADRs on, each of which has 
separate reporting and disclosure requirements.19
19 The NYSE also has alternate listing standards for non-US 
Corporations. Thus foreign corporations may choose to qualify either under the domestic listing criteria (original and alternate original 
listing standards) ox under those designed specifically for non-US corporations.
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Having its ADRs listed on an Exchange increases the 
issuer's visibility and name recognition which may affect 
future capital raising efforts. An exchange listing is 
also beneficial because many institutional investors are 
required to limit their investment in unlisted securities. 
US disclosure regulations also make it easier for companies 
to monitor the ownership of its shares by large investors. 
SEC regulations do not permit a public offering under a 
Level II program.
Besides the high legal and listing costs, an issue 
that has generated some controversy in this area is the 
stringent reporting requirements of the SEC. Information 
production is costly and critics of the SEC contend that 
the SEC's burdensome and costly reporting requirements
discourage many foreign firms from seeking a listing on US 
exchanges even though they meet all of the listing 
requirements. This line of reasoning is supported by the 
experience of NASDAQ. The number of foreign listings on
NASDAQ tripled between 1977 and 1983, but this growth rate
was reduced significantly after foreign firms seeking 
NASDAQ quotations were subject to more stringent reporting 
requirements in 1983 (Baumol and Malkiel,) . In the words 
of former SEC commissions Philip Lochner himself, "new
foreign participation in NASDAQ was halted when the 
commission imposed new reporting requirements." In fact 
between 1983 and 1991, the number of foreign firm listings 
on NASDAQ fell from 294 to 213. Moreover, the vast
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majority of these ADR programs are Level I (unlisted) which 
trade in OTC market. Thus, many foreign firms seem to 
favor foreign stock exchanges with less stringent reporting 
requirements. There are more than 2,000 foreign firms 
trading in London, many on an unlisted basis. The above 
figures do seem to suggest SEC regulation of foreign 
securities is an important factor (mainly as a deterrent) 
in a foreign firm's decision to select a market for its 
trading abroad.
The SEC rationale for subjecting foreign firms to the 
same rules and requirements that apply to US companies is 
based on its mandate for investor protection and the 
maintenance of a fair disclosure system that does not 
discriminate against US issuers (Edwards) . Given the 
significant increase in the trading of foreign securities 
by US investors ($240 billion in 1989), it is questionable 
whether SEC regulations protect US investor or simply 
forces them to transact in more costly and less regulated 
markets. SEC requirements may also partly explain the much 
greater popularity of unregistered (Level I) ADRs versus 
listed ADRs. In the absence of SEC regulations, US 
investors should demand a higher risk premium as 
compensation for not being kept as well informed. Thus, 
foreign companies unwilling to disclose more information 
voluntarily would be subject to a higher cost of capital. 
There is in fact voluntary disclosure of information that 
takes place in the 144A private placement market. According
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to Lessard (1990), "the evidence is overwhelmingly in favor 
of the view that investors in the marketplace are not 
misled by accounting policies" (Lessard, 1990) . His 
results hold not only for US but also other foreign 
markets. Meek (1983) finds that while home country 
earnings announcements have significant information content 
for investors, subsequent release of US GAAP data appears 
to only have a marginal impact, if any.
3.2.3 Sponsored Level III
The major disclosure difference between a Level II and 
Level III program is that a Level III program entails the 
filing of Form F-l in addition to other forms required for a 
Level II program, as explain above. More importantly, 
however, a Level III program allows the issues to raise 
capital through a public offering.
Form F-l requires the following information to be 
included in the prospectus: use of proceeds, determination
of offering price, dilution and other pertinent 
information. The added cost of a book-building-type "road 
show" in addition to the costs intrinsic to a listing, such 
as legal, accounting and investor relation costs, implies 
that setting up and maintaining a Level III program is 
expensive. The average capital raised per public 
depositary receipt offering ranged between $256 Million to 
$138 Million for the period 1991 to 1997. The total 
capital raised through these offering has steadily 
increased from a low of $1 Billion in 1990 to approximately
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$14 Billion in 1997. The exception is the year 1995 when 
it showed a slight decline form the previous year. In 
terms of the relative importance of the three exchanges in 
the context of ADRs; the trading volume in 1996 for ADRs 
was 98.4 Million shares on AMEX, 1,560 Million shares on 
NASDAQ and 3,983 Million shares on NYSE; the dollar trading 
volume for the same year was $0,705 Billion on AMEX, $35 
Billion on NASDAQ and $138.1 Billion on NYSE.
With respect to voting rights, the depositary is 
responsible for distributing proxy material to all 
registered ADR holders of Level II and III programs and is 
obliged to vote as instructed to do so by the record 
holder. Subscription rights extend to the ADR holders.
3.2.4 Private Placement (Rule 144A)
Under rule 14 4A non-US issuers can raise capital 
through the private placement of depositary receipts with 
large institutional investors, more specifically qualified 
institutional buyers (QIB) . A QIB is currently defined as 
an institution that owns and invests on a discretionary 
basis at least $100 Million (or, in the case of registered 
broker-dealers, $10 Million) in securities of an 
unaffiliated entity. Presently, there are more than 3,000 
QIBs.
The major advantage of a 144A ADR is that it provides 
a less expensive method of raising equity capital relative 
to a public offering while avoiding SEC registration. A 
Level I program can be established alongside a 144A program
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but not for ADRs listed on either NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. 
Prior to rule 144A traders could not resell private 
placement securities without registering them with the SEC 
or holding then for two years. Despite lack of regulation, 
disclosure of information does occur due to the negotiation 
that is involved in these deals.20 The 144A market has 
benefited from the establishment of PORTAL (Private 
Offerings Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages) 
in June 1990 by the National Association of Securities 
Dealers.
In addition to the above mentioned structures for ADR 
programs, there also exist unsponsored ADRs which are 
issued by a depositary in response to a market demand but 
without a formal agreement with the company. These ADRs 
can only trade in the OTC market, are now considered 
obsolete, and are now rarely initiated. There also ADRs of 
a few companies that trade on US Exchanges that have been 
exempted from SEC registration and disclosure requirements 
based on grand-fathering of their historical listings that 
occurred prior to 1983. Among these grand-fathered issues 
is Telefonos de Mexico, the Mexican telephone company. An 
indication of the growing importance of ADRs to US 
investors is the introduction of the ADR Index by Bank of 
New York which tracks all ADRs traded on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ. In addition to this composite index, there are
20 Interestingly, this venue also provides a mechanism for LBO owners 
who do not wish to take their companies public again to get their money out.
70
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
four regional sub-indices (for Europe, Asia, Latin America 
and Emerging markets) and various country indices.
Mexican ADRs, represent about 5 percent of the total 
depositary receipt programs by country, an impressive 
number considering the total number of firms that trade on 
Bolsa is quite small (in the vicinity of 200) and the fact 
that the country with the largest percentage of ADRs is 
United Kingdom with only 17% (at the end of June 1997) . In 
terms of share trading volume and dollar trading volume, 
Mexican ADRs account for a significant percentage of all 
ADRs in both categories and rank among the top five 
countries in term of the percentage of share and dollar 
trading volume by country. In the context of foreign 
investment in Mexico, the importance of ADRs cannot be 
overemphasized as can be seen by examining the data 
reported in Table 2.3 and in Figure 2.2.
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Chapter 4: Data Description
The data for this dissertation were provided directly 
by the Mexican stock exchange. Much of the data used in 
this study have only recently been made public. Bolsa de 
Valores did not retain any price and volume data on a 
computerized basis prior to 1989. The data used in this 
study are from 1989 to July 1996. All data used in this 
study were adjusted for dividends, stock splits and rights 
offerings. The adjustment of data is particularly 
difficult for Mexican stocks due to the presence of 
different series and the cancellation of some series. The 
Mexican stock exchange also provided adjusted price data.21 
The data provided includes only industrial, retail, and 
service firms.
A comprehensive list of all capital raising Mexican 
ADRs with information on lead underwriter, offering date, 
amount raised, and the nature of the ADR (Level III 
NYSE/AMEX or 144A) was provided by the Bank of New York. 
This information was cross-checked for all Mexican 
companies present in Moody's international Manual. The 
Bolsa does not maintain a careful distinction between NYSE 
and 144A issues. Bankers Trust permitted the use of their
21 Bolsa officials were kind enough to manually recalculate the 
adjusted prices for 5 stocks chosen at random to verify the accuracy 
of the data.
72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research database on ADRs, normally reserved for clients, 
to search all ADR programs established by Mexican firms 
with precise starting dates. Officials of Bank of New 
York and Bankers Trust were also helpful in providing 
answers to numerous technical questions about ADRs.
The financial information for Mexican firms was 
provided by Bolsa and Inverlat (a leading Mexican 
brokerage house). Officials of Inverlat translated all 
the descriptions of financial variables from Spanish to 
English. The key differences between Mexican and US 
accounting principles were obtained from The Accounting 
Profession in Mexico. The series for the Mexican National 
Consumer Price Index used to adjust the data for effects 
of inflation wherever appropriate was obtained from INEGI 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Geografia e 
Informatica). Finally weekly data on the premiums/ 
discounts on Mexican funds trading on NYSE were provided 
by Southwest Asset Trust Management Company.
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Chapter 5: Initial Public Offerings
5.1 Underpricing
5.1.1 Initial Underpricing: The International Evidence
Significant underpricing of IPOs is a well documented 
phenomenon that has been the subject of considerable 
research. Studies by Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1984, 1987) 
and more recently by Ibbotson et al. (1994) among others 
find the average first day return to IPOs in the US to 
about 15 percent. Adding to this empirical regularity is 
the growing body of international evidence on initial 
underpricing. While the US, other developed countries 
(Australia, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom etc.) and 
emerging markets (Brazil, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, etc.) 
all display IPO underpricing, the magnitude of the 
underpricing varies considerably across these three groups 
of countries. Initial returns, measured between the 
subscription price and the first trading day, are on 
average approximately 15 percent for industrialized 
countries, and on the order of 60 percent for emerging 
markets (Jenkinson and Ljunggvist, (1996)). Moreover, 
there is considerable variation in the IPO underpricing 
within the emerging market countries, ranging from 
approximately 16 percent in Chile to nearly 170 percent in 
Malaysia (Aggarwal et al. (1993), Dawson (1987)). Dhatt
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et al. (1993), Alphao (1989), Chen (1992) and Wethyavivom 
and Koo-Smith (1991) document first day returns of 78.5 
percent for Brazil, 78.1 percent for Korea, 54.4 percent 
for Portugal, 45 percent for Taiwan and 58.1 percent for 
Thailand, respectively. Clearly, these figures indicate 
that there is much higher underpricing in emerging markets 
relative to the US or other developed markets.
In the context of Mexico, Aggarwal et al. (1993) find 
that market adjusted returns measured from the offering 
price to the closing price on day 1 are 2.8 percent, which 
is not statistically significant. The median market 
adjusted return is even lower, a mere 0.7 percent. Their 
sample includes 44 companies and covers the period from 
1987 to 1990. The authors do not provide a breakdown of 
their sample in terms of the industrial classification of 
the firms or whether any IPOs were the result of the 
privatization program that the Mexican government actively 
pursued at that time. Lack of this information makes a 
careful interpretation of the results of Aggarwal et al. 
study problematic as the amount of underpricing has been 
shown to vary substantially across industries and greater 
for privatization programs than private sector issues. 
Their study does offer any detailed explanations for the 
observed low underpricing.
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A more in-depth study by Hensler et al. (1995), 
examines IPOs by 68 Mexican firms over a period of 1987 to 
1993. Their results are in marked contrast to those of 
Aggarwal et al., (1993) who report a first day average 
market adjusted return (IPC in the context of Bolsa, which 
is discussed in chapter 2) of 40.79 percent (t=3.81) for 
banks, 16.87 percent (t=3.14) for brokerage houses, 11.68 
percent (t=2.86) for industrial firms, and a statistically 
insignificant 7 percent (t=1.80) for services firms. The 
authors attribute the observed underpricing to the hot 
issue market in 1987 (nearly half of the IPOs in their 
sample were issued in 1987) and the 14 banks in the sample 
that were part of the Mexican government's privatization 
program.
The underpricing results are not so marked when the 
firms are grouped by year of offer. The average first day
returns fall within the modest range of 3.4 percent to
■ *'
8.24 percent during the period 1988 to 1992, with the 
exception of 1987 in which underpricing was a relatively 
high 34.07 percent. The authors conjecture that Mexican 
bank IPOs were an important component of the government's 
reprivatization afid reform program and to ensure its 
success the Mexican government engaged in deliberate 
underpricing, possibly motivated by nonmarket
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considerations. The results of their study are consistent 
with the hypothesis that privatization offerings engender 
substantial underpricing since underpricing for the 16 
privatized IPOs is 35.79 percent (t=3.61) while 
underpricing for the remaining 52 IPOs is 13.21 percent 
(t=4.60) . The pattern of higher first day returns for 
privatized IPOs relative to private sector issues is 
similar that reported by Menyah and Paudyal (1996) for the 
United Kingdom. This study differs from previous studies 
of Mexican IPOs not only in terms of its coverage, but 
more importantly in its focus on international equity 
offerings, a perspective unique to this study.
5.1.2 Models of Underpricing
The IPO market is characterized by problems of 
adverse selection and moral hazard that were first 
described by Akerlof (1970) .22 In the context of the IPO 
market, the several hypotheses that have been offered to 
explain documented underpricing of IPOs can be broadly 
classified into two categories: (i) theories based on
information asymmetry and (ii) institutional explanations.
In the Rock (1986) framework, it is the presence of 
informed traders that causes underpricing. It is assumed
22 Though the Akerlof (1970) paper does not directly model the IPO 
market, it is one of the earliest works that addresses the issue of 
asymmetric information.
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that informed traders invest only in issues that they 
expect to appreciate due their superior information. This 
implies that issues that increase in price ex post are 
oversubscribed due to demand from • both informed investors 
and uninformed investors. In contrast, issues that are 
overpriced ex post are undersubscribed due to the absence 
of any demand from informed traders. Thus, an uninformed 
investor receives all requested shares. Because of excess 
demand, ex post oversubscribed issues are rationed 
resulting in underpricing. Faced with this winners curse 
phenomenon, uninformed investors demand a discount in the 
offer price for a new issue. The above discussion implies 
that the magnitude of this discount (or the level of 
underpricing) is related to the extent of rationing, which 
is an increasing function of the number of informed 
traders vis-a-via the number of uninformed traders.
Beatty and Ritter (1986), Booth and Smith (1986), and 
Carter and Manaster (1990) offer tests of Rock's model. 
More specifically, Beatty and Ritter (1986) postulate that 
underpricing should increase with the ex-ante uncertainty 
surrounding the IPO. The intuition behind this result cam 
be seen by modeling information production as a call 
option on an IPO. Informed traders specialize in 
acquiring information about firms with the greatest ex
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ante uncertainty (where the uncertainty refers to the 
dispersion of the possible market values, a) . This 
follows directly from the result that the value of a call
option is an increasing function of a (where the offer
price is the exercise price) and the assumption that 
information acquisition is a costly activity. So, the 
proportion of informed capital relative to total capital
in an IPO is an increasing function of the riskiness of
the firm. It can be established that an increase in 
uncertainty implies greater underpricing since an increase 
in the uncertainty (o) causes an increase in the level of 
informed trading which in turn increases the severity of 
the winner's curse problem resulting in greater 
underpricing.
Booth and Smith (1986), and Carter and Manaster 
(1990) develop models in which the reputational capital of 
an intermediary serves as a mechanism to certify firm 
quality (as well as a disciplinary mechanism) that helps 
reduce the adverse selection problem, leading to a 
separating equilibrium. Signaling models fit within the 
Rock framework since the degree of information asymmetry 
determines the amount of underpricing. However, these 
models depart from Rock's information asymmetry structure
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by assuming that managers are better informed about the 
future cash flows of the firm than are investors, unlike 
Rock who assumes managers are uninformed. In such a 
scenario, less risky firms have am incentive to retain a 
certifies of their value to signal their lower riskiness 
to investors. Low riskiness indicates the presence of 
fewer informed traders amd consequently reduced
underpricing, as the adverse selection problem is less 
severe. A firm cannot credibly signal its own quality, 
since a firm typically goes public only once amd therefore 
has am incentive to cheat. Because the underwriter 
remains active in the market, its reputation provides a 
measure of the riskiness of the firm. More specifically, 
underwriters with high reputation will have less risky 
clients. Since underwriters earn quasi rents on their 
reputational capital, they want to avoid firms with high 
o. It is assumed that underwriters can identify o amd 
furthermore, all investors know the reputation of each
underwriter. Firms with high o do not find it to their 
advantage to pay the costs required to use high quality
underwriters, as their high a is likely to be detected by
the underwriter who would therefore charge appropriately 
higher underwriting fees.
80
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Central to the above models is the notion that the 
magnitude of underpricing is an increasing function of the 
severity of information asymmetry between management and 
investors. Accordingly, any action taken by a firm that 
reduces information asymmetry should be expected to lessen 
the underpricing of the IPO.
Titman and Trueman (1986) develops a model that 
builds on this idea and shows that a firm can use the 
quality of its auditor as a signal to convey the value of 
the firm to investors. The basic premise of their model 
is that the selection of an auditor (of a given quality) 
involves a tradeoff between the cost of the auditor (where 
the cost of an auditor's services is an increasing 
function of its quality) versus the expected gains from 
receiving a fair market value. Only firms with favorable 
information find it cost-effective to use a high quality 
auditor. Higher quality auditors can be assumed to 
provide more reliable information because of their higher 
reputational capital involved in the process. This 
implies that firms (investors) can use the quality of the 
auditor as a signal to reveals managerial private 
information, where private information refers to 
uncertainty regarding a firm's future cash flow. Auditors 
are able to mitigate this uncertainty, and the degree to
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which they are able to lessen this uncertainty depends 
directly upon their quality. This line of reasoning is 
similar to that of Leland and Pyle (1977) who show that 
the amount of an entrepreneur's ownership in a project can 
reflects his private information. While the Titman and 
Trueman model focuses on the effect of the quality of the 
auditor on the value of a new issue, it is broadly 
applicable to any third party such as investment bankers 
that can provide credible information about the firm.
Models based on asymmetric information discussed 
above argue that the quality of a firm's auditor and 
underwriter serve as signaling devices that can be used to 
convey the value of the firm to investors. However, these 
signaling devices reveal partial and not complete 
information, and therefore complement each other. Slovin 
and Young (1990) show that banks (in the context of 
providing loans) also provide valuable information which 
they acquire in the process of (i) evaluating a loan to 
limit adverse selection problems and (ii) monitoring the 
borrower to limit moral hazard. In comparison to auditors 
and underwriters, banks have an incentive to continuously 
monitor borrowing firms since bank loans are private 
securities that usually have a lower claim compared to 
other fixed-payoff claim holders. Therefore, the presence
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of bank debt in an issuing firm's portfolio can be 
expected to lessen information asymmetry between the firm 
and investors so firms with bank debt should experience 
less underpricing relative to firms with no bank debt, a 
result that is consistent with Slovin and Young's 
evidence.
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang
(1989), and Welch (1989) view underpricing as a deliberate 
action taken by firms as a signal of firm quality. In 
this two stage financing model, high quality firms can 
afford to underprice their IPO in the expectation that 
they will later be able to obtain a higher price in 
subsequent seasoned equity offerings. Firms of lower 
quality are unable to mimic this signal as it is expected 
that information pertaining to firm quality will be 
revealed prior to the post-IPO financing. In essence, the 
firm underwrites itself by incurring a high deadweight 
cost, namely underpricing. Although firms primarily 
signaling with underpricing, the retention rate of the 
owners also signals firm quality, consistent with the 
model of Leland and Pyle (1977) ,23 Welch (1989) reports 
that a quarter of companies that went public between 1977
23 It would be Irrational and inefficient for a lower quality firm to 
hold a large non-diversified portfolios and assume unsystematic risk.
83
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and 1982 made a seasoned offering within three years of 
going public. In contrast, Helwege and Liang (1996) find 
fewer that 4 percent of the companies that went public in 
1983 make subsequent equity offerings in the ten years 
following the IPO. Moreover, Garfinkel (1993) finds that 
underpricing does not significantly affect the likelihood 
of reissuing equity. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) 
question the Welch Hypothesis as an explanation of 
underpricing in countries where shareholders hold pre­
emptive rights, since there would be no benefits from 
signaling with underpricing in such a situation. Rights 
offerings are one of the dominant forms of raising capital 
in Mexico. Moreover, implicit in these two stage 
financing models is the assumption of some minimum capital 
requirement at flotation. Otherwise, "a firm could signal 
by indefinitely underpricing a single share, and 
subsequently raising its required funds in the after- 
market. The cost of such a signaling strategy would be 
zero, which would violate the single crossing condition, 
Jenkinson and Ljunggvist (1996) ." This assumption seems 
to be appropriate for US or UK markets where the typical 
IPO companies are young and small. However, in some 
countries such as Mexico issuers are large and well
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established and are clearly not constrained by this 
minimum capital requirement.
Benveniste and Spindt's (1989) analysis of IPOs is in 
contrast to models that view the underpricing phenomenon 
as a result of a winner's curse problem. In models based 
on information asymmetry between informed traders and 
uninformed traders there is no incentive for the informed 
traders to reveal their information. That is, the 
allocation mechanism does not distinguish informed traders 
from uninformed traders. This still leads to a rationing
bias against uninformed traders as informed traders invest
only in issues that are ex post underpriced. Also,
implicit is the assumption that participation by 
uninformed traders is necessary in order for an issue to 
be fully subscribed. Benveniste and Spindt treat the IPO 
premarket as an auction where the underwriter (auctioneer) 
invites bids from its regular customers. In this 
framework, an underwriter has regular vs. occasional 
customers. The regular customers possess information that 
is superior to both that of the issuing firm and the
underwriter. In this context, underpricing is
compensation paid to induce informal investors to reveal 
their information correctly. In this model, underwriters 
promote underpricing as their reputation is directly
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dependent upon maintaining long-term relationships with a 
core group of well-informed investors. This relationships 
depends upon regular investors earning expected future 
profits as a result of this underpricing as determined by 
the extent of underpricing. Given the book-building 
activities that occurs prior to an IPO in many countries, 
this model seems highly relevant in trying to incorporate 
this information gathering stage.
Tinic (1988) and Hughes and Thakor (1992), propose a 
lawsuit avoidance hypothesis that argues underpricing is 
the means by which issuers can protect themselves a prior 
against losses from future litigation by investors. Thus 
IPO underpricing is no more than cost of insuring against 
these potential legal liabilities. In addition to these 
direct costs there is also the issue of the loss of 
reputational capital of the underwriter. Drake and 
Vetsuypens's (1993) study finds little empirical support 
for this lawsuit avoidance hypothesis. They find that a 
sample of IPOs that were subsequently involved in 
litigation were just as underpriced as other IPOs of 
similar size. Furthermore, class action lawsuits
typically include investors who purchased the stock in the 
aftermarket.
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5.2 Long-Run Performance
5.2.1 Empirical Evidence and Models of Long-Run 
Underperf ormance
Ritter (1991) and Loughram and Ritter (1995) examine 
the long run performance of IPOs and find substantial 
underperformance of IPOs in the first few years after 
flotation. The finding that IPOs on average underper form 
nonissuing firms of similar size and underperform market 
indexes has been confirmed by Carter, Dark and Singh 
(1998), Affleck-Graves, Hedge and Miller (1996), Loughran 
(1993), and Aggarwaal and Rivoli (1990) among others for 
the US. This pattern of underperformance has also been 
documented for different countries and over different time 
periods. Studies by Aggarwal et al. (1993), Keloharju
(1993), Hin and Mahmood (1993) and Levis (1993) find 
negative adjusted returns in the aftermarket for Brazil, 
Finland, Germany, Singapore and UK, respectively. The 
international evidence on the long run performance of IPOs 
is mixed, however, with Japan, Korea and Sweden showing 
raw and adjusted returns that are positive for three year 
aftermarket performance. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist
(1994) contend that results showing departure from the 
poor long run performance observed for the US and other 
countries may be due to the bias in the time period
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analyzed. The sample period covered in some studies tends 
to focus on periods with high IPO activity which is 
associated with bull markets. Studies covering longer 
time intervals that include bear market periods would then 
be expected to report lower term longer returns than 
currently observed.
Unlike initial underpricing, the long run performance 
of IPOs as well explanations for this anomaly remain more 
open issue in the current academic literature. In the 
absence of any arguments that present this stylized fact 
as an "equilibrium outcome of a consistent economic model" 
it has been difficult to reconcile this apparent anomaly 
with the fundamental conditions of no arbitrage and market 
efficiency. Although many studies find IPO aftermarket 
underperformance to be economically and statistically 
significant, it is not clear what should constitute the 
appropriate benchmark portfolio for measuring these long 
run returns (Ritter (1991)). In fact, the estimation of 
the long-run performance of IPOs is sensitive to the 
choice of benchmark portfolio. Arguments of risk mis- 
measurement, such as the failure to adjust for betas or 
alternatively the assumption of unit time invariant betas 
are valid criticism of the long-run performance results 
but cannot account for the degree or extent of the
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underpricing observed. This point is well summarized by 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996), "few long-run studies 
adjust for systematic risk, but most researchers tend to 
view the resulting bias as negligible; given the extent of 
underperformance, betas would have to be implausibly small 
or even negative (in rising markets) to explain away 
long-run losses purely as risk adjusted returns."
Spiess and Afflec-Graves (1995) find similar 
underperformance even for seasoned equity offerings
suggesting that long-term negative returns are not unique 
to IPOs. The major conclusion drawn from the observed 
long run underperformance is that managers are able to 
take advantage of windows of opportunity, that is, to 
conduct IPOs when investors are overly optimistic about 
the future potential of new issues (Aggarwal and Rivoli
(1990), Ritter (1991), Levis (1993), and Speiss and 
Affleck-Graves (1995)) . Besides the obvious question of 
the reasons for the systematic optimism shown by 
investors, this line of reasoning contradicts models of 
initial underpricing that are based on the premise that 
the aftermarket values new issues efficiently. For
example, the fads and timing hypothesis of long run 
underperformance indirectly imply that the positive
initial returns observed for IPOs are not due to
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deliberate underpricing (irrespective of the reasoning 
behind it), a somewhat unsettling suggestion.
Brav and Gompers (1997) argue that underperformance 
is determined by firm characteristics rather than by 
whether the offering is an IPO or not. They find that 
only the smallest nonventure backed companies underperform 
while venture backed companies do not show any significant 
underperformance. More interestingly they find that 
underperformance is concentrated in small, low book-to- 
market firms and not observed for the typical IPO. This 
result is consistent with Ritter's (1991) findings that 
underperformance results are largely driven by young, 
speculative growth firms. These results imply that it is 
the small firms that are more likely to be misvalued that 
is overvalued, due to fads or the over optimistic 
sentiments of investors who are primarily individuals.24
In a broader context it is the information asymmetry 
that causes lower returns and not IPO per se. There is 
some empirical evidence that lends indirect support to 
this more refined investor sentiment hypothesis, one that 
focuses on small firms. Carter, Dark and Singh (1998)
24 According to Brav and Gompers (1997), "it might not pay for a 
sophisticated investor to research a small firm because they cannot 
recoup costs of information gathering and trading. The absolute 
return that an investor can make is small because the dollar size of 
the stake is limited by firm size.*
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find that long run underperformance is less pronounced for 
IPOs associated with more prestigious underwriters. This 
findings is consistent with the argument that investment 
banks are interested in protecting their reputational 
capital and can do so by underwriting the IPOs of the 
firms that have relatively better long run returns.
Fields (1996) shows that long-term IPO returns are 
positively related to institutional holdings. Ritter
(1991) finds that on partitioning aftermarket performance 
by age, firms less than 2 years old have an average 
matching firm-adjusted initial return of 29.42 percent and 
3 year holding return of 5.34 percent. In contrast, firms 
older than 20 years have initial returns of 5.42 percent 
and 3 year holding period raw returns of 91.81 percent 
(that is, they outperform the matching firms) . Similar 
but weaker patterns are reported for aftermarket 
performance categorized by gross proceeds.
Although there is no unified theory of initial 
underpricing and long run performance, the Welch (1989) 
model views underpricing as a deliberate action by firms 
to signal firm quality and thus would predict positive 
after market returns for underpriced firms. Since, in 
this framework, firms recoup their underpricing costs in 
subsequent equity offerings, a declining stock price would
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be inconsistent with such a strategy. However, studies by 
Ritter (1991), Levis (1993), and Aggarwal, Leal and 
Hernandez (1993) find a negative relation between initial 
returns and aftermarket performance. More specifically, 
firms with the highest initial returns have the worst 
long-term returns. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996) 
hypothesize that in a Benveniste amd Spindt (1989) 
framework firms with upward price adjustment in the offer 
price relative to the filing price range should perform 
better than firms with downward price adjustment. Such an 
argument implicitly assumes that an upward price 
adjustment indicates positive information being revealed 
by the informed investors as part of the book building 
process and vice-versa. Weiss (1993) does not find any 
difference between the performance of firms that 
experienced an upward price adjustment compared to those 
that had a downward price adjustment. In sum, there seems 
to be no satisfactory theoretical explanation of observed 
long run underperformance associated with IPOs. Despite 
of the inherent difficulties in measuring long run 
performance, the empirical evidence makes it hard to 
dismiss this stylized fact.
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5.2.2 Measuring Long Run Performance
Long run returns are calculated using Ritter's (1991) 
methodology. Month 0 is defined as the initial return 
period. The aftermarket returns are calculated for the 
next 36 months where each month consists of successive 21 
trading days relative to the IPO date. Month 1 thus 
comprises event days 2-22 (that is, it excludes initial 
returns), month 2 covers event days 23-43, and so on. The 
monthly returns are calculated as follows:25
arit= rit - rmt
where artt is the monthly IPC-adjusted return for stock i 
in event month t. The variable rtt is monthly raw return 
for stock i in event month t, calculated by compounding 
the daily returns for 21 day trading period. rmt is the 
corresponding monthly return on the IPC index (the IPC 
index is discussed in chapter 2) . The average abnormal 
return for a portfolio of n stocks for event month t is:
25 Following Aggarwal, Leal and Hernadez (1993) the monthly market 
adjusted abnormal return for each IPO event month t is also calculate 
as:
This is done to account for the effects of inflation but the results 
are not materially different and therefore only presented in figure 
5.1 for comparison purposes.
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the t-statistic is given by:
where nt is the number of observation in month t and sdt is 
the cross sectional standard deviation of the adjusted 
returns for month t. The cumulative abnormal return from 
event month 1 to even month t is given by:
where var is the average cross sectional variance over 36 
months and cov is the first order autocovariance of the 
ARt series. Implicit in the above procedure is the idea 
of monthly rebalancing. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist
(1994) recommend the use of buy-and-hold returns which may 
better describe the behavior of the typical investor. 
Unlike CARs, buy-and-hold returns do not imply selling
CARi.t-Y.ABi
r=l
and the appropriate t statistic is calculated as:
[/ * var+ 2 * (/ - 1)* cov]
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well performing stocks to buy more of past underperformers 
to maintain equal allocation of proceeds in each IPO at 
the same stage of seasoning. The buy-and-hold returns are 





A performance measure based on this buy-and-hold return is
the wealth relative, defined as:
WR = 1+average t-month total return on IPOs 
1+average t-month total return on IPC
A wealth relative greater than 1.00 indicates IPOs
outperforming the market benchmark, while a wealth
relative of less than 1.00 indicates that IPOs
underperformed.
5.3 Operating Performance
Degeorge and Zeckhauser's (1993) investigation of
reverse leveraged buyouts (LBOs), a special class of IPOs
offers several interesting theoretical insights as well as
empirical evidence regarding operating performance
following an IPO. Their model draws upon the Myers and
Majluf (1984) framework in which managers try to arbitrage
the market, based on their private information about the
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future prospects of the firm by issuing stock when it is 
likely to be overvalued. Importantly, market participants 
are not fooled and factor this lemons problem into their 
valuation of the issuing firm's stock. Along the same 
lines of reasoning, firms will choose to go public when 
their operating performance is above average and expected 
to fall in the future. In this stylized model, since the 
firm decided to stay private the year before, the 
implication is that the previous year's performance must 
have been below the firm's true potential. Thus, an 
increase in operating performance (on an industry adjusted 
basis or more generally relative to a control group) in 
the pre-offering year with a subsequent decline in 
operating performance would be the predictions of this 
model.
Information asymmetry and the adverse selection 
problem induced by it are not the only reason why a strong 
gain or peak in operating performance (followed by 
subsequent decline) of a firms can be expected to coincide 
with the decision to go public. Performance manipulation 
or performance borrowing may be another reason why such 
changes in operating performance might be expected. 
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) offer a simple example in 
which it is assumed that the company sells shares at a
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certain multiple of its earnings. Thus, it is in the best 
interests of the managers to boost earnings. Managers 
could engage in such performance manipulation by using 
various methods to increase sales temporarily (at the 
expense of future sales) or defering research and
development expenses or even soft-pedaling prior years 
earnings to show an improvement leading up to the time of 
the IPO. According to Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (1996), US 
GAAP accounting allows IPOs great flexibility in reporting 
their earnings and even allows them to retroactively 
restate all financial information presented in the 
prospectuses. Teoh, Wong and Rao (1993) present empirical 
evidence that shows IPOs make extensive use of this 
practice. Moreover, if the market expects such
manipulation and downgrades the multiple it attaches to
earnings, this expectation could itself cause earnings
manipulation.
Other possible explanations for the observed pattern 
in operating performance around and following an IPO are 
based on corporate governance and ownership change 
considerations. Reduced managerial ownership following an 
IPO may lead to agency problems (Jensen and Meckling 
(1987), Jensen (1989)). However, it is not clear at the 
outset whether managerial incentives could be sufficiency
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diminished by the IPO for the lost incentives hypothesis 
to alone account for the deterioration in operating 
performance subsequent to an IPO.
Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) report empirical 
evidence that shows companies typically go public 
following particularly strong operating performance but 
are unable to sustain the pre-IPO performance. In terms 
of stock price performance, reverse LBOs do not 
underperform a group of comparison firms. This implies 
that although the operating performance of IPOs shows a 
decline, the market is not surprised and appropriately 
discounts this effect irrespective of whether such a 
decline in operating performance is due to (i) information 
asymmetry, (ii) inflated accounting figures, or (iii) 
agency problems, as discussed above.
Jain and Kini (1994) is the first study of the post­
issue operating performance of IPO firms. Their study 
finds all that for the years examined from -1 to +3 (year 
-1 being the fiscal year prior to the IPO) IPO outperform 
a comparable group of industry firms in terms of
operating return on assets. However, this difference is 
statistically significant only until year +1. In terms of 
operating cash flow deflated by assets, IPOs outperform 
their industry counterparts, but only in year -1. Though
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the authors do not report the figures for this absolute 
level of performance, the inference that can be drawn from 
the information presented is that the biggest difference 
in operating performance between IPOs and the comparable 
industry sample is in year -1. The change in operating 
performance of IPOs shows a very different pattern with 
the median values with operating performance showing a 
decline for all years 0, +1, +2 and +3 relative to year -1 
both on an unadjusted as well as a industry adjusted 
basis.
Jain and Kini partition their results based on the 
fraction of the equity retained by the original 
shareholders to examine whether the operating performance 
results can be explained by the agency model of Jensen and 
Meckling (1987) and the ownership retention signaling 
model of Leland and Pyle (1977) . The median level of 
equity retained by original entrepreneurs is a high 71.04 
percent. The high-ownership group (ownership £ 73.12
percent) outperforms the low ownership group for each of 
the four years 0, +1, +2 and +3 relative to -1 both on a 
unadjusted as well as a adjusted basis. However, the high 
ownership group and the low ownership group born a 
statistically significant decline in operating 
performance, both before and after industry adjustment,
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for each of the four years relative to -1. The authors do 
not find any relationship between post-IPO performance and 
initial underpricing. This is not necessarily strong 
evidence against theories that model underpricing as a 
signal of firm quality, because it is an open question as 
to how effective operating performance is as a measure of 
firm quality.
Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) also report a 
decline in operating performance in their study of IPOs. 
Other thain this overall drop in operating performance the 
results and conclusions of their study are markedly 
different from those of Jain and Kini (1994) . Mikkelson 
et al. (1997) show that operating income of IPOs deflated 
by either sales or assets exceeds the performance of a 
matched control group before flotation. The subsequent 
decline in operating performance is however limited to the 
first year after the firm goes public. Median operating 
income on an industry adjusted basis falls from nine cents 
in year -1 to a negative two cents in year +1. The 
performance does not decline significantly during the 
second through tenth years. Also comparison of firm 
characteristics prior to and after the offering show that 
while the median book value of assets increases from $5.8 
million to $19.2 million, the composition of assets in
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terms of current assets and plant and equipment does not 
change much. The most noticeable change is in the 
financial leverage which decreases significantly. This 
empirical finding is shared by Pagano, Panetta and 
Zingales (1992) who interput this observation as 
suggesting that companies time the market. This is 
somewhat inconsistent with the high market-to-book ratios 
observed at the time of the IPOs, implying high investment 
needs in sectors with high growth opportunities.
Mikkelson et al. (1997) do not find any relationship 
between operating performance and the ownership level of 
officers and directors, in contrast to the Jain and Kini 
study. The median ownership retained by officers and 
directors drops from 67.9 percent before the IPO to 43.7 
percent immediately afterwards. The ownership level of 
officers and directors continues to decrease with the 
median stake of officers falling to 28.6 percent in year 
five and 17.9 percent in year 10. It is worth noting that 
it takes almost ten years before the ownership stake of 
officers and directors reaches the level that is normally 
observed in publicly traded firms. Even though there is a 
significant decline in management ownership immediately 
following the IPO, the size of their ownership stake is 
sufficiently real to align the interests of managers with
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those of the shareholders. In later years, external 
monitoring, the threat of takeover, and stock-based 
compensation plans mitigate the negative effects 
associated with the lower ownership stake of managers. 
The poor performance is mainly concentrated in small and 
young firms; in fact, large and established companies do 
not underperform industry matched firms. The authors 
suspect the high initial operating costs and low sales 
combined with an aggressive pricing strategy might be 
responsible for the poor performance of the smaller and 
less established firms. Loughran and Ritter (1997) find 
similar results but in the context of seasoned equity 
offerings. They find a decline in operating performance 
even for large issuers but the post-issue deterioration 
is more severe for smaller companies.
5.4 Empirical Results
5.4.1 Description and Firm-Profiles of IPOs
The sample includes Mexican firms that went public 
during the period January 1989 and July 1996. The IPOs 
are classified based on the place of listing. Domestic 
IPOs refer to offerings that were strictly made only in 
Mexico, that is on the Bolsa, with no foreign tranche. 
Global IPOs refer to companies that conducted an equity 
offering in Mexico and the US, either on NYSE/AMEX or the
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144A private placement market concurrently. The global 
IPOs also include a small number of shares sold in Canada 
and Asia. It should be noted that domestic IPOs do not 
imply the complete absence of foreign participation in the 
afhecings as foreign investors can invest in Mexican 
stocks by purchasing free subscription shares directly. 
The important differences between a Level III sponsored 
ADR program and 144A private placement are discussed in 
chapter 3.
Table 5.1 presents a breakdown of IPOs by year and 
place of listing. The years 1989 and 1995 were clearly 
periods with low IPO activity, there being only one new 
public offering in each year. The devaluation of the Peso 
is mainly responsible for the lack of new offerings by 
Mexican companies. The resulting loss of foreign 
confidence explains why there were no international equity 
offerings in 1995. A look at Table 5.1 creates the 
impression that international offerings came to complete 
stop after 1994. This result is misleading, however, as 
the table covers a period only until July of 1996 and does 
not report IPOs (both domestic as well as global) that 
were made in the later half of 1996 and in 1997. Thus the 
process of international equity offerings that started 
in the early 90s and slowed down in the mid 90s has since
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Table 5.1
Breakdown of Mexican IPOs by Year and Kind
This table lists the number of Mexican IPOs by year and by place of listing. 
International equity offerings refer to the special case of IPOs which involve 
both a domestic offering and an international offering (in the form of ADRs), 
concurrently. The international offering is further broken down by whether 
the international offering is a NYSE/AMEX Level III sponsored ADR program or a 
Private Placement under Rule 144A.




(Balsa as well as tike following:)
HTSE/AUKX 144A
1989 1 — — 1
1990 4 — — 4
1991 6 — 6 12
1992 2 1 3 6
1993 5 8 — 13
1994 15 2 2 19
1995 1 — — 1
«
1996 6 — — 6
Total 40 11 11 62
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shown a resurgence. The offerings with a 144A tranche 
were more popular in the early 90s with a total of nine 
IPOs in 1991 and 1992. In 1993 and 1994 the international 
IPOs were more concentrated in the NYSE/AMEX category then 
in the 144A market. This trend of conducting IPOs in the 
early 90s in the 144A market and then shifting to 
NYSE/AMEX is shared by other Latin American countries 
also. The total of 22 global IPOs includes all Mexican 
IPOs that occurred between 1989 and 1996 and that had a 
foreign tranche. The domestic IPOs do not include every 
IPO that took place on Bolsa in the time span covered by 
this study because offerings by brokerage firms or 
financial groups are excluded. The domestic IPOs are 
evenly spread over the years with the exception of 1994 
when there were 15 new IPOs.
Table 5.2 presents the IPOs by year and industrial 
classification. Industrial firms dominate the sample with 
24 observations, followed by 14 for retail firms, 9 for 
construction firms and 14 for communications, 
transportation, services, and holding firms. Both the 
total number of IPOs as well as global IPOs are more or 
less evenly distributed over the different sectors for the 
time span covered in this study. This distribution of 
IPOs is quite different from the one Hensler et al. (1995)
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This table lists the number of IPOs in Mexico by year and industry classification. The IPOs include both domestic as 
well as international offerings. The industry classification presented here has been adapted from the Mexican Stock 






Mini ng Industrials Construction CossMroe Comm, and 
transport
Services Holding
1989 — — — — — — 1 1
1990 — 1 1 1 — — 1 4
1991 — 5(1) — 3(2) 1(1) 2 (2) 1 12(6)
1992 — — 2(2) 2(1) — 1(1) 1 6 (4)
1993 — 4(3) 3(3) 4(1) 2(1) — — 13(8)
1994 1 10(2) 3(1) 3 1(1) 1 — 19(4)
1995 — — — — — -- 1 1
1996 — 4 — 1 1 — — 6
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Printing Editorial 
Steel Industry Metallurgical Industry 
Metal Manufacture 
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Transportation Machinery And Equipment 
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in which IPOs by banks (mostly privatization) and 
brokerage houses dominate the sample.
Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics in the IPO 
pre-market on the offer price, number of shares offered, 
gross proceeds and age (Table 5.4 presents some 
descriptive statistics in the IPO after-market). The
offering price of an ADR (Level III or 144A) differs from 
the offering price of the stock in Mexico because a single 
ADR usually represents some multiple of the underlying
stock. The offering price in Table 5.3 is however
unaffected by this as it is stated on a per share (and not
ADR) basis to facilitate comparisons across different
groups. The offering price of NYSE IPOs is the highest 
with a mean of 21.11 Pesos and a median of 13.19 Pesos.
The offering price of 144A IPOs and domestic IPOs is not
very different with a means (medians) of 7.31 (3.60) and
8.27 (3.30), respectively. Difference of means tests
using t-test for means and Kruskal-Wallis test for medians 
reveal that the offer price of NYSE IPOs is significantly 
different from that of 144A IPOs as well from domestic
IPOs at the 5 percent level of significance. The number 
of shares offered represents the sum of the shares offered 
in the home market and the shares offered in the 
international markets (the number of ADRs offered is
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The IPO Pre-Market Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the offer price, number of shares offered, gross proceeds and age.





NYSE 11 21.11 13.19 17.84 2.18 52.88
144A 11 7.31 3.60 7.02 2.25 23.70
Domestic 33 8.27 3.30 11.30 1.28 59.90













Number of Shares Offered
NYSE 11 45406493.64 34000000 27307365.83 13636000 85731400
144A 10 86817747.00 83000000 77271407.60 12570100 262616318
Domestic 33 26127407.73 19631516 30395876.22 5000 149523196































NYSE 11 623887910.3 632750472.0 325419973.80 165680000 1300850000
144A 10 345986392.9 244772405.4 182193641.01 187294490 678988144
Domestic 33 128433070.3 82620552.5 123457040.25 13600 535500000














NYSE 11 34.45 25 25.66 5 102
144A 11 30.45 26 30.89 2 105
Domestic 39 16.00 11 15.37 1 58



































The IPO After-Market Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the closing price, market value and the volume traded on the l“ trading day after the offer price.





NYSE 11 22.72 16.05 19.98 2.19 60.40
144A 11 7.56 3.71 7.34 2.32 25.00
Domestic 39 9.76 4.19 15.00 0.10 73.00













Market Value ((>00 N$)
NYSE 11 3606200.33 2527125.58 3005588.89 691657.62 9477519.95
144A 11 1590075.42 1000911.05 1237562.66 552029.17 4628657.48
Domestic 36 1329226.79 315387.46 2185942.47 37857.14 8625609.19




























NYSE 11 1303260.27 600000 2111764.07 5000 7496000144A 11 1323415.36 395000 1952171.24 5000 5454069
Domestic 39 28791958.77 48000 159397466.25 0 994951052




















converted into number of local shares by multiplying by 
the appropriate factor). The domestic IPOs display the 
lowest number of total shares offered with a mean (median) 
of 26,127,407 (19,631,516) shares. The number of shares
offered by domestic IPOs is statistically different from 
those offered by the other sub-groups. This difference is 
present both for the mean and the median number of shares. 
This result suggests that it is the relatively smaller 
firms (lower number of shares in conjunction with lower 
offer price) that conduct a purely domestic offering. 
Owing to the relatively smaller size of the offerings, 
these companies do not find it economical to include a 
foreign tranche in their offerings. In addition, the
costs of establishing and maintaining an ADR program 
arguably exceed the potential benefits of a foreign 
listing for these companies.
Table 5.5 presents the percentage of equity sold in 
the different markets. The overall percentage of equity 
sold (that is number of shares offered divided by total 
number of shares) is about the same for NYSE, 144A and 
domestic IPOs with a median figure of 22 percent. A lower 
offer price makes the 144A and domestic IPOs smaller 
issues compared to NYSE IPOs in terms of gross proceeds. 
The importance of the foreign tranche can be clearly seen
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Percentage of Equity Sold
This table presents the percentage of equity (number of shares offered divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding) sold in different markets.
* Numbers are expressed as Percentage
Peroentaqm of Equity Sold in Mexico




NYSE 11 7.73 6.09 6.11 2.94 24.81
144A 10 14.50 10.96 11.74 3.31 42.69
Domestic 33 30.98 27.71 25.72 0.02 100.00
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsamples










Percentage of Equity Sold In US
NYSE 11 16.74 15.88 8.19 4.26 33.19
144A 11 15.57 13.27 9.70 3.33 32.48





Total Impact (the comb ned percentaae of equity Mid in all markets)
NYSE 11 24.47 22.34 11.62 8.81 44.25
144A 10 28.38 22.72 18.23 13.33 75.17
Domestic 33 30.98 27.71 25.72 0.02 100.00













*T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 level 
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 level
in table 5.5, with the NYSE and 144A IPOs issuing a 
greater percentage of equity in the US than in Mexico. 
Thus, global IPOs by Mexican firms are not only relatively 
larger issues but include a foreign tranche that is bigger 
than the domestic component of the offering.
In terms of gross proceeds, the NYSE IPOs have the 
highest proceeds with a mean (median) of 623,887,910 
(632,750,472) Pesos. The mean (median) gross proceeds for 
the 144A and domestic IPOs are 345,986,392 (244,772,405)
and 128,433,070 (82,620,552) Pesos, respectively. The
difference among the three sub-groups are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level for both the mean and 
the median. This result implies that there is a certain 
hierarchy in terms of firm size (gross proceeds being a 
proxy for firm size) and listing venue. Level III ADR 
programs are established by large companies, 144A programs 
by intermediate sized companies, and purely domestic 
listings by relatively smaller companies. The age of the 
firms is calculated as the date of listing minus the date 
of constitution. However, in many cases the date of 
constitution is simply the date of incorporation or the 
date when a company changed its name and thus does not 
necessarily reflect the true starting date of a company. 
The resulting understated age figure was corrected by
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obtaining the earliest available date of establishment by 
using different sources such as Moody's Reports, the 
Mexican Company Handbook, and publications of Mexican 
brokerage houses. The mean (median) age of the NYSE IPOs 
and 144A IPOs is 35 (25) and 30 (26) years, respectively. 
There is no statistical significant difference between the 
ages of these two groups. The mean (median) age for the 
domestic IPOs is 16 (11) years which is considerably less 
than that of the other groups. In contrast the typical US 
IPO firm is only six years old, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(1996) . Thus, Mexican firms that go public are much older 
than US firms that go public.
The different groups of IPOs display parallel
characteristics in the IPO after-market just as in the 
pre-market. Consistent with a higher offering price, the 
NYSE IPOs also have a higher closing price with a mean 
(median) of 22.72 (16.05) pesos. The market values of the 
three sub-groups also differ considerably (the differences 
in medians for all three sub-groups are statistically
significant at the 5 percent level) with the median values
being 2,527 million, 1,000 million and 257 million Pesos
for NYSE IPOs, 144A IPOs and domestic IPOs respectively. 
The differences in the volume of trading between the three 
sub-groups is especially noteworthy. A higher volume of
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trading is observed for NYSE IPOs (mean of 1,303,260 and 
median of 600,000 shares) and 144A IPOs (mean of 1,323,425 
and median 395,000 shares) relative to domestic IPOs 
(median of 48,000 shares). This result can be explained 
by (i) Bolsa's policy of maintaining continuous trading 
for stocks traded in international markets and (ii) 
trading by arbitrageurs in the two markets. The mean 
figure is less representative due to the presence of an 
extreme observation.
5.4.2 Results on Underpricing
Table 5.6 and Table 5.8 list the results for initial 
underpricing. The results are presented for various sub 
groups formed by partitioning the data based on listing 
venue, age, gross proceeds, industry classification, and 
year of listing. The results are reported on a raw and on 
a market adjusted basis by subtracting the contemporaneous 
market return from the initial return. Table 5.9 and 
Table 5.10 present initial returns for the first week and 
the first month on a market adjusted basis, respectively. 
It is not uncommon in some countries for these initial 
one-day return to persist beyond the first day sometimes 
up to a period of several weeks due to infrequent trading 
or restrictions on price movements (Loughran et al., 
(1994)). In fact, for Mexico, Aggarwal et al. report the
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Table 5.6
Initial Underpricing
Panel A provides statistics for raw returns (the average initial return is 
computed for the initial period (Month 0) defined as the offering date to the 
first closing price). Panel B provides the market adjusted returns (raw 
returns less the contemporaneous, market return).
♦ Numbers are expressed as Percentage
By  Place of Listing
Panel A: R aw Returns
IPO Kind H Mea n Median STD 1 " 99“
Percentile Percentile
NYSE 11 5.81** 4.30** 7.27 -0.03 21.68
144A 11 3.66** 4.28** 2.86 0.00 10.17
Domestic 33 1.99** 0 .00** 3.36 -0.89 13.87
Complete 55 3.09** 1.2 0** 4.52 -0.89 21.68Sample
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns
IPO Kind H Mea n Median STD 1“ 99“
Percentile Percentile
NYSE 11 5.90** 3.70** 7.36 -1.53 21.77
144A 11 4.09** 3.80** 2.98 -0.22 9.48
Domestic 33 2.25** 1.28** 3.68 -2.24 14.79
Complete 55 3.35** 2.08** 4.67 -2.24 21.77
Sample
By  A?m
Panel A: Raw Returns
ASS H M ean Muiti m STD 1” 99“
Percentile Percentile
< 5 8 4.70** 4.69* 4.72 -0.89 11.05
6-15 16 1.19** 0.58** 1.64 0.00 5.09
16-33 15 1.03* 0.00* 2.00 -0.03 6.27
>33 16 6.10** 4.29** 6.14 0.00 21.68
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns
AGE H M ean Median STD 1“ 99**
Percentile Percentile
< 5 8 4.88** 4.95** 4.14 -0.86 10.22
6-15 16 1.25** 0.52* 2.22 -2.18 5.07
16-33 15 1.17 0.04 2.62 -1.53 7.74>33 16 6.72** 4.17** 6.05 -2.24 21.77
By Gross Proceeds
Panel A: Raw Returns
Gross(H$) H Mean Mull an STD 1“ 99“
Proceeds Percentile Percentile
< 55M 14 1.74** 1.71** 1.91 0.00 5.47
56M-184M 14 1.17* 0.23* 2.38 -0.89 7.91
185M-424M 14 5.13** 2.42** S.SI -0.03 21.68
>424M 13 4.40** 4.30** 4.54 0.00 16.08
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns
Gross (N$) H Mean Median STD 1“ 99“
Proceeds Percentile Percentile
< 55M 14 1.98** 2.13** 2.50 -2.24 6.37
56M-184M 14 1.47* 0.86* 2.78 -2.18 7.95
185M-424M 14 5.22** 3.41** 6.69 -1.30 21.77
>424M 13 4.84** 3.80** 4.69 -1.53 14.88
*T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 level
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.7
Analysis of Initial Returns by Gross 
Proceeds Adjusted for Inflation
Panel A provides statistics for raw returns (the average initial return is 
computed for the initial period (Month 0) defined as the offering date to the 
first closing price) . Panel B, C and D provides the market adjusted returns 
(raw returns less the contemporaneous, market return). Gross proceeds are 
measured in Pesos of December 1996 purchasing power using the Mexican National 
Consumer Price Index.* Numbers are expressed as percentage
By 1“ Day
Panel A: Raw Returns
Gross (K$) V Mean Median STD I " 99“
Proceeds Percentile Percentile
<127M 14 1.61** 0.76** 1.97 0.00 5.47
128M-371M 14 1.30* 0.51** 2.36 -0.89 7.91
372M-836M 13 5.53** 3.51** 6.77 0.00 21.68
>836M 14 4.08** 4.29** 4.52 -0.03 16.08
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns
Gross(N$) H Mean Median STD 1“ 99“
Proceeds Percentile Percentile
<127M 14 1 .86** 1.60** 2.53 -2.24 6.37
128M-371M 14 1.59* 1.17* 2.76 -2.18 7.95
372M-836M 13 5.65** 3.54** 6.75 -0.83 21.77
>836M 14 4.46** 3.75** 4.73 -1.53 14.88
By 7“ Day
Panel C: Market Adjusted Returns
Gross (H$) N Mean Median STD 1“ 99“
Proceeds Percentile Percentile
<127M 14 1.93** 1.77** 2.88 -3.12 5.77
128M-371M 14 2.91 0.48 6.46 -3.56 18.97
372M-836M 13 7.23** 2.17* 10.87 -3.23 26.27
>836M 14 6.92** 2.60** 9.79 -1.43 33.32
By 30“ Day
Panel D: Market Adjusted Returns
Gross (MS) N Mean Marti in STD 1“ 99“
Proceeds Percentile Percentile
<127M 13 2.51 0.74 8.23 -8.00 22.22
128M-371M 14 17.72* 1.62 33.18 -9.35 112.37
372M-836M 13 10.23* 5.93* 19.20 -20.00 44.05
>836M 14 14.23** 7.99** 16.87 -6.67 55.07
*T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 level
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.8
Initial Underpricing
Panel A provides statistics for raw returns (the average initial return is 
computed for the ini tied, period (Month 0) defined as the offering date to the 
first closing price). Panel B provides the market adjusted returns (raw 
returns less the contemporaneous, market return)
* Numbers are expressed as percentage
Bgr Industry
Panel A: Raw Returns




Mining 0 — — — — —
Industrials 24 1.78** 0.51** 2.72 -0.03 11.05
Construction 8 5.19** 2.82** 5.86 0.00 16.08




3 2.51 1.20 3.36 0.00 6.33
Services 4 2.56 2.69 2.48 0.00 4.85
Holdings 3 2.64 — 4.57 0.00 7.91
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns




Mining 0 — — — — —
Industrials 24 1.83** 1 .11** 2.77 -2.24 10.22
Construction 8 5.17** 4.39* 6.03 -2.18 14.88




3 4.82 6.51 4.32 -0.09 8.04
Services 4 2.37 2.23 2.98 -0.22 5.25
Holdings 3 2.07 -0.44 0.51 -1.30 7.95
B y  Tear
Panel A: Raw Returns




1989 0 — — — — —
1990 2 0.96 0.96 1.36 0.00 1.92
1991 12 4.09** 3.75** 4.46 0.00 13.871992 5 6.52* 5.49 6.71 0.00 16.081993 12 3.84* 0.51** 6.39 -0.89 21.681994 18 1.52** 0.56** 2.02 -0.03 6.331995 1 7.91 7.91 — 7.91 7.911996 5 0.95 0.00 1.43 0.00 3.23
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns




1989 0 — — — — —
1990 2 0.45 0.45 2.46 -1.30 2.191991 12 4.68** 4.30** 4.57 -0.44 14.791992 5 5.55 3.58 6.53 -0.22 14.881993 12 4.19* 2.17* 6.63 -1.53 21.771994 18 1.97** 1.66** 2.67 -2.24 6.511995 1 7.95 7.95 — 7.95 7.951996 5 1.14 0.43 2.18 -0.83 4.38
*T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) Is significant at the 0.10 level 
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 level
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Table 5.9
Initial Underpricing (First Week)
This table presents the market adjusted returns 
contemporaneous, market return) for the first week 
* Numbers are expressed as percentage
(raw returns less the
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns
By Place of listing





NYSE 11 7.69** 5.14 11.37 -2.92 29.42
144A 11 3.64 0.71 8.60 -2.00 28.06
Domestic 33 3.13** 1.95** 6.24 -10.37 16.15
Complete Sample 55 4.15** 1.75** 8.00 -10.37 29.42
By




< 5 8 8 .20* 6.64* 10.22 -3.43 28.06
6-15 16 2.07 -0.93 7.05 -10.37 16.04
16-33 15 1.43 0.98 4.35 -3.59 11.08
>33 16 6.75** 4.99** 9.29 -5.76 29.42
By dross Proceeds
Gross Proceeds 





< 55M 14 1.55 0.93 4.63 -5.76 12.61
56M-184M 14 3.29 4.11 7.59 -10.37 16.04
185M-424M 14 6.06** 1.71* 10.16 -2.42 28.06
>424M 13 5.80** 4.83** 8.65 -2.66 29.42




Mining 0 — — — — —
Industrials 24 2.93** 1.81* 5.96 -5.76 16.15
Construction 8 8.99 7.84 14.23 -10.37 29.42
Commerce 13 4.55* 1 .01* 8.28 -3.43 25.70
Communications & 
Transportation
3 2.74 5.14 4.47 -2.42 5.50
Services 4 0.91 -0.42 3.38 -1.44 5.93
Holdings 3 4.92 3.10 4.95 1.14 10.53
By Year
Year H Mean Median STD 1“PamanHU 99“Percentile
1989 0 — — — - —
1990 2 7.86 7.86 6.73 3.10 12.61
1991 12 3.88* 1.55* 6.11 -3.89 16.151992 5 7.52 -0.61 13.05 -2.23 28.06
1993 12 6.43* 0.10 11.78 -3.43 29.421994 18 2.18* 2.83** 4.73 -10.37 7.49
1995 1 10.53 10.53 — 10.53 10.53
1996 5 0.25 -0.91 4.40 -3.59 7.84*T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is 
level
**T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is 
level
significant at the 0.10 
significant at the 0.05
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Table 5.10
Initial Underpricing (First Month)
This table presents the market adjusted returns (raw returns less the 
contemporaneous, market return) for the first month 
* Numbers are expressed as percentage
Panel B: Market Adjusted Returns
By Place of listing





NYSE 11 1 2.22* 13.42* 18.46 -12.37 44.77
144A 11 0.18 1.63 14.93 -18.15 28.38
Domestic 32 7.56** 4.62** 20.61 -18.12 100.34
Complete Sample 54 7.01** 4.62** 19.24 -18.15 100.34
By Age





< 5 8 15.33 11.17 37.38 -18.12 100.34
6-15 16 6.27 4.52 14.86 -17.79 32.37
16-33 14 1.14 0.86 12.16 -18.15 28.89
>33 16 8.71** 5.80** 15.32 -11.50 44.77
By Gross Proceeds
Gross Proceeds 





< 55M 13 -1.08 -1.08 9.50 -18.12 19.60
56M-184M 14 14.73** 8.94** 28.03 -13.18 100.34
185M-424M 14 5.02 5.34 16.71 -18.15 36.90
>424M 13 8.91* 7.94** 15.56 -11.79 44.77
By Industryr




Mining 0 — — — — —
Industrials 23 5.18* 6.24 13.76 -18.12 32.37
Construction 8 15.81** 11.92** 14.19 0.32 44.77
Commerce 13 6.59 2.78* 14.50 -13.18 36.90
Communications & 
Transportation
3 -5.98 -5.49 5.29 -11.50 -0.96
Services 4 -3.60 -4.10 12.53 -18.15 11.92Holdings 3 2.65 7.24 64.06 -13.72 100.34
By Tear




1989 0 — — — — —
1990 2 -0.50 -0.50 9.54 -7.24 6.25
1991 12 1.65 -2.68 16.14 -17.79 32.371992 5 1.23 1.63 12.39 -18.15 13.42
1993 12 11.94* 10.75* 19.55 -13.18 44.77
1994 18 6.02** 5.80** 10.75 -18.12 28.38
1995 1 100.34 100.34 — 100.34 100.34
1996 4 0.31 -0.12 4.43 -4.60 6.08*T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 
level
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 
level
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market adjust returns from offering for Day 1 and Month 1 
to be 2.8 percent, and 33 percent respectively.
The mean (median) first day market adjusted return is
3.09 percent (1.20 percent) for the complete sample. This 
result stands in contrast to the average first day return 
of approximately 15 percent reported for the US and UK 
markets. All three sub-groups, NYSE IPOs, 144A IPOs, and 
domestic IPOs, show modest underpricing. The median level 
of underpricing does not exceed 5 percent for any of these 
sub-groups. The mean (median) first day returns for the 
NYSE and 144A IPOs are 5.81 percent (4.3 percent) and 3.66
percent (4.28 percent), respectively.
Although underpricing seems unusually low, the
results are not out of place considering the
characteristics of these firms.26 Mexican IPOs are 
conducted by large, well established firms with long
operating histories, unlike the US where the companies 
that go public are typically small and young, often with a 
unproven track record, or represent significant growth 
options that are difficult to price Loughran et al.,
(1994). Offerings by these mature companies in Mexico 
should be relatively easier to price since these firms are
26 The underpricing for NYSE IPOs would even be lower if one extreme 
observation were excluded.
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largely assets in place. Also these are firms that are 
willing to go through the time consuming and expensive 
process required for establishing an ADR, a process that 
reveals a considerable amount of information about the 
company. This point is discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 3. Even in the 144A market, extensive
negotiations take place between the parties involved a 
process that reveals a great deal of information about the 
company. The low market adjusted one day return of 1.99 
percent for the domestic IPOs is somewhat surprising since 
these are relatively smaller and younger companies that do 
not choose to' obtain a listing in a foreign market that 
has stringent listing and maintenance requirements. It is 
possible, however, that a listing on Bolsa itself 
represents an important form of self-selection, since only 
approximately 200 firms trade on Bolsa. Also closer 
inspection of the Mexican firms trading on Bolsa reveals 
that these firms are generally tightly controlled family 
owned businesses. It is not uncommon for the level of 
family ownership to be as high as 70 percent even after 
five years of being a public firm (numbers supporting this 
assertion are not reported in the tables) . Thus, 
consistent with signaling model of Leland and Pyle (1977) 
the high proportion of equity retained by owners is able
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to resolve the information asymmetry surrounding the
domestic IPOs.
Partitioning the data based on the quartiles of the 
age variable reveals a predictable pattern with 
underpricing decreasing as a function of age. However, 
the highest quartile with firms greater than 33 years old 
shows, oddly enough, underpricing that is greater than
that observed for the next two lower quartiles. The 
underpricing observed by dividing the sample according to 
the quartiles for gross proceeds is somewhat puzzling as 
there seems to be a positive relation between the level of 
underpricing and gross proceeds instead of the inverse
relation predicted by theory. This result, however, may 
be an artifact of the effect of inflation as the gross 
proceeds that are reported are not adjusted for inflation. 
To check for any effects of inflation, underpricing by 
gross proceeds was recalculated after adjusting gross 
proceeds for inflation. Specifically, all figures were
expressed in terms of December 1996 purchasing power using 
the National Consumer Price Index. The results, however, 
remain unchanged. The results for underpricing by gross 
proceeds adjusted for inflation are presented in table 
5.7. Table 5.8 are reported to determine whether there is 
one particular industry or year (hot issue phenomenon)
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driving the results. Inspection of Table 5.8 reveals no 
such peculiarities. Table 5.9 and 5.10 show that positive 
returns continue beyond day 1 but there is no dramatic 
change in magnitude (except for NYSE IPOs) as reported by 
Aggarwal et al., (1993).
The results on underpricing are similar to those 
reported by Aggarwal et al. (1993) who find underpricing 
to be of the order of 2.8 percent. The time period 
covered in their study is from 1987 to 1990 and includes 
44 companies, but the authors do not provide any detailed 
information on the characteristics of their sample. In 
contrast, Hensler et al. (1995) find underpricing to be 
40.79 percent for banks, 16.87 percent for the industrial 
firms and 7 percent for the services. The high 
underpricing observed for their sample is mainly due to 
the (i) privatization IPOs in the sample and (ii) the hot 
issue phenomenon. The authors conjecture that the Mexican 
bank IPOs undertaken by the Mexican government were 
deliberately underpriced to ensure success, possibly 
reflecting nonmarket incentives. In fact, their
underpricing results fall to 13.21 percent privatized IPOs 
are excluded from the sample. Further, underpricing for 
the year 1987 was a high 34.07 percent and falls within
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the modest range of 3.4 percent to 8.24 percent for 1988 
to 1992 period.
As noted earlier the mean (median) age of the NYSE, 
144A, and domestic IPOs is 35 (25), 30 (26), and 16 (11), 
respectively. In contrast, the typical US IPO firm is 
only six years old. In general, Mexican firms that IPO 
are large, well established firms with long operating 
histories and high levels of family ownership. Global 
IPOs are also associated with very prestigious 
underwriters. In addition, the inclusion of ADRs in the 
offering is a positive signal since ADR issuers incur 
substantial costs in preparing accounting statements in 
accordance with SEC rules and US GAAP accounting rules. 
The above discussion implies that Mexican ADR IPOs should 
show less underpricing both because of the different 
characteristics of the Mexican firms as well as arguments 
related to global issues, as discussed above. Similar 
results are also reported by Ejara et al. (1998) who find 
that ADR IPOs are significantly less underpriced than 
matching US IPOs, with average underpricing of only 5.71 
percent for ADR IPOs over a period of 1991-1996. Doukas 
et al. (1992) find the underpricing for ADR-IPOs of 25 
foreign firms that went public in the period 1982-1989 to 
be an insignificant 0.96 percent.
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In July 1993, the second tier market of the Mexican 
Stock Exchange became operational. This section of the 
stock market was created to supply capital to medium-size 
companies and has less stringent listing and maintenance 
requirements than the main market. More specifically, to 
be listed on the second tier market, a company only has to 
have a net worth between 20 and 100 million N$ (the 
requirement for the main market is 100 million N$) and 
have show a profit in the past three years of operation. 
A similar market is the London's unlisted securities 
market or as it now called the alternative investments 
market.
We disaggregate the domestic IPOs into domestic-main 
(main market) and second tier sub-group to examine 
differences in underpricing between two groups. The 
results are reported in table 5.11 to 5.13. Firms that 
trade on the second tier market have lower market 
capitalization with a mean (median) of 282 (151) million
N$ compared to firms that trade on the main market which 
have a mean (median) of 1,921 (792) million N$. The
difference between the market capitalization of the two 
groups is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.
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The IPO Pre-Market Descriptive Statistics 
Second-Tier Market Analysis
This table presents the offer price, number of shares offered, gross proceeds and age
H*N>
10








Domestic-Main 20 9.74 4.58 13.45 1.28 59.9
Ilnd Tier 13 6.02 3.30 6.68 1.35 27.0





Number of Shares Offered
Domestic-Main 20 32437719.25 23528850 37628645.95 5000 149523196
Ilnd Tier 13 16419236.15 16627760 7309126.86 3020404 30759190






Domestic-Main 20 164578516.2 114382125.8 145815129.1 13600.00 535500000.0
Ilnd Tier 13 72824692.1 80588827.2 38104966.7 15779159.75 137941840.4
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsamples





Domestic-Main 26 15.5385 11 15.2374 1 58
Ilnd Tier 13 16.9231 9 16.2196 1 49
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsamples


















The IPO After-Market Descriptive Statistics 
Second-Tier Market Analysis
This table presents the closing price, market value and the volume traded on the I*1 trading day after the offer price





Domestic-Main 26 11.59 5.56 17.60 0.10 73.0
Ilnd Tier 13 6.10 3.35 6.76 1.35 27.3
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsanples
Main-IInd Tier 1.40 0.43
(0.17) (0.51)
Market Value (000 N$)
Domestic-Main 23 1921091.53 792201.93 2545661.84 37857.14 8625609.19
Ilnd Tier 13 282081.48 150834.23 443632.92 44984.92 1726424.70
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsamples
Main-IInd Tier 3.01** 8.50**
(0.006) (0.004)
VolUM
Domestic-Main 26 42808364.77 122000 194943947.4 0 994951052
Ilnd Tier 13 759146.77 10000 2654686.9 0 9593908
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsamples
Main-IInd Tier 1.10 4.30**
(0.28) (0.04)





Second-Tier Market Analysis 
Initial Underpricing
Panel A provides statistics for raw returns (the average initial return is 
computed for the initial period (Month 0) defined as the offering date to the 
first closing price). Panel B, c and D provides the market adjusted returns 
(raw returns less the contemporaneous market return)
B y  iifr Day
Samel A: R aw B a t o n u




Domestic-Main 20 2.44** 0.58** 3.87 0.00 13.87
Ilnd Tier 13 1.30* 0 .00* 2.51 -0.89 7.91
Complete Sample 33 1.99** 0 .00** 3.40 -0.89 13.87




Samel B: Market Adjusted Returns
Domestic-Main 20 2.43** 1.59** 4.02 -1.30 14.79
Ilnd Tier 13 1.99** 1.28* 3.24 -2.24 7.95
Complete Sample 33 2.25** 1.28** 3.68 -2.24 14.79




B y  7*** Day
Samel C: Market Adjusted Returns
Domestic-Main 20 3.80** 1.85** 6.39 -3.89 16.15
Ilnd Tier 13 2.11 2.42 6.13 -10.37 10.53
Complete Sample 33 3.13** 1.95** 6.24 -10.37 16.15




B y  3 0 * Day
Samel D: Market Adjusted Returns
Domestic-Main 19 5.96* 3.87 12.92 -13.72 32.37
Ilnd Tier 13 9.90 5.37 28.93 -18.12 100.34
Complete Sample 32 7.56** 4.62** 20.61 -18.12 100.34
Test Statistics for Differences in Subsamples
Main-IInd Tier 0.23(0.82) 1.28(0.26)
*T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 
level
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 
level
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There is no statistical difference between the age of 
these two sub-groups. The mean (median) age of domestic- 
main sample is 16 (17) years and the mean (median) age of 
the second tier firms is 17 (9) years. As expectedly/ the 
mean (median) gross proceeds raised by second tier firms 
is less than that of main market securities, the 
difference being statistically significant. Inspite of a 
size difference between the second tier firms and the main 
market securities there is no difference between the 
underpricing shown by the two groups. Both groups show 
underpricing of less than 3 percent. The low underpricing 
shown even by the second tier firms suggests there is 
stringent screening of firms that are allowed to list on 
Bolsa.
5.4.3 Results on Long-Run Stock Price Performance
Table 5.15 to Table 5.18 present market-adjusted 
abnormal returns as well as cumulative abnormal returns 
for a period of three years from the initial offering. In 
general, the poor long run stock price performance 
reported for the US market is not observed for the Mexican 
IPOs. The CARs stay positive until month 36 for the 
complete sample. This result in consistent with the 
earlier results on underpricing and the finding that 
Mexican firms that list on Bolsa are not the typical
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Table 5.15
Abnormal Returns for Initial Public Offerings 
Bolsa IPO and Level III sponsored program (NYSE Listing) , 
concurrently
Average IPC adjusted (ARt) and cumulative average return (CAR1>c) in present, 
with associated t-statistics for 36 months after going public, excluding the 
initial return ARt » 1/nt Ei-int (tipo.it ~ tipc.it) where rtpo.it is the total return 
on IPO firm i in event month t, and rjpc.it i3 the total return on the IPC 
index. The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is computed for each 
month as ARt*''/nc/c3dt, where nt is the number of firms trading in each month, 
and csdt is computed as csdt =* [t*var+2 (t-1) cov]1/2 where t is the event month, 
var is the average cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order 
autocovariance of the ARt series (adapted from Ritter, 1991).








1 11 4.17 63.64 1.33 4.17 63.64 1.07
2 11 6.68 72.73 1.62 10.86 68.18 1.41
3 11 4.07 45.45 0.86 14.93 60.61 1.47
4 11 -3.54 27.27 -1.31 11.39 52.27 0.94
5 11 8.51 81.82 3.26** 19.90 58.18 1.44
6 11 1.22 45.45 0.29 21.12 56.06 1.387 11 -3.91 18.18 -0.98 17.22 50.65 1.03
8 11 3.82 72.73 1.67 21.04 53.41 1.17
9 11 3.67 63.64 1.09 24.71 54.55 1.29
10 11 -2.01 63.64 -0.45 22.70 55.46 1.12
11 11 -0.87 45.45 -0.39 21.83 54.55 1.02
12 11 0.21 54.55 0.07 22.04 54.55 0.99
13 11 -4.38 63.64 -0.78 17.66 55.25 0.76
14 11 -1.91 54.55 -0.53 15.75 55.20 0.65
15 11 -8.02 18.18 -1.97* 7.73 52.73 0.31
16 11 -2.03 36.36 -0.52 5.71 51.71 0.22
17 11 4.09 45.45 0.69 9.80 51.34 0.37
18 11 -3.91 36.36 -0.91 5.89 50.51 0.21
19 11 3.35 54.55 1.11 9.24 50.72 0.32
20 11 -1.16 27.27 -0.17 8.08 49.55 0.28
21 11 7.98 72.73 2.19* 16.06 50.65 0.54
22 11 -0.46 63.64 -0.10 15.60 51.24 0.51
23 11 -1.69 45.45 -0.93 13.90 50.99 0.44
24 11 -3.61 27.27 -0.74 10.29 50.00 0.32
25 10 1.15 70.00 1.04 11.44 50.73 0.33
26 9 1.20 44.44 0.61 12.63 50.53 0.3427 9 -1.50 44.44 -0.31 11.13 50.34 0.30
28 9 3.21 77.78 0.93 14.35 51.16 0.37
29 9 -7.70 22.22 -2.80** 6.64 50.32 0.17
30 9 -3.21 44.44 -0.96 3.43 50.16 0.0931 9 0.22 55.55 0.08 3.65 50.31 0.09
32 7 -4.92 28.57 -0.92 -1.27 49.85 -0.0333 6 -10.47 16.67 -1.62 -11.74 49.27 -0.23
34 5 -0.76 20.00 -0.10 -12.50 48.84 -0.2235 4 -11.17 00.00 -2.55* -23.67 48.29 -0.3736 4 11.51 75.00 1.64 -12.16 48.59 -0.19
Note: The fewer number of firms trading is due to data limitations.
Specifically- the data provided by Bolsa officials ends in July 1996.
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Table 5.16
Abnormal Returns for Initial Public Offerings 
Bolsa IPO and. 144A Private Placement, concurrently
Average IPC adjusted (ARt) and cumulative average return (CARx,t) in present, with associated t-statistics for 36 months after going public, excluding the 
initial return ARt ” 1/nt £i_int (rIP0>it - ripc.it) where ripo.it is the total return 
on IPO firm i in event month t, and ripc.it is the total return on the IPC 
index. The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is computed for each 
month as ARt* Vrit/csdt, where ii* is the number of firms trading in each month, 
and csdt is computed as csdt=[t*var+2 (t-1)cov]1/2 where t is the event month, 
var is the average cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order
1991).










1 11 -8.32 27.27 -2.87** -8.32 27.27 -2.45
2 11 12.30 81.82 2.58** 3.98 54.55 0.663 11 -1.47 36.36 -0.58 2.52 48.49 0.32
4 11 2.28 63.64 0.58 4.79 52.27 0.52
5 11 0.67 63.64 0.18 5.47 54.55 0.52
6 11 2.28 54.55 0.74 7.74 54.55 0.67
7 11 -3.77 36.36 -0.64 3.97 51.95 0.32
8 11 -1.83 36.36 -0.67 2.14 50.00 0.16
9 11 2.17 27.27 0.37 4.32 47.48 0.30
10 11 -9.53 18.18 -1.96* -5.21 44.55 -0.34
11 11 -2.24 63.64 -0.70 -7.45 46.28 -0.47
12 11 3.90 45.45 1.33 -3.54 46.21 -0.21
13 11 4.03 72.73 1.13 0.49 48.25 0.03
14 11 -0.94 45.45 -0.54 -0.45 48.05 -0.02
15 11 -1.54 27.27 -0.59 -1.99 46.67 -0.11
16 11 -1.78 36.36 -0.82 -3.77 46.02 -0.19
17 11 0.06 45.45 0.02 -3.71 45.99 -0.19
18 11 1.93 81.82 1.28 -1.78 47.98 -0.09
19 11 1.47 72.73 1.00 -0.32 49.28 -0.01
20 11 1.80 72.73 0.77 1.48 50.46 0.07
21 10 -2.91 50.00 -0.83 -1.43 50.44 -0.06
22 10 -0.06 50.00 -0.03 -1.49 50.42 -0.06
23 10 -0.27 50.00 -0.09 -1.75 50.40 -0.07
24 9 3.27 66.67 0.85 1.52 50.97 0.06
25 9 4.28 66.67 1.25 5.80 51.49 0.21
26 9 -3.16 22.22 -0.71 2.64 50.54 0.10
27 9 1.43 55.56 0.86 4.07 50.70 0.14
28 9 0.62 66.67 0.25 4.70 51.19 0.16
29 9 -3.34 33.33 -0.81 1.35 50.66 0.05
30 9 4.99 77.78 1.42 6.35 51.44 0.2131 9 -2.17 33.33 -0.82 4.17 50.93 0.14
32 9 -5.16 44.44 -0.99 -0.98 50.76 -0.03
33 9 -2.35 44.44 -0.70 -3.34 50.59 -0.11
34 9 -0.42 55.56 -0.10 -3.75 50.72 -0.12
35 9 0.37 55.56 0.12 -3.38 50.84 -0.1136 9 -2.71 44.44 -0.41 -6.09 50.68 -0.19
Note: The fewer number of firms trading is due to data limitations. 
Specifically the data provided by Bolsa officials ends in July 1996.
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Table 5.17
Abnormal Re'turns for Initial Public Offerings
Bolsa IPO
Average IPC adjusted (ARt) and cumulative average return (CAR1>t) in present, 
with associated t-statistics for 36 months after going public, excluding the 
initial return ARt - 1/nt £i-int (rIPO,it - risc.it) where ripo.it is the total return 
on IPO firm i in event month t, and ripc.it is the total return on the IPC 
index. The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is computed for each 
month as ARt*'̂ nt/csdt, where nt is the number of firms trading in each month, 
and csdt is computed as csdt1* [t*var+2(t-l) cov]1/2 where t is the event month, 
var is the average cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order









1 38 0.60 47.37 0.30 0.60 47.37 0.21
2 37 4.95 67.57 2.31** 5.55 57.33 1.013 35 1.68 54.29 0.68 7.23 56.36 0.98
4 33 0.38 57.58 0.11 7.62 56.64 0.84
5 33 -0.71 54.55 -0.28 6.91 56.25 0.67
6 33 -0.71 57.58 -0.27 6.20 56.46 0.54
7 33 0.23 48.48 0.09 6.43 55.37 0.51
8 32 3.01 56.25 1.17 9.44 55.47 0.699 32 4.66 62.50 2.03* 14.10 56.21 0.97
10 32 -3.93 40.63 -1.26 10.17 54.73 0.66
11 32 6.05 53.13 0.77 16.22 54.60 1.00
12 32 -1.48 46.88 -0.62 14-74 53.98 0.87
13 32 -1.27 40.63 -0.56 13.47 53.00 0.76
14 32 -0.02 50.00 -0.01 13.46 52.79 0.7315 32 -2.26 34.38 -0.78 11.20 51.61 0.59
16 32 -4.24 34.38 -1.87* 6.96 50.57 0.3517 32 -3.38 37.50 -1.70* 3.58 49.82 0.1818 32 -2.79 43.75 -1.34 0.79 49.50 0.04
19 32 0.42 46.88 0.20 1.21 49.36 0.06
20 30 -1.54 43.33 -0.46 -0.33 49.09 -0.01
21 29 -2.22 48.28 -1.11 -2.55 49.05 -0.11
22 29 1.28 62.07 0.61 -1.28 49.58 -0.0523 27 -0.45 62.96 -0.10 -1.73 50.07 -0.0724 26 3.98 69.23 1.11 2.25 50.72 0.08
25 24 0.74 54.17 0.26 2.99 50.82 0.10
26 21 5.06 42.86 0.69 8.05 50.62 0.2627 19 10.37 68.42 1.21 18.42 51.02 0.5528 18 -0.79 55.56 -0.34 17.63 51.12 0.5029 17 -2.44 35.29 -0.77 15.19 50.81 0.4130 17 -3.90 23.53 -1.72 11.29 50.28 0.3031 17 4.20 52.94 0.93 15.50 50.33 0.4132 16 -0.92 50.00 -0.31 14.58 50.33 0.37
33 16 -0.52 56.25 -0.16 14.06 50.43 0.3534 16 0.35 43.75 0.13 14.41 50.32 0.3535 16 -0.66 31.25 -0.24 13.75 50.00 0.3336 16 -1.11 50.00 -0.39 12.64 50.00 0.30
Note: The fewer number of firms trading is due to data limitations.
Specifically the data provided by Bolsa officials ends in July 1996.
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Table 5.18
Abnormal Returns for Initial Public Offerings 
All IPO, includes Bolsa as well as Global IPOs
Average IPC adjusted (ARt) and cumulative average return (CAR1>t) in present, 
with associated t-statistics for 36 months after going public, excluding the 
initial return ARt ■ 1/rit Et-i1*6 (rIP0,it - rIPCjit) where rIP0,it i* the total return 
on IPO firm i in event month t, and rifc.it is the total return on the IPC 
index. The t-statistic for the average adjusted return is computed for each 
month as ARt * ' lJnt / c 3 d t , where nt is the number of firms trading in each month, 
and csdt is computed as csdt “ [t*var+2 (t-1) cov]1/2 where t is the event month, 
var is the average cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order
Month Hneber 
of firms 




1 60 -0.38 46.67 -0.24 -0.38 46.67 -0.19
2 59 6.65 71.19 3.71** 6.27 58.82 2.17
3 57 1.53 49.12 0.84 7.80 55.68 2.15
4 55 -0.02 52.73 -0.01 7.78 54.98 1.81
5 55 1.41 61.82 0.79 9.19 56.29 1.91
6 55 0.27 54.55 0.14 9.47 56.01 1.79
7' 55 -1.40 40.00 -0.68 8.07 53.79 1.41
8 54 2.19 55.56 1.29 10.26 54.00 1.66
9 54 3.95 55.56 2 .10** 14.21 54.17 2.17
10 54 -4.68 40.74 -2.06** 9.53 52.87 1.38
11 54 2.95 53.70 0.62 12.48 52.94 1.72
12 54 -0.04 48.15 -0.02 12.45 52.55 1.65
13 54 -0.83 51.85 -0.43 11.62 52.50 1.48
14 54 -0.59 50.00 -0.43 11.03 52.33 1.35
15 54 -3.29 29.30 -1.66 7.75 50.85 0.92
16 54 -3.29 35.19 -2.05** 4.46 49.89 0.51
17 54 -1.16 40.74 -0.65 3.30 49.36 0.37
18 54 -2.06 50.00 -1.33 1.24 49.40 0.13
19 54 1.23 53.70 0.89 2.47 49.62 0.26
20 52 -0.76 46.15 -0.31 1.72 49.45 0.17
21 50 -0.11 54.00 -0.06 1.61 49.65 0.15
22 50 0.63 60.00 0.39 2.23 50.08 0.21
23 48 -0.70 56.25 -0.27 1.54 50.32 0.14
24 46 2.02 58.70 0.82 3.56 50.62 0.31
25 43 1.57 60.47 0.92 5.13 50.94 0.42
26 39 2.27 38.46 0.56 7.41 50.58 0.56
27 37 5.31 59.46 1.16 12.72 50.82 0.93
28 36 0.56 63.89 0.36 13.28 51.14 0.9429 35 -4.02 31.43 -2.03** 9.26 50.68 0.63
30 35 -1.44 42.86 -0.82 7.82 50.50 0.5231 35 1.54 48.57 0.64 9.36 50.45 0.62
32 32 -2.98 43.75 -1.28 6.38 50.32 0.40
33 31 -2.98 45.16 -1.30 3.40 50.22 0.20
34 30 -0.07 43.33 -0.03 3.33 50.09 0.19
35 29 -1.79 34.48 -0.93 1.54 49.82 0.0936 29 0.13 51.72 0.05 1.68 49.85 0.09
Note: The fewer number of firms trading (trading is a misnomer in the present 
context) is due to data limitations. Specifically the data provided by Bolsa 
officials ends in July 1996.
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young, high growth firms that IPO in the US and that are 
more susceptible to over-optimism by investors. 
Consequently, with less information asymmetry the 
likelihood of market timing by firms or overly optimistic 
sentiments shown by investors should also be reduced. As 
such, the market should not be surprised by subsequent 
performance. Table 5.18 shows that the share price 
performance of the complete sample match as that of the 
IPC benchmark (t-statistics are insignificant) . This 
result is the same as that reported by Hensler et al., 
(1995) who also do not find any long-non under-performance 
for portfolios of industrial (N=22) and service (N=ll) 
firms when cumulating over a 300 day period. The NYSE 
IPOs display similar behavior with CARs remaining positive 
until month 31. Months 34 to 36 CARs become negative but 
are statistically insignificant. The small number of 
observations remaining after month 31 make the t- 
statistics less meaningful. The CAR for 144A IPOs over 
the entire 3 years period is -6.09 percent but again 
insignificant (t-statistic of -0.19). The domestic IPOs 
also show almost all positive CARs over the entire 3 years 
period and suggest no under-performance (or superior 
performance) as indicated by the insignificant t- 
statistics. These results are represented graphically in
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Figure 5.1. Similar figures were also recalculated to 
adjust for the effects of inflation along the lines of 
Aggarwal et al., (1993). The results are not materially 
different and are only presented in Figure 5.1 for 
comparison purposes.
The buy-and-hold returns are reported in Table 5.19 
for different groups formed by partitioning the data on 
initial returns, age, and gross proceeds. The results do 
not suggest that more underpriced IPOs subsequently 
perform better or that underperformance is concentrated in 
young or smaller firms.
5.4.4 Results on Operating Performance
Tables 5.14 to 5.17 present operating performance for 
different sub-groups both on an unadjusted and adjusted 
basis. Operating performance is measured by dividing 
operating income (more specifically, operating income 
before deducting depreciation, interest, taxes 
extraordinary items) by (i) end of year assets and (ii) 
sales. Calculating these two measures of operating 
performance is recommended as total assets generally 
change substantially as a result of the IPO (Mikkelson et 
al., (1996)). The adjusted operating performance is 
calculated by subtracting contemporaneous mean (median) 
operating returns on assets (sales) of a group of industry
138
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Table 5.19
Holding Period Returns and Wealth Relatives
Aftermarket performance of Mexican ISOs of Mexican IPOs over the years 1989- 
1996 for periods of 1, 3, 6 months and 1, 2, 3 years following the IPO. The aftermarket performance is measured as the buy-and-hold returns and computed 
on the closing prices (after adjustment for dividends and stock splits) on 
second trading day after IPO, and the last day of the holding period. Aftermarket performance are reported for different samples based on initial 
underpricing, age and gross proceeds (adapted from Ejara et al., (1998). 
Holding period returns are expressed as percentage. Numbers in [] brackets 
are wealth relatives, numbers in {) parenthesis are sanple size. A wealth 
relative of less then one indicates IPO underfoxmance.
Average Holding Period Percentage Be turn (%) over trading Dags 
«<"«■ Initial Public Offering (IPO)
ISO 8ag>le Month 1 Month 3 | Month 6 I Tear 1 Tear 2 Tear 3
Initial Underpricing









































































































































































Note: The fewer number of firms trading is due to data limitations. 
Specifically, the data provided by Bolsa officials ends in July 1996.
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and size matched firms from the corresponding raw 
operating return on assets (sales) of each firm (Barber 
and Lyon (1996), Mikkelson et al. (1997)). In addition to 
the mean, the median level of operating performance is 
also presented since accounting ratios can be skewed (Jain 
and Kinni, (1994)).
Table 5.20 presents the operating performance results 
for the NYSE IPOs. Looking at year -1, the NYSE IPOs do 
not outperform a group of publicly traded market firms. 
The adjusted measures are all statistically insignificant. 
This is in sharp contrast to studies discussed earlier (in 
the literature review on operating performance) which find 
that the timing of IPOs generally coincides with a peak in 
operating performance so that IPO firms outperform 
significantly a group of control firms in year -1. This 
result implies that Mexican companies are not trying to 
time the market. Such an action would be arguably futile 
since there is a little probability that investors would 
be fooled or be overly optimistic even when presented with 
a scenario of strong gains in the operating performance 
just prior to the offerings considering the (i) long 
operating histories of these companies and (ii) the less 
speculative nature of the businesses of these firms. 
Elaborating on the last point, these firms are different
141
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Table 5.20
Measures of operating performance of companies that had a
Bolsa IPO and Level III Sponsored Program (NYSE Listing) ,
concurrently.
Operating performance is operating income before depreciation, interest, 
taxes, and extraordinary items divided end-of-year assets (panel A) or divided 
by sales (panel B). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by 
subtracting the mean/median performance measure for a group of matched
Performance
Msaatira
Tear -1 Tear 0 Tear 1 Tear 2 Changes
-1 to 0 - 1 to 1 1 to 2













































































































*T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 
level
**T-test (for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 level
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(and less speculative) than offerings made in the US 
during the 1980s which were predominantly by firms in the 
computer, electronics, medical related, and oil and gas 
industries (Mikkelson et al., (1997)). Those areas entail 
growth options that are relatively difficult to price and 
hence are more likely to be candidates for over optimism 
by investors.
Looking at years -1, 0, +1, and +2 the NYSE IPOs do
not perform any better or worse than the control group. 
The notable exception to this result is year +1 where the 
operating return on sales actually falls below that of the 
control group as can be seen in Panel B, with the adjusted 
measures being negative and statistically significant. 
Both the operating return on assets and operating return 
on sales continue to decline from the year prior to the 
offering to two years after the offering. The median 
operating return on assets drops from 9 percent in year -1 
to 4 percent in year +2 and the median operating return on 
sales drops from 13 percent to 7 percent for the same 
period (on an adjusted basis). However, a more relevant 
question is whether the rate of decline in the operating 
performance measures for the NYSE IPOs is any faster than 
that of the control group. The operating performance of 
the NYSE declines at a faster rate than that of the
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control group from year -1 to year 0. This can be seen by 
examining the median operating return on assets which is - 
2 percent on an adjusted basis and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. This decline in 
operating performance actually continues until year +2 as 
is evident by the figures for the adjusted median 
operating return on sales for year -1 to 0, to +1 to +2. 
The results for 144A IPOs reported in Table 5.21 are 
similar (results for the combined sample of NYSE, and 144A 
IPOs are presented in Table 5.22).
The results for the domestic IPOs in Table 5.23 show 
that for any given year from -1 to +2 the domestic IPOs 
outperform a comparable group of industry firms in terms 
of both operating return on assets as well as operating 
return on sales. This is evident by examining the median 
adjusted operating returns on assets (as well as sales) 
for years -1 to +2 each of which is positive and 
statistically significant. There is a modest decline in 
performance from year -1 to 0, and the median adjusted 
operating return on assets is a -2 percent (statistically 
significant at 10 percent level) .
Overall, the results suggest that there is nothing 
extraordinary in terms of the operating performance of 
Mexican IPOs (NYSE, 144A, and Domestic IPOs) and the
144
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Table 5.21
Measures of operating performance of companies that had a
Bolsa IPO and Rule 144A Private Placement, concurrently.
Operating performance is operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes, and extraordinary items divided end-of-year assets (panel A) or divided 
by sales (panel B). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by 
subtracting the mean/median performance measure for a group of matched
Performance
Measure
Tear -1 T ear 0 Tear 1 Tear 2
-1 to 0 -1 to 1 1 to 2












































































































*T-test(for Mean)/Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 
level**T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 
level
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Table 5.22
Measures of operating performance of companies that had a
Bolsa IPO and Level III or Rule 144A Private Placement
concurrently. (Global IPO) .
Operating performance is operating incana before depreciation, interest, 
taxes, and extraordinary items divided end-of-year assets (panel A) or divided 
by sales (panel B). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by 
subtracting the mean/median performance measure for a group of matched
S e r f o a m o e Tear -1 Tear 0 Tear 1 Tear 2
M t m i r t
-1 to 0 -1 to 1 1 to 2
Panel A: Operating Tnrnami divided b y  Assets
Mean
Unadjusted 0.09** 0.08** 0.06** 0.03** -0 .02** -0.04** -0 .0 2**(n-2 1) (6.90) (6.57) (4.79) (3.19) (-2.23) (-2 .6 6) (-2.41)
Adjusted 0.01 0.003 -0.01 -0.02 -0 .02** -0.03** -0.004(n-2 1) (0.82) (0.25) (-1.24) (-1.71) (-2.37) (-2.13) (-0.50)
Median
Unadjusted 0.09** 0.08** 0.08** 0.03** -0.009* -0 .0 2** -0.005*(n-2 1) (76.5) (112.5) (95.5) (76.5) (-37.5) (-52.5) (-54.5)
Adjusted 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.004 -0 .0 2** 0.02(n-2 1) (27.5) (40.5) (-17.5) (-27.5) (-20.5) (-52.5) (6.5)
Panel B: Operating Inc new divided by  Sales
Mean
Unadjusted 0 .12** 0.13** 0 .10** 0.07** -0.007 -0.03 -0.03**(n-2 1) (6.73) (5.59) (3.72) (2.61) (-0.48) (-0.97) (-2.46)
Adjusted 0.001 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03** -0.05* 0.01(n-2 1) (0.05) (-0.99) (-1.71) (-1.28) (-2.32) (-1.89) (0.98)
Median
Unadjusted 0 .12** 0 .11** 0.13** 0.04** 0.003 -0.02 -0.008*(n-2 1) (76.5) (112.5) (84.5) (67.5) (5.5) (-20.5) (-50.5)
Adjusted 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05** -0.06** 0.06(n-2 1) (21.5) (-32.5) (-34.5) (-3.5) (-66.5) (-50.5) (61.5)
*T-test(for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.10 
level
**T-test (for Mean) /Signed-Ranks Test (for Median) is significant at the 0.05 
level
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Table 5.23
Measures of operating performance of companies that had a 
Bolsa IPO Domestic.
Operating performance is operating income before depreciation, interest, taxes, and extraordinary items divided end-of-year assets (panel A) or divided 
by sales (panel B). Performance measures of each company are adjusted by 
subtracting the mean/median performance measure for a group of matched
Pei Tin mini is Manure
Tear -1 Tear 0 Tear 1 Tear 2 f f K  i i i i j i i
-1 to 0 -1 to 1 1 to 2

































































































(99)*T-test(For Mean) /Signed-Ranks test (For Median) is significant at the 0.10 
level
**T-test (For Mean) /Signed-Ranks test (For Median) is significant at the 0.05 
level
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timing of the offerings. The pattern of a peak in 
operating performance in the year prior to the offering 
followed by a sharp subsequent decline that is observed in 
the US is not characteristic of any of the Mexican firm 
groups. These results are consistent with the earlier 
results of low underpricing and the absence of any poor 
long-run stock price performance. A meaningful line of 
causation can be developed by looking at the initial 
underpricing, operating performance, and long-run stock 
price performance results in unison rather them analyzing 
them separately. The low underpricing observed for all 
NYSE IPOs, 144A IPOs, and domestic IPOs, suggests that 
these firms are high quality entities or that there is 
relatively little information asymmetry associated with 
these companies. This conclusion is consistent with the 
empirical observations: (i) that these are well
established, large firms with long operating histories and 
(ii) with respect to the NYSE IPOs and 144A IPOs, that 
these are firms that are willing to meet the listing fees, 
maintenance requirements, increased disclosure
requirements, costs incurred in complying different 
standards of disclosure and a possible increase in 
litigation potential associated with the more stringent 
rules and regulations in the US. Thus, irrespective of
148
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whether the low underpricing is due to less information 
symmetry or whether these are high quality firms, both 
sets of arguments preclude observing a peak in operating 
performance prior to the offering followed by a subsequent 
decline in performance. Moreover, studies by Jain and 
Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al., (1997) find this 
deterioration in operating performance of US IPOs to be 
concentrated in smaller, younger firms rather a phenomenon 
unique to IPOs. The operating performance results for 
Mexican IPOs are in agreement with all of these 
observations. Finally, the lack of any poor long-run 
stock price performance, even though a departure from that 
observed in the US, implies that the market capitalizes 
any relevant information properly, which suggest that case 
(i) there is little information asymmetry and (ii) there 
are no surprises on average in the subsequent operating 
performance of these firms.
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Chapter 6: Seasoned Global Equity Offerings
6.1 Introduction
The market reaction to seasoned equity offerings has 
been the focus of a number of empirical studies. However, 
there is little empirical evidence on global seasoned 
equity offerings, an area that remains relatively 
unexplored. Global equity offerings refer to the special 
case of the sale of common equity in the home market as 
well as one or more international markets. In the context 
of Mexico and Latin America, equity ADR issues have 
increased from 89 million US$ in 1990 to 3,822.2 million 
US$ in 1994, a greater than 4,000 fold increase in nominal 
terms (Griffith, 1995),27 The issue of global equity 
offerings assumes importance not only from the perspective 
of foreign firms but also in the context of US firms since 
US firms raised approximately 20 billion US$ in 1995 
through follow-on equity offerings in foreign markets. 
This figure is impressive since in 1985 US firms only 
raised 89 million US$ in foreign markets so that these 
firms now have access to well developed foreign capital 
markets (Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 1998) .
27 This figure includes ADR IPOs as well. However, the route to 
international equity markets generally begins with a Level I listing, 
where the company sets up an OTC program to build name recognition and 
increase trading volume prior to a global equity offering.
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The notable differences between a global and domestic 
equity offerings are the inclusion of international 
underwriters in the syndicate and the placement of shares 
by international underwriters targeted almost exclusively 
to institutions. The offer price per share is the same in 
both the domestic and international tranches, that is 
there no price discrimination across markets. Since 
foreign investors can always purchase Mexican shares by 
participating in a domestic offerings or purchasing them 
on the Bolsa, global equity offerings have to provide more 
than just another venue for purchasing Mexican shares to 
be able to explain why firms engage in such offerings. 
Before discussing the relevant seasoned equity issuance 
literature and the empirical results, a brief discussion 
of the rationale for global equity offerings is provided 
below.
6.2 Rationale for Global Issues
Market imperfections such as information constraints, 
differences in tax structures or regulatory barriers that 
impede market integration can give rise to a situation 
where higher gross proceeds can result from a global issue 
compared to a domestic issue, ceteris paribus. Prominent 
among these considerations is an argument related to 
information costs that can cause market segmentation.
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According to Merton's (1987) investor recognition 
hypothesis, it may be optimal for investors to exclude 
from their portfolios securities on which they possess 
limited information, or alternatively the market value of 
the firm is an increasing function of the number of 
investors who know about the firm. Merton's (1987) result 
that an asset with a relatively small base of informed 
investors sells at a lower price that it would in a fully 
informed economy is the same as that implied by Barry and 
Brown's (1985) model that, "securities for which there is 
relatively little information will have higher expected 
returns than will otherwise identical securities." French 
and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1995) among 
others show home-bias in portfolio holdings even in the 
absence of explicit investment barriers that is partly 
attributable to such information costs.
These arguments suggest that, global issues are 
associated with a reduction in information costs due to 
the dissemination of information involved in the equity 
issuance process. Clearly, gains resulting from increased 
investor recognition and an enlarged investor base will be 
greatest for firms that are not already listed abroad (in 
the context of the present study that would mean listed in
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US) prior to the seasoned global equity offering.28 This 
implies that the negative price reaction observed for 
seasoned equity issuance announcements should be less 
pronounced for firms with no prior international listing 
compared to that for firms that already have a Level I, 
Level II or Level III ADR program. It should be noted 
that the absence of a prior listing does not preclude some 
degree of awareness by investors outside the home country 
due to the possibility of joint ventures, operations in 
foreign markets or advertising, access to international 
press, etc. Even companies with a prior listing abroad 
can be expected to obtain a higher offer price from a 
global issue vis-a-via a domestic issue if the marketing 
activities and the road show accompanying a firm- 
commitment offer reduce the information costs for foreign 
investors.
Chaplinsky and Ramchand (1998) in their study of 258 
US firms that made a global offering between 1986 and 1995 
find that, all else equal, the negative stock price 
reaction for a global offers is lower on average by one 
percent relative to domestic offerings. They find the 
positive gains from global issues are mainly due to on
28 Firms can also reduce these information costs by other actions such 
as direct foreign investment and mergers and joint ventures with 
foreign firms etc.
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expanded investors base following issuance, a result 
consistent with Merton's (1987) model. Their results also 
support the attenuation hypothesis, with the greatest 
gains occurring for firms with the least investor 
recognition abroad as measured by a firm's prior trading 
on a foreign exchange (a Level I, or Level II listing in 
the context of the present study), amount of foreign 
sales, or whether the firm had made a global issue
previously. Such results show that there are benefits to
global issues even for firms with a prior listing abroad. 
Thus, even though there is an upper bound to recognition
as implied by attenuation this bound is not reached easily
as indicated by the positive benefits to global issue 
beyond those achievable by listing. According to 
Chalinsky et al. (1998), "One explanation for these 
incremental benefits is that the road show and targeted 
marketing efforts that accompany global issue help gain 
new investors beyond those already familiar with the firm 
through listing. Indeed, the overall results are much in 
keeping with Merton's larger point that it takes prolonged 
commitment to develop recognition that this awareness is 
gained only gradually."
Other market imperfections such as differences in tax 
structures, ownership restrictions, and transaction costs
154
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
can also cause market segmentation (Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986), Hietala (1989), Bergstrom et al., (1993), Bailey 
and Jagtiani (1994), Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995)). If 
markets are not completely integrated due to the presence 
of such imperfections, it is questionable whether firms 
face the perfectly elastic demand curve normally assumed 
under perfect capital markets. Contrary to the assumption 
of a perfectly elastic demand curve, empirical evidence 
supporting this notion has been generated by Kraus and 
Stoll (1972), Scholes (1972) and Bagwell (1991), among 
others. Faced with a downward sloping demand curve firms 
can reduce the price pressure effects that can result from 
the issuance of additional shares by conducting global 
issues since the activities associated with these issues 
can create additional demand for the new shares. The 
argument that explains global issues based on the above 
notion of finite price elasticity is straight forward, 
based on simple supply and demand considerations. A large 
supply of shares would depress the price, the magnitude of 
which is determined by how binding is the constraint of 
foreign participation which depends upon market 
imperfections or the degree of segmentation.
It is doubtful whether tax differences or ownership 
restrictions are meaningful considerables in the context
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of Mexico. The tax treatment of nonresidents who invest 
in Mexican securities is favorable both for individuals 
and for corporate investors. There is no capital gains 
tax on the sale of shares and dividends paid by Mexican 
corporations are exempt from withholding tax. Also, 
nonresidents investing in Mexican stock exchange 
securities are not required to file any kind of Mexican 
tax return.29 In regards to the issue of ownership 
restrictions, foreign investors can freely acquire any B 
series shares or any of the other series to the limit 
dictated by Mexican securities rules and regulations. A 
global issue cannot circumvent the limit for any of the 
different series.
All else equal, higher transaction costs on the Bolsa 
would make purchasing shares through a global issue a more 
attractive proposition for US investors. Since 1991 
brokerage costs on Bolsa have decreased significantly 
(exact figures are given op page 35 in chapter 2) but 
execution costs still differ between the NYSE and the 
Bolsa. A study by Korn (1997) finds that as ADR trading 
price increases, relative execution costs become 
significantly lower on the NYSE than on the Bolsa. As the
29 In fact, tax arguments alone would make investment in Mexican 
securities more attractive to Mexican nationals than for US investors 
(Domowitz et al., 1997).
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ADR trading price decreases, relative execution costs on 
Bolsa become more competitive and in some cases even lower 
than NYSE due to the enforcement of the NYSE minimum tick 
rule. Theoretical arguments aside, the absence of more 
conclusive empirical evidence on cost differentials and 
differences in direct issue costs (such as gross spread, 
expenses of the offering, capital requirements etc.) 
weakens the transaction costs argument to explain global 
issues. Chaplinsky et al. (1998) also conjecture that 
global issues might be partly motivated by companies 
desire to create a more heterogeneous shareholder base 
that can improve liquidity and reduce volatility in 
response to specific news events owing to different 
opportunities, tastes, or preferences of domestic and 
foreign investors. They also hypothesize that global 
issues allow the possibility of raising capital an more 
favorable terms by by-passing unfavorable demand 
conditions at home. This line of reasoning is based on 
the empirical observations that announcement date price 
reaction to new issues is positively related to recent 
stock market performance (Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Korajczyk, Lucas and Macdonald (1990)).
The next section reviews the seasoned equity issuance 
literature including previous empirical evidence. A brief
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discussion of studies that have examined the effects of 
international listing also follows. The overlap between 
this line of research and the present study is that for 
some companies in the sample the seasoned global equity 
offering also coincides with a firm's first listing 
abroad. The last section is a discussion of the results.
6.3 Announcement-Effects of Seasoned Common Stock Issues
Several hypotheses have been put forth to explain the 
significant negative price reaction surrounding 
announcements of seasoned equity offerings. Prominent 
among these are arguments based on the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) framework. In the Myers and Majluf model, managers 
arbitrage the market based on their private information, 
issuing a security when it is overpriced. Investors are 
unable to separate firms with favorable information from 
firms with unfavorable information. A negative reaction 
in response to new equity issues is viewed as a way for 
investors to hedge against this risk of adverse selection. 
Because debt is a fixed claim, it is less sensitive to 
changes in firm value as long as bankruptcy is avoided. 
More specifically, because investors are not able to 
assess the true value of the firm, including its new 
projects, due to information asymmetry, investors revise
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their expectations downward in response to news of a 
seasoned equity issue.
Miller and Rock's (1985) cash flow signaling 
hypothesis and Jensen's (1986) wasteful investment 
hypothesis also predict a negative reaction to new equity 
issues but are based on different lines of reasoning. In 
the Miller and Rock (1985) model any unanticipated issue 
of a security is a negative signal. More specifically, 
any unanticipated security that represents new financing 
conveys unfavorable information to the market as it 
implies a decline in operating cash flows relative to 
expectations. In this model expectations regarding the 
firm's level of planned investment and the value of the 
firm's assets are already formed (conditional on the 
current cash flow) and the only new piece of information 
is the unanticipated demand for cash.
Jensen's wasteful hypothesis is in contrast to Miller 
and Rock's model and assumes significant agency problems. 
In Jensen's view thus there is a tendency for managers to 
overinvest and cash must be monitored. An announcement of 
a stock issue has a negative impact on stock price since 
it represents an increase in the firm's demand for cash 
and the level of its planned investment. Debt issues 
differ from equity issues because numerous restrictions
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(in the form of covenants for bonds) accompany a debt 
issue. Thus, debt issues place more constraints on the 
firm and expose it to greater external monitoring. In 
both models the magnitude of the price decline is related 
to the size of the issue and equity issues that are used 
to retire debt (that is, do not represent new financing) 
should not experience any negative price reaction. 
Likewise a secondary offering of equity should not affect 
the firm's share price.
Scholes (1972) price pressure hypothesis, although 
not a behavioral model, is also used to explain the 
decline in stock price surrounding equity issue 
announcements. If markets are incomplete and there are no 
perfect substitutes for a firm's securities, then firms 
face a downward sloping demand curve for their securities. 
Therefore, any increase in the number of shares caused by 
a seasoned equity offering results in a permanent decrease 
in stock price. A related version of the price pressure 
hypothesis is the transaction cost hypothesis which 
predicts a temporary price reduction as a form of discount 
to compensate investors for the transaction costs they 
incur in rebalancing their portfolios to absorb the new 
shares.
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Asquith and Mullins (1986) document a -3.2 percent 
statistically significant announcement day effect in 
response to seasoned equity issues that is also 
economically meaningful since in terms of the loss in firm 
value this translates into a 31 percent offering dilution 
(that is, the loss in firm value as a percentage of the 
funds raised in the primary offering). A statistically 
significant negative announcement day occurs even for 
secondary offerings (in which the firm receives no 
proceeds from the sale) suggests that the type of security 
is the main determinant of the price response. Further, 
they find that the negative market reaction is not due to 
any changes in financial leverage or capital structure.30 
The authors find the magnitude of the price decline to be 
related to the size of equity issue which they interpret 
to be consistent both with the asymmetric information and 
the price-pressure hypothesis. Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986) also find a significant -3.56 percent (two day) 
announcement day effect. They do not find any
relationship between stock price effects and the net 
amount of new financing or the size of the offering, a 
result that is not consistent with the Miller and Rock
30 Therefore the argument that because of the tax advantages of debt, a 
decrease in financial leverage causes the stock price to decline does 
not hold.
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model. They also find that for completed offerings, the 
average returns are positive for the period between the 
announcement and the issuance day. They contend that 
positive post-announcement returns increase the likelihood 
of managers completing the proposed offering. They 
interpret the -0.7 percent issuance day effect as 
reflecting the resolution of uncertainty regarding the 
outcome of the proposed offering. Similar negative 
announcement effects are also reported by Masulis and 
Korwar (1986) and Barclay and Litzenberger (1988).
6.4 Private Placements of Equity
The seasoned global equity offerings examined in this 
chapter include 144A equity offerings. Rule 144A private 
placement offerings refer to the sale of debt or equity by 
foreign issuers to qualified institutional buyers (QIB), 
that is, institutions that own and invest on a 
discretionary basis at least $100 million. A Level I 
program can be established together with a 144A program 
but ADRs listed on either NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ cannot 
conduct a private placement of equity. Presently, there 
are more than 3,000 QIBs. The 144A market is
predominantly a debt market. There are some important 
differences between the 144A private placements considered 
in this study and the private placements that have been
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investigated in the literature. A discussion of these 
differences is preceded by a review of the literature on 
private placement.
Wruck (1989) and Hertzel and Smith (1993) find the 
announcement of a sale of private equity is associated 
with a positive share price response. Wruck (1989) finds 
significant announcement period abnormal returns on the 
order of positive 4.4 percent in sharp contrast to the 
decline in stock price associated with issuance of public 
equity offerings. The majority of the private sales in 
Wruck' s sample have only one purchaser (with the average 
block size being 19.6 percent of the voting securities) 
even though SEC regulations allow up to 30 purchasers in a 
private sale. The willingness of a non-management 
investor to bear a large amount of firm specific risk by 
buying a block of securities conveys positive information 
to the market. Wruck also attributes the positive stock 
price response to the sale of private equity to changes in 
ownership concentration, where the positive abnormal stock 
returns reflect the expected benefits of increased 
monitoring. A greater level of ownership concentration 
increases firm value if the blockholders can ensure more 
efficient use of resources through their increased 
ownership or the increased probability of a takeover that
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aligns the interests of the manager with those of 
shareholders.31 Non-management holdings increase by 
approximately 7 percent whereas management holdings
decrease by approximately 15 percent subsequent to the 
sale of private equity.
Hertzel and Smith (1993) also find private placements 
are associated with positive abnormal returns even though 
equity is sold at substantial discounts. Their research 
extends the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by adding 
private equity issuance as an additional choice to issuing 
public equity. In this framework, undervalued firms can 
resort to a private placement of equity as a means of 
avoiding a public equity issue without having to forego an 
investment opportunity because managers are able to reveal 
their private information through negotiations with an
outside investor. The discount reflects the information 
acquisition costs incurred by private investors to assess 
firm value and provides compensation for monitoring 
services provided by private investors. In contrast to 
Wruck, Hertzel and Smith find ownership structure effects
31 There is an increase in firm value when the level of concentration 
(after the sale) is low (0 to 5 percent) or high 25 percent).
There is a negative relation between fixm value and ownership
concentration for the intermediate range, as for this range the block- 
holders (non-management investors) do not have enough voting rights to 
influence the behavior of managers. That is, managers do not face the 
disciplinary effects of the market for corporate control. This result
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to be only of limited importance as an explanation for the 
positive abnormal returns associated with private 
placements. They find a substantial fraction of the 
placements involve multiple investors (as opposed to 
Wruck's finding of mainly single investors) and are 
essentially passive investments in which there is limited 
ability to affect firm performance directly. This effect 
is most pronounced for placements that involve 
institutional or foreign buyers with the discount adjusted 
abnormal returns being the lowest for foreign placements. 
According to Hertzel and Smith, "for the smaller firms 
private sales of equity are primarily capital-raising 
events as opposed to ownership-restructuring events." 
Interestingly, they find negative returns preceding 
private placements instead of the positive share price 
run-up observed for public issues. They argue that this 
result is consistent with Lucas and Macdonald (1990) who 
model the share price run-up prior to a seasoned equity 
issue as a function of information asymmetry. More 
specifically, the observed price run-ups preceding public 
issues are due to the decisions of undervalued firms to 
postpone equity issues until the under-valuation vanishes.
Is the same as that reported by Stulz (1988) and Slovin and Sushka 
(1993).
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If private placements are a substitute for delaying public 
issues and help to resolve information asymmetry (in the 
Myers and Majluf sense) then no price run-ups need be 
observed for private placements.
Discussion with Bolsa officials suggests that 144A 
ADR offerings conform closely to the case of multiple 
buyers of private equity placements. However/ it is 
difficult to argue a priori that 144A ADR offerings should 
have a positive share price response. One of the main 
arguments for viewing a private placement as a positive 
event for firm value is that since investors value 
diversification they will take on an undiversified 
position only if they possess favorable information about 
the firm.
It is not clear whether the diversification of the 
large institutional investors involved in these 
transactions is affected by the size of the stakes they 
take. In fact, Hertzel and Smith find that the 
diversification of the large institutional investors is 
not materially affected by their participation in private 
placements. There is also some empirical evidence that 
suggests large institutional investors typically vote 
street rules, meaning that a bank or an insurance company, 
including one that has a current or a potential future
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relationship with the firm, will generally vote with 
management or abstain from voting. Even in the case of 
disagreements they may still vote with management or sell 
their holdings rather than vote against incumbent 
management (Pound, 1988). Under current rules and 
regulations fiduciary managers are not required to 
disclose their voting behavior to beneficial owners. Such 
observed patterns in the voting behavior of large 
institutions raises questions about the effectiveness of 
shareholder monitoring activities of these large 
blockholders. Similar conclusions are reached by Brickley 
et al. (1988) with the qualification that some pressure 
resistant institutions such as public pension funds, 
endowments, or foundations show a greater tendency to 
oppose management than other institutions such as banks, 
insurance companies, corporate pension funds, and 
brokerage houses etc. In contrast, corporate blockholders 
have a greater incentive to undertake monitoring 
activities because of possible takeover opportunities.
Thus, it is uncertain a priori whether 144A private 
placements will show a positive share price response due 
to the high concentration of large institutions in such 
offerings. Moreover, unlike private transactions with 
active investors, 144A placements involve multiple
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investors whose diversification is not likely to be 
affected materially by these transactions. Overall, there 
is little empirical support for the hypothesis that these 
investors provide effective monitoring services. 
Moreover, after the introduction of Rule 144A, 
institutions are no longer required to hold these 
securities for a period of two years or register them with 
the SEC in order to be able to resell private placement 
securities. Instead, they can be sold to any qualified 
144A institution. This liquidity is likely to reduce the 
extent of monitoring conducted by these institutions.
6.5 Effects of International Listing
There are some important differences between the 
seasoned global equity offerings considered in this study 
versus standard US offerings in terms of the (i) presence 
of a foreign tranche in these offerings and (ii) prior 
listing in an international market. All the seasoned 
global offerings in the sample include a domestic 
(Mexican) component that is similar to the firm commitment 
seasoned offerings that have been studied in the 
literature. The foreign tranche consists of either a 
public offering of equity on the NYSE/AMEX (that is, a 
Level III offering) or a private placement in the 144A 
market. Of the total 27 global offerings that comprise
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the sample, 16 companies conduct a public offering on the 
NYSE/AMEX while 11 conduct a private placement in the 144A 
market concurrently with a domestic offering. In addition 
to differences in the foreign tranche of these offerings, 
some companies already have prior listings in the US, in 
the form of Level I, Level II, or Level III program, while 
others do not. More specifically, 2 firms in the 144A 
category and 7 firms in the NYSE category had an 
established ADR program prior to the capital raising 
offering, mainly in the form of OTC trading. Thus, for 
some companies the global seasoned equity offering 
coincides with their initial entry (that is, a formal 
listing) in the US capital markets. The announcement 
effect observed for these companies will reflect the 
effects of both a seasoned equity offering as well as the 
initiation of an international listing. To have an 
appropriate benchmark, it is necessary to review the 
previous empirical evidence on effects of international 
listing on stock returns.
The benefits of an international listing include an 
enlarged investor base, increased international investor 
recognition, access to more extensive capital markets, and 
greater monitoring and certification. There is also a 
greater degree of transparency associated with US markets
169
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
because of the more stringent disclosure requirements. An 
international listing may also improve liquidity, that is, 
generate a lower bid-ask spread, because of increased 
inter-market competition among market makers. If spreads 
drop following a listing, the lower expected returns 
required by investors because of the reduction in
transaction costs should give rise to an increase in share 
value. This reasoning is based on the argument that
expected returns are an increasing function of liquidity 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) . Domowitz et al. (1996) find 
such a decline in the implicit bid ask spreads of Mexican 
firms that obtain an ADR listing in the US.
There are also substantial costs associated with an
international listing including listing fees, greater 
disclosure of information, costs incurred in complying 
with those standards of information as well as an increase 
in litigation potential due to these rules and the more 
stringent enforcement in the US. The above discussion 
implies that international listing should be associated 
with a positive share price response. This benefit to 
international listing is a signaling effect reflecting 
management's confidence in the firm's business prospects. 
Because of the penalty costs associated with the loss of a 
listing, the decision to list indicates management's
170
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
confidence in its future ability to meet the minimum
listing requirements of the foreign stock exchange. The 
magnitude of the share price response will also be related 
to the degree of market segmentation since the expected
benefits from an improvement in liquidity, an enlarged
investor base, or increased investor recognition will be
minimal if the two markets are well integrated.
Among the previous studies on international listing, 
a line of research has examined stock price reactions to 
US firms listing their shares abroad. Alexander et al. 
(1988), using monthly returns, find positive significant 
CARs in the pre-listing period (where t=0 denotes the 
month security starts trading in the US) and insignificant 
CARs in the listing period. They find this effect to be 
more pronounced for non-Canadian firms than Canadian 
firms. Jayaraman et al. (1993) examine 95 foreign firms 
that began trading in the US in the form of ADRs. They 
find the ADR listing to be associated with positive 
abnormal returns. Foerster and Karolyi (1996) document 
similar results for a set of Canadian and European firms. 
However, this phenomenon represents a very different case 
from the focus of the present study which is the entry of 
an emerging market firm into a well developed and more
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transparent capital market.32 A somewhat more comparable 
set of studies examines the impact on stock returns of 
listing by foreign firms, generally European in the US. 
The current study differs from previous studies not only 
in terms of the domicile of the firms but also in terms of 
the event itself which is a seasoned global equity 
offering, that is a securities issuance event, and not 
merely an international listing of existing shares.
6.6 Empirical Results
The data for this chapter were obtained from the 
Bolsa, the Bank of New York and Bankers Trust. The Bolsa 
maintains figures on foreign placement but does not 
maintain a clear distinction between NYSE/AMEX public 
offerings vs. 144A private placement offerings. The ADR 
department of Bank of New York was instrumental in 
preparing a list of all capital raising Mexican ADRs, with 
both the market and the date of issuance clearly 
identified. Bankers Trust permitted the use of their ADR 
database to search information on the starting dates for 
ADR programs of all Mexican firms irrespective of whether 
it was a capital raising issue or not. This made it
32 For brevity, only the literature closest in spirit to the present 
study is discussed here. Some of the literature on the valuation 
effects of listing by US firms abroad as well as effects on stock 
returns of a firm changing its domestic trading place is discussed in
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possible to identify firms that had an ADR program prior 
to the global equity issue. The global issue sample in 
this study is smaller them the complete set of global 
offerings by Mexican firms between 1989 and 1995 mainly 
due to the exclusion of non-industrial firms (financials 
and utilities) from the sample to maintain comparability 
across different subgroups. Prior research establishes 
that at the announcement date, share price reactions for 
equity issues by utilities (Asquith and Mullins (1986), 
Masulis and Korwar (1986)) and banks (Polenchek, Slovin, 
and Sushka (1989)) differ from those reported from 
industrials. It should be noted that most studies dealing 
with international listing of firms in the US use the 
first trading date as the event date, a departure from 
typical event studies that focus on detecting abnormal 
returns around particular announcement dates. In part, 
this is because information on the decision to list or 
application dates is rarely published in major newspapers.
Table 6.1 presents information on the number of 
domestic and global (with a foreign tranche on the 
NYSE/AMEX or 144A) seasoned offerings on Bolsa between 
1989 and 1997.33 While the total number of seasoned
the introduction as a way of alluding to the differences between the 
present study and the literature.
33 Bolsa officials were not able to provide figures for 1991.
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Table 6.1
Public Firm Commitment: and Rights Offerings on 
the Bolsa Between 1989 and 1997.
This table presents the number of Public Firm Commitment and Rights offerings 
on Bolsa between 1989 and 1997. The total number of public firm commitment 
offerings in a given year is given in column two. The public firm commitment 
offerings are broken down in terms of global (NYSE/AMEX or 144A) and purely 
domestic offerings. The number of rights offerings is given in the last 
column. The number in parenthesis is the number of observations for which 
data was available to be included in the sample. Bolsa officials were not 
able to provide comprehensive figures for Public firm commitment offerings in 
1991.
Tear Public Offerings with Securities 
currently Quoted in  Stock
Humber of Rights 
Offering
Total Global Domestic
1989 — — — —
















1995 1 0 1 31
1996 16 6(6) 10(5) 18
1997 6 2 4 29
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offerings in any given year is less than 20, it should be 
noted that the total number of firms trading on the Bolsa 
has been about 200 over this time period. It is clear 
from table 6.1 that the dominant form of raising capital 
in Mexico is rights offerings. There were almost no 
seasoned equity offerings on the Bolsa for the year 1995, 
a consequence of the 1994 Peso devaluation. Table 6.2 
gives a more detailed breakdown of the global issues in 
terms of whether the foreign tranche included a public 
offering on NYSE/AMEX (this subset of global offerings is 
referred to as the NYSE sample) or a private placement in 
the 144A market (referred to as the 144A subgroup) .
There were a total of 31 global offerings by Mexican 
firms between 1989 and 1997 compared to 40 domestic 
offerings. The 275 rights offerings for the same period 
far outnumber the firm commitment seasoned offerings. 
Over the entire period the number of domestic offerings 
is greater than the number of global issues except for 
1994 when there were eight global and only three domestic 
offerings. The number of global offerings is evenly 
distributed over the years showing a sustained trend 
rather than a concentration in a particular year. There 
is approximately an equal number of NYSE and 144A 
offerings in any given year during the sample period
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Table 6.2
A Breakdown of Seasoned Equity Offerings on 
Bolsa by Kind and Year.
This table presents the number of global and domestic seasoned offerings as well as the number of rights offerings on the Mexican Stock Exchange between
1990 and 1997. The global issues are further broken down into NYSE/AMEX 
(Public) offerings and 144A (Private placements offerings). The figures for1991 are not comprehensive.
Year Public Offerings w i t h  Securities currently 




(that is, total of Global and 
Domestic)








1990 0 0 0 2 2 32
1991 2 4 6 — 6 40
1992 2 3 5 9 14 41
1993 2 2 4 11 15 44
1994 7 1 8 3 11 40
1995 0 0 0 1 1 31
1996 4 2 6 10 16 18
1997 0 2 2 4 6 29
Tota1 17 14 31 40 71 275
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except for 1994 when there were seven NYSE offerings but 
only one 144A offering. Overall, there were 17 NYSE and 
14 144A global offerings. Referring back to table 6.1, it 
is clear that the composition (16 NYSE and 11 144A) and 
distribution of the sample is reflective of the overall 
distribution of the global issues.
Table 6.3 presents information on the average 
(median) issue size for domestic and global seasoned 
issues as well as for rights offerings. This table also 
reports the average (median) issue size of the foreign 
tranche and the proportion of proceeds raised abroad. A 
comparison of the global and domestic issues in terms of 
issue size (average or median proceeds) reveals that the 
global issues are much larger than the domestic issues. 
The difference in issue size between the two groups is 
large; for example, the average (median) issue size for 
global issues in 1992 was 1907.7 (972.0) million new pesos 
while for domestic issues the figure for the same year is 
572.9 (224.6) million new pesos. With the exception of
1997, the average (median) issue size of the global issues 
is at least twice as large the average issue size of the 
domestic issues. In comparison, rights offerings are 
smaller than both the domestic and global firm-commitment
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Table 6.3
Gross Proceeds from Global and Domestic Firm-Comnltment 
Seasoned Equity Issues, and Rights Offerings.
Domestic Issues are firm-commi tment equity issues offered only in Mexico. 
Global equity issues are firm-conmitment equity issues offered in Mexico and 
one or more foreign markets. N denotes the number of issues in a given year 
for which the relevant data was available. Average proceeds is the amount 
raised abroad in a global issue and percent foreign proceeds is the percentage 
of foreign proceeds to the total amount raised in a global issue. Proceeds 
are in 000,000 N$. There was only a single domestic offering in 1995 (a









Average % Pozeign Proceeds 
(Median)
MT8B 144A Total




































1990 2 40.6 40.6
1991
1992 8 572.9 224.6
1993 5 269.3 92.7
1994 2 321.8 321.8
1996 5 203.2 154.7
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issues although the total amount of capital raised, in 
general, is greater through rights offerings.
With respect to foreign proceeds both in peso terms 
as well as a percentage of the total gross proceeds, table 
6.3 shows that the foreign tranche is typically a 
significant portion of the overall issue. Generally, the 
underwriting contract does not specify that a certain 
number of shares must be sold abroad and instead is a 
discretionary variable that can be altered by the 
syndicate members in response to investor demand. Thus, 
the number of shares can be moved from one market to the 
other (that is, between the domestic and international 
markets) in response to changes in economic or political 
conditions if the need arises. The percentage of total 
proceeds accounted for by foreign proceeds (foreign 
proceeds divided by the total gross proceeds) ranges 
annually between 54.4 (54.6) to 82.7 (82.7) percent.
Thus, it is the foreign tranche that assumes greater 
significance relative to the domestic component in a 
global equity offering. This result holds for both NYSE 
offerings and 144A offerings. The percentage of foreign 
proceeds ranges from 56.9 (54.8) to 71.2 (71.2) percent
for the NYSE offerings and it ranges from 42.3 (42.3) to
82.7 (82.7) percent for the 144A offerings. This evidence
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underscores the importance of the global equity markets to 
the capital raising efforts of the Mexican firms that 
conduct firm commitment offerings.
Table 6.4 presents information on offer price, gross 
proceeds, and proportion of foreign proceeds, adjusted for 
inflation, for the firms present in the sample categorized 
by different sub-groups. The test for differences between 
the groups is performed using a t-test of the difference 
in means and a Kruskal-Wallis chi-square test (results for 
Wilcoxon signed rank test were very similar and therefore 
not reported) . The mean (median) offer prices for the 
NYSE, 144A and domestic offerings are 29.86 (22.84), 26.64 
(19.2) and 5.06 (4.73) N$, respectively. The offer price 
for the NYSE sub-group is not statistically different from 
the offer price of the 144A sub-group. The offer price of 
purely domestic offerings is significantly lower and
statistically different from the NYSE and the 144A groups. 
To avoid any effects of inflation, all calculations for 
proceeds (both gross proceeds as well as foreign proceeds) 
were conducted by first expressing all the data in terms 
of the purchasing power of December 1996. The mean
(median) gross proceeds for the NYSE and 144A sub-groups 
are 2,793 (866) and 2,216 (1,210) million N$,
respectively. The median issue size for the 144A sample
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Seasoned Equity Issuance Descriptive Statistics
This table presents information on the offer price, the amount raised in the offering, the amount raised in different 
market and the percentage of foreign proceeds. Distinction is made between domestic and global offerings, with the
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NYSE 16 29.86 22.84 25.83 1 3.63 99.60
144A 11 26.64 19.20 23.91 3.01 78.00
Domestic 6 5.06 4.73 2.84 I 1.82 9.00

















NYSE 12 2,793.11 866.01 3,978.64 95.14 11,711.29
144A 7 2,216.52 1,210.98 2,585.43 522.51 7,825.19
Domestic 6 158.99 154.13 52.17 99.30 235.91
































Grots Proceeds in Mexico (000,000 N$)
(adjusted for inflation)
NYSE 14 890.68 279.47 1,653.51 1 4.37 6,393.62144A 7 637.47 801.91 446.16 135.52 1,211.76
Domestic 6 158.99 154.13 52.17 | 99.30 235.91













Grosi Proceed* in US(adjusted for In000,000 NS)flation)
NYSE 14 1,565.86 416.82 2,575.75 1 27.18 9,148.90
144A 11 1,236.97 641.94 1,889.51 | 111.34 6,745.85







NYSE 12 61.41 55.47 19.34 1 28.57 98.00
14 4A 7 62.45 66.67 19.19 1 33.33 86.21









is greater than the NYSE sample but the difference between 
the two groups is not statistically significant either for 
the mean or the median. In contrast, the average (median) 
issue size for the domestic issues is only 154 million N$, 
statistically smaller than that of the NYSE and 144A 
groups. The percentage of proceeds from the foreign
tranche is nearly the same for the NYSE and 144A groups 
with the mean (median) figures being 61.41 (55.47) and
62.45 (66.67) percent for the two groups respectively, and 
these differences are not statistically significant.
Table 6.5 reports selected characteristics such as 
firm size, riskiness, and measures of growth opportunities 
of these firms to assess the factors that influence a
firm's decision to issue equity abroad. Firms that issue 
equity on NYSE have the highest market capitalization 
among the three groups with a mean (median) of 7312.3 
(3692.5) million N$. In comparison, the market
capitalization of 144A and domestic issues is 4588.7 
(2814.4) and 4896.3 (338.6) million N$, respectively. The 
differences between the market capitalization of NYSE and 
144A issues are not statistically significant for either 
the mean or the median. However, the median
capitalization of domestic issues is significantly smaller 
than that of both the NYSE and 144A issues. The Kruskal-
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Table 6.5
Selected Characteristics of Firms Mating 
Global and Domestic Equity Offerings.
The first row gives means and the second row in parenthesis gives medians. The figures reported are averages for the year prior to issue. Market capitalization is found by multiplying the price of each series by its 
respective number of shares outstanding and then adding these sums up. The 
figures for Peta, volatility (standard deviation of returns) and marketability 
index where provided directly by Bolsa. The Marketability Index is defined by 
Bolsa as an indicator which measures the rate at which a corporation's shares 
are negotiated in the in the securities market with relation to tradeability.
Variable Global Issues Domestic Issue
HTSK 144A
Market 7312.3 4588.7 4896.3Capitalization (3692.5) (2814.4) (338.6)
(000,000 N$)
Age of the firm in 27.1 26.2 28.6
years at the time (21) (13) (18)
of the Seasoned 
Equity Issuance
Peta Coefficient 0.6 1.5 0.5
(0.4) (0.8) (0.3)
Volatility 35.1 36.9 29.1
(30.1) (36.6) (27.1)
P/E 21.9 11.8 27.6
(21.7) (11.2) (19-0)
P/BV 3.0 2.3 1.6
(2.7) (2.0) (1.2)
Marketability 6.8 6.9 5.5
Index (6.8) (7.1) (6.1)
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Wallis chi-square has a value of 6.26 (p value 0.0123) for 
the domestic-NYSE comparison and 3.7915 (p value 0.0515) 
for the domestic-144A comparison. The median age (as 
measured at the time of the seasoned equity issuance) is 
highest for the NYSE issues with a mean (median) of 27.1 
(21) years. The median age of the 144A issues is a much 
lower 13 years. There is no statistical difference 
between the betas, the degree of systematic risk between 
the three groups, the P/E ratio which is a proxy for 
growth opportunities, is highest for the NYSE issues with 
a mean (median) value of 21.9 (21.7) . In comparison, the 
mean (median) P/E ratio for the 144A issues is 11.8 (11.2) 
and is statistically different (t-value 2.9517, Kruskal-- 
Wallis 4.7779) from that of the NYSE issues at the 5 
percent level.
The above results have several important 
implications. First, there is a notable statistically 
significant difference in the market capitalization of 
firms that conduct the global versus domestic equity 
issues Second, within the category of global issues, firms 
that choose to issue on NYSE are better established (in 
terms of higher age) and yet have greater investment 
opportunities than firms that issue on 144A. Discussion 
with officials of the Bank of New York also point to the
185
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fact that relatively younger companies generally start 
with an 144A offering or a Level I listing before 
upgrading to a Level III program. These results suggest 
that global equity issue's differ from domestic issuers 
largely in terms of scale and to a lesser degree, age. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that there 
are important economies of scale in information 
production. These results also been a similarity to the 
results for initial public offerings which indicated low 
underpricing and no deterioration in long-run stock price 
or operating performance among all three sub-groups of 
Mexican firms. From a firm life cycle perspective, it 
seems apparent that it is not quality per se that 
distinguishes global issues from domestic issues. Instead, 
it is a stage in the life-cycle of the firm with only 
large, well established firms conducting global issues.
6.7 Share Price Effects of Global Equity Offerings
The expected returns for equity offerings are 
calculated using the market model. For security j, the 
abnormal return using the market model is calculate as 
follows:
ARjt - Rjt ~ (ctj + |3jRipc,t) 
where ARjt is the abnormal return of security j for a day 
t, Rjt is the actual return of security j for a day t, and
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Rirc,t is the return on the IPC index on day t. The 
coefficients Oj and (Sj are ordinary least square estimates 
of intercept and slope, respectively, from a market model 
estimated from day -195 to -76, relative to issuance day.
Table 6.6 presents the excess returns for global 
equity issues, that is, including both NYSE and the 144A 
issues. For the 27 global issues, the day 0 (where 0 is 
the issuance day) excess return is -2.60 percent and is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level (z-
statistic of -3.99); 85 percent of the returns are
positive. This result is similar to the negative issuance 
day effect observed for seasoned equity offerings in the 
United States although the magnitude is much greater for 
Mexican global issues than for US issues (Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986) . This result is consistent with both the 
price pressure or transaction costs hypotheses discussed 
earlier. The group of purely domestic offerings also 
shows a similar negative price response on the issuance 
day, with an excess return of -3.796 percent,
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (z-
statistic of -2.227); 67 percent of returns are negative.
It is difficult to isolate the announcement effect 
for global equity issues as these announcements are not 
reported in major publications and the time period
187
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Table 6.6
Excess Returns for Global (NYSE/AMEX or 144A)
Equity Issues
Excess returns (in percent) at the issuance of seasoned equity issues by 
Mexican firms in Mexico and one or more foreign markets (that is NYSE/AMEX or 144A), concurrently. Excess returns are calculated using the market model 
where the parameters are estimated using a least squares regression over a 
pre-announcement interval (-195 to -76) where t » 0 is the issuance date.
R-27 (saxpie size)
Day Relative to 
Event
Average Car (%) E-stat±stic Percent Positive 
CARs
-5 -0.09 0.19 35.00
-4 -0.48 -0.43 35.00
-3 -0.59 -0.82 35.00
-2 -1.16 -1.87 20.00
-1 -0.02 0.19 40.00
0 -2.60 -3.99** 15.00
1 0.29 0.64 50.00
2 0.38 0.82 65.00
3 -0.14 -0.05 40.00
4 -0.62 -1.01 25.00
5 -0.30 -0.64 40.00
Average CARs for Selected Intervals
Interval for 
Trading Dags
Average Car (%) E-statistic Percent Positive 
CARs
(-75 to -50) 0.92 0.46 40.00
(-50 to -30) -3.15 -1.80 25.00
(-30 to -15) -4.20 -1.94 30.00
(-15 to - 5) -1.15 -0.59 35.00
(- 5 to + 5) -4.51 -1.93 35.00
(- 2 to + 2) -2.73 -1.76 20.00
(- 1 to 0) -2.61 -2.70** 15.00
(-75 to - 5) -7.79 -1.97* 20.00
(-30 to - 5) -5.32 -1.93 25.00
(-50 to - 5) -8.46 -2.72** 15.00
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
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involved in establishing an ADR program and the start of 
trading can range from 7 weeks for a 144A program to 
nearly 14 weeks for a Level III (NYSE) program. Lacking a 
precise estimate of the trading days between initial
announcement and issuance, excess returns are calculated 
over broad intervals to obtain some measure of the
announcement effect. As mentioned earlier, this is a 
problem common to most studies dealing with listings by 
foreign firms in the US. The excess returns for the
intervals (-50 to -30) and (-30 to -15) are -3.15 percent 
and -4.20 percent, respectively but are only marginally 
significant (z-statistics are -1.80 and -1.94, 
respectively). Despite the lack of statistical
significance the returns are clearly negative with nearly 
75 percent of the events being negative. A result that 
stands out in Table 6.6 is the strongly negative share 
price effect of -8.46 percent for the interval (-50 to -5) 
with a z-statistic of -2.72; 85 percent of returns are
negative. These negative returns are likely to reflect 
the negative response to the initial announcement, a 
result that is consistent with the existing literature.
Since the nature of the NYSE and 144A markets are 
different, we disaggregate global issues into NYSE issues 
(public offerings) and 144A issues (private placements) to
189
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obtain additional insight about stock price response to 
global seasoned equity offerings. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 
present the excess returns for the NYSE and 144A issues, 
respectively. The day 0 issuance effects are both 
negative. Specifically, both groups show a negative 
issuance day effect that is statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level. The NYSE group shows modest evidence 
of a negative announcement day effect as can be seen by 
the excess returns over various intervals such as (-75 to 
-50) and (-50 to -30) . This suggests that Mexican 
investors suffer a loss of wealth in response to the 
announcement of a NYSE equity issue. The 144A issues show 
less evidence of a negative announcement effect. The 
excess return for (-75 to -50) is 1.55 with a z-static of 
0.01 percent; 50.0 percent of the returns are negative. 
The excess return for the (-50 to -30) interval is 
negative, -2.09 percent, but not statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. Thus Mexican investors sustain a 
sharp reduction in wealth in response to the issuance of a 
144A type issue equity issue, but less evidence of a 
negative announcement effect.
These results are consistent with arguments made 
earlier about the benefits of a global listing. The NYSE 
sample consists of firms that are either establishing an
190
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Table 6.7
Excess Returns for Equity Issues with 
a Foreign Tranche on the NYSE/AMEX.
Excess returns (in percent) at the issuance of seasoned equity for issues that include a foreign tranche on the NYSE/AMEX (a Level III public offerings), in 
addition to the domestic component. Excess returns are calculated using the 
market model where the parameters are estimated using a least squares 
regression over a pre-announcement interval (-195 to -76) where t * 0 is the 
Issuance date. ______________________ _________________H»16 (sample size)
Day Relative to 
Event
Average Car (%) E-statistic Percent Positive CARs
-5 0.31 1.18 33.33
-4 -0.83 -0.67 25.00
-3 -0.98 -1.38 25.00
-2 -1.38 -1.56 25.00
-1 0.37 0.52 41.67
0 -3.11 -3.41** 25.00
1 0.28 0.64 66.67
2 0.19 0.25 66.67
3 -0.76 -1.26 25.00
4 -0.82 -1.04 33.33
5 -0.64 -1.04 33.33
Average CARs for Selected Intervals
Interval for Trading Days Average Car (%)
E-statistic Percent Positive 
CARs
(-75 to -50) 0.50 0.58 33.33
(-50 to -30) -3.85 -1.74 25.00
(-30 to -15) -3.78 -0.86 33.33
(-15 to - 5) 2.14 1.41 58.33
(- 5 to + 5) -6.07 -2 .11* 25.00
(- 2 to + 2) -3.30 -1.50 16.67
(- 1 to 0) -2.84 -2.09* 8.33
(-75 to - 5) -5.03 -0.56 25.00
(-30 to - 5) -1.94 0.19 33.33
(-50 to - 5) -5.70, -1.12 16.67
* Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 1% level.
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Table 6.8
Excess Returns for Equity Issues with a Foreign 
Tranche in the 144A Private Placement Market.
Excess returns (in percent) at the issuance of seasoned equity for issues 
that include a foreign tranche in the 144A. Market (private placement), in addition to the domestic component. Excess returns are calculated using the 
market model where the parameters are estimated using a least squares regression over a pre-announcement interval (-195 to -76) where t ■ 0 is the 
issuance date. _______________  _______________
^ 1 1  (sasqple size)
Day Relative to 
■vent
Average Car (%) Z-statistic Percent Positive CARs
-5 -0.55 -0.98 37.50
-4 -0.08 0.08 50.00
-3 -0.09 0.33 50.00
-2 -0.90 -1.07 12.50
-1 -0.52 -0.29 37.50
0 -1.71 -2.13* 00.00
1 0.32 0.21 25.00
2 0.66 1.01 62.50
3 0.65 1.34 62.50
4 -0.36 -0.35 12.50
5 0.19 0.25 50.00
Average CARs for Selected Intervals
Interval for 
Trading Days Average Car (%)
Z-statistic Percent Positive CARs
(-75 to -50) 1.55 0.01 50.00
(-50 to -30) -2.09 -0.72 25.00
(-30 to -15) -4.83 -2 .02* 25.00
(-15 to - 5) -5.65 -2.55* 00.00
(- 5 to + 5) -2.16 -0.47 50.00
(- 2 to + 2 ) -1.89 -0.95 25.00
(- 1 to 0) -2.23 -1.71 25.00
(-75 to - 5) -11.94 -2.43* 12.50
(-30 to - 5) -10.39 -3.29** 12.50
(-50 to - 5) -12.60 -2.93** 12.50
* Significant at 5% level.
** significant at 1% level.
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ADR program for the first time (their first listing) or 
upgrading from a lower level program. Both of these 
events are positive events and reveal sufficient favorable 
information about the firm to counter much of the adverse 
selection problem typical of a seasoned equity issue 
announcements. This reflects a combination of the 
following factors (i) management's confidence that the 
future prospects of the firm are sufficient to induce 
international holders to invest (ii) the certification of 
the high quality of these firms provided by global issue 
and (iii) the benefits from an international listing. 
Since equity issuance announcements typically have a 
strong negative effect, the lack of a statistically 
significant negative announcement effect confirms that 
there are modest gains to Mexican firms from securing a 
listing in the US. The existence of such an effect may be 
more difficult to argue for a simple Level I listing 
(trading on OTC) due to the relative ease (lowest costs) 
of establishing such a program and the little increase in 
the disclosure of information it requires. The majority 
of ADR programs are in fact Level I programs. The 144A 
issues also show little evidence of negative announcement 
effects.
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Finally, we disaggregate the sample based on the 
absence or presence of a prior listing at the time of the 
global issue the results for which are presented in table 
6.9 and 6.10. Both categories show a negative day 
issuance day effect, significant at the 5 percent level 
and similar returns for the announcement period. Overall, 
the results on share price response to global issue 
suggest that there are not strong gains to international 
listing (more specifically for Mexican firms listing in 
the US).
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Table 6.9
Excess Returns for Global (NYSE/AMEX or 144A)
Equity Issues with no Prior Listing Abroad
Excess returns (in percent) for seasoned global (NYSE/AMEX or 144A) issues 
that were not traded on either the OTC, NASDAQ or NYSE/AMEX. The seasoned equity issuance coincides with the entry of these firms in the international 
markets. Excess returns are calculated using the market model where the parameters cure estimated using a least squares regression over a pre- 
announcement interval (-195 to -76) where t ■ 0 is the issuance date._______
V*15 (sanq>le size)
Day Relative to 
Event
Average Car (%) Z-statistle Percent Positive 
CARs
-5 0.22 0.74 45.56
-4 -0.38 0.24 36.36
-3 0.33 1.41 45.46
-2 -1.79 -2.56* 18.18
-1 -0.20 0.27 45.46
0 -2.20 -2.56* 9.09
1 0.75 1.35 45.46
2 0.37 0.49 54.55
3 -0.18 -0.001 45.46
4 -0.28 -0.34 18.18
5 -0.98 -1.50 27.27
Average CARs for Selected Intervals
Interval for 
Trading Days
Average Car (%) Z-statistio Percent Positive 
CARs
(-75 to -50) 3.41 1.27 54.55
(-50 to -30) -3.40 -1.08 27.27
(-30 to -15) -4.92 -2 .12* 18.18
(-15 to - 5) 0.51 1.08 36.36
(- 5 to + 5) -3.51 -0.64 36.36
{- 2 to + 2) -2.64 -1.25 18.18
(- 1 to 0) -2.38 -1.63 18.18
(-75 to - 5) -5.45 -0.65 27.27
(-30 to - 5): -4i60 -1.13 18.18
(-50 to - 5) -8.33 -1.67 18.18* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
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Table 6.10
Excess Returns for Global (NYSE/AMEX or 144A) Equity 
Issues with a prior international listing, in the form 
of a Level I, Level II or Level III ADR program.
Excess returns (in percent) for seasoned global (NYSE/AMEX or 144A) issues 
that have a prior international listing. These firms were already listed on the OTC or one of the exchange at the of the seasoned equity issuance.
Excess returns are calculated using the market model where the parameters are 
estimated using a least squares regression over a pre-announcement interval 
(-195 to -76) where t » 0 is the issuance date.___________________________
H-12 (MU>le size)
Day Relative to 
Event
Average Car (%) S-statistie Percent Positive CARs
-5 -0.56 -0.59 22.22
-4 -0.63 -0.97 33.33
-3 -1.77 -2.83** 22.22
-2 -0.21 0.18 22.22
-1 0.21 -0.01 33.33
0 -3.03 -3.11** 22.22
1 -0.21 -0.49 55.56
2 0.38 0.67 77.78
3 -0.09 -0.07 33.33
4 -0.88 -1.05 33.33
5 0.31 0.53 55.56
Average CARs for Selected Intervals
Interval for 
Trading Days
Average Car (%) E-statistic Percent Positive 
CARs
(-75 to -50) -2.12 -0.72 22.22
(-50 to -30) -2.83 -1.49 22.22
(-30 to -15) -3.32 -0.55 44.44
(-15 to - 5) -2.98 -1.99 33.33
(- 5 to + 5) -5.73 -2.17* 33.33
(- 2 to + 2 ) -2.84 -1.25 22.22
(- 1 to 0 ) -2.87 -2 .2 1* 11.11
(-75 to - 5) -10.66 -2 .22* 11.11
(-30 to - 5) -6.20 -1.64 33.33
(-50 to - 5) -8.63 -2 .2 1** 11.11* Significant at the 5% level.** Significant at the 1% level.
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Chapter 7: Summary and Concluding Remarks
This dissertation examines the equity issuance 
process, both initial public offerings as well as seasoned 
equity offerings, in the context of international equity 
offerings. Specifically, this study considers equity 
offerings by Mexican firms over the period 1989 to 1997 
that included a foreign tranche in the US (NYSE/AMEX or 
144A) in addition to the domestic component in Mexico. 
Despite the internationalization of capital markets and 
the accompanying increased interest in US ownership of 
foreign stock, this line of research remains relatively 
unexplored mainly due to lack of availability of data. 
Moreover, there is little empirical evidence and few 
published studies of the Mexican market about some of the 
well documented stylized facts of equity issuance such as 
IPO underpricing, long run stock price underperformance, 
and share price response to seasoned equity offerings. 
This study uses data that has only recently been made 
public by the Bolsa de Valores. In the process, it allows 
an assessment of the robustness of current theoretical 
models of equity issuance (both IPOs and seasoned equity) 
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A Mexican firm going public or issuing seasoned 
equity has a choice of making a purely domestic offering 
or simultaneously raising capital outside the home 
jurisdiction by making an American Depositary Receipt 
(ADR) offering. Further, it has a choice of making a 
Level III ADR offering (a public offering) or a 144A 
(private placement offering), which differ in terms of 
trading venue, the requirement to comply with US Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, and the level of 
continuing disclosure.
This dissertation provides empirical evidence on 
several interesting questions raised by such corporate 
choices within the equity issuance process such as (i) 
whether there is a separating or pooling equilibrium in 
terms of firm quality, offering venue (domestic or 
global), and the type of international offering (Level III 
public offering or 144A private placement issue) and (ii) 
the effects of international listing on firm valuation. 
More specifically, the objective of this study is to 
examine underpricing, aftermarket stock price and 
operating performance of ADR IPOs compared to a control 
group of domestic IPOs, and the share price response to 
seasoned global issues. A distinction is maintained 
between Level III and 144A placements for the ADR issues.
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Certain unique institutional characteristics of ADRs 
imply that the pricing, aftermarket performance, and share 
price response of equity issues (IPOs as well as seasoned) 
with a foreign tranche in the form of an ADR may be 
different from purely domestic offerings. ADR IPOs and 
ADR seasoned equity offerings are generally undertaken by 
large internationally known firms with substantial foreign 
income, including joint ventures with foreign companies. 
These ADR issues are typically associated with prestigious 
underwriters that are less inclined to conduct a global 
equity offer if a firm is not of the requisite quality or 
if the offer is not of sufficient size.
ADR issuers incur substantial costs such as listing 
fees and increased disclosure of information costs that 
are incurred in preparing accounting statements that 
accord with SEC rules and the US GAAP. In addition to the
signaling content of ADR issues, there are the benefits of
international listing that include an enlarged investor 
base, increased investor recognition as well a higher
degree of monitoring and certification. This suggests 
that, ADR IPOs and ADR seasoned equity offerings should 
show superior results (in terms of underpricing,
aftermarket stock price and operating performance, and 
share price response to seasoned equity issues) than
199
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purely domestic equity offerings. This argument becomes 
weaker in the context of 144A placements as the issues in 
this market are exempt from SEC registration and 
participation is limited to QIBs.
The empirical evidence is consistent with the above 
hypothesis. All three sub-groups NYSE, 144A and domestic 
IPOs show very modest underpricing with the median level 
of underpricing not exceeding 5 percent for any the sub­
groups. These results are robust to any industry effects, 
hot issue phenomena, or any firm characteristics such as 
age or issue size. This result is in contrast to the 
average fist day return of approximately 15 percent 
reported for the US and UK markets. However, this 
unusually low underpricing is consistent with the 
characteristics of Mexican firms. Sample firms are large 
and well established with long operating histories and 
high levels of family ownership concentration.
The difference between Mexican firms that go public 
versus US firms that go public is well illustrated by the 
fact that the mean age of domestic IPOs in Mexico is 16 
years (NYSE and 144A IPOs have even a higher age with mean 
figures of 35 and 30, respectively) compared to 6 years 
for the typical US firm. The results for the NYSE and 
144A IPOs are also explained by the above discussion on
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ADRs, since the inclusion of an ADR in the offering is a 
positive signal. The low underpricing observed for 
domestic IPOs is somewhat surprising considering the 
absence of a foreign tranche (and the related arguments) 
and the relatively smaller size of these companies. It is 
plausible that a listing on the Bolsa itself represents an 
important form of self selection, with only approximately 
200 firms trading on the Bolsa.
The poor long run stock price performance reported 
for the US market is not observed for the Mexican IPOs 
(NYSE, 144A or domestic issues) . This result is 
consistent with the results on underpricing in Mexico that 
suggest there is less information asymmetry and less 
likelihood of market timing by firms. The Mexican results 
are also consistent with the finding of Carter, Dark and 
Singh (1998) that long run underperformance is less 
pronounced for IPOs associated with more prestigious 
underwriters. Furthermore, Ritter (1991) in his study of 
long term performance finds that on partitioning 
aftermarket performance by age, firms older than 20 years 
have initial returns of 5.42 percent and do not show any 
long run stock price underperformance (in fact, they 
outperform the matching firms) .
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The results for operating performance do not show a 
peak in operating performance in the year prior to the 
initial public offering followed by a sharp subsequent 
decline for any of three subgroups (NYSE, 144A or 
domestic) . This implies that Mexican companies going 
public are not attempting to time the market. Such a 
timing action would be arguably futile in Mexico since 
firms that go public have (i) long operating histories and 
(ii) are less speculative than IPOs in the US. Therefore, 
there is less incentive for Mexican firms to engage in 
market timing or performance manipulation. Specifically, 
Mexican firms are distinctly different from many of the 
IPOs conducted in the US during the 1980' s that were 
dominated by firms in the computer, electronics, medical 
related, and oil and gas industries (Mikkelson et al., 
(1997)). The activities of firms in such areas entail 
growth options that are relatively difficult to price and 
hence such firms may be more likely candidates for over 
optimism by investors. Mexican results are also consistent 
with studies by Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al., 
(1997) who find the deterioration in operating performance 
to be concentrated in smaller, younger firms rather than a 
phenomenon characteristic of IPOs in general.
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Finally, results on share price responses to seasoned 
equity issues show that global issues differ from the 
domestic issues largely in terms of scale (market
capitalization) and to some degree in terms of the age of 
the issuing firm. From a firm life cycle perspective, 
global issues represent a mature stage in the life cycle 
of firms, that is such offerings are by relatively large, 
well established firms. The results suggest that there
are no significant gains for a US listing by Mexican firms
or from upgrading from a lower level program to a Level
III listing.
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